电力监管权力配置研究
本文选题:监管 切入点:电力监管 出处:《西南政法大学》2014年博士论文
【摘要】:中国国家电力监管委员会自2003年成立以来,一直处于监管无效的困境中,长期被大型电力企业架空权力,其执掌的电力行业市场化改革,迄今为止仍游离在电力行业的边缘地带。这种状态是导致我国电力行业效率低下、缺乏可持续发展能力的制度性原因之一。为了推进电力行业的市场化改革,提高电力行业的效率,增强电力行业的可持续发展能力,2013年的国务院机构改革,撤销了电监会,其电力监管职能被配置给了新组建的国家能源局。新国家能源局能走出原电监会监管无效的困境吗?或者,中国怎样才能摆脱电力监管无效的困境?从法学角度观察,这一中国现实问题的答案,依赖于对电力监管权力配置的基本理论问题的探寻:应该怎样合理乃至最优配置电力监管权力?或者,应该怎样配置电力监管权力,才具有正当性乃至具有更高的正当度?(正当的才是合理的,正当度越高,越优。) 本研究旨在为中国电力监管权力配置的优化(使之具有正当性乃至更高的正当度)提供法理基础及制度设计,在研究路径上分三步:首先,通过确立电力监管权力配置在理论上应然的正当状态,为中国电力监管权力配置的优化提供理论依据;其次,通过确立中国电力监管权力配置的实然状态,为优化中国电力监管权力的配置提供事实依据;最后,在前述研究的基础上,充分考虑中国电力行业的本国特点,针对中国配置电力监管权力之实然状态中存在的问题,得出具体的优化中国电力监管权力配置的制度设计。 除绪论外,本文共计五章,采三段论式的逻辑结构。电力监管权力配置的理据和域外先进国家电力监管权力配置的立法得失部分是全文的大前提,中国电力监管权力配置的实然状态部分是全文的小前提,中国电力监管权力配置的优化方案部分是全文的结论。以下分别介绍各部分的逻辑主线及主要内容。 作为大前提部分的理论基础,包括前三章内容,研究政府监管权力的法理特征、合理的乃至更优的电力监管权力配置在理论上应然的内在理念与外在表现、域外先进国家电力监管权力配置立法上实然的相关经验和教训,旨在为优化中国电力监管权力的配置提供理论上的衡量标准,是全文的重点。其中: 第一章界定与电力监管权力相关的基本概念,解决“电力监管权力是一种什么样的权力”的问题。“监管”是一个颇有争议的概念,本文所确定的法学中的“监管”概念,是“市场监管”的简称,指在市场经济体制条件下,为了矫正、改善市场失灵,国家机关通过制定、执行法律、法规,干预市场主体活动的行为。政府监管权力是随着市场经济的不断发展和成熟,现代社会为了应对复杂现实需要而产生的替代传统司法权的一种新型权力,具有公权力性、准司法性、主动性与集合性特征。这些特征使其在理论上与传统的行政权、司法权既相同又相异,决定了新型的政府监管制度与规范传统公权力之制度的相似性和差异性。政府监管权的以上特征决定了合理的政府监管制度所应该具有的特征:应该确保政府监管权力的公共利益目的性和有限性;应该确保政府监管机构产生上的非政治化,外部法律地位上的独立性、内部机构设置上的分离性、监管人员在知识上的专业性;应该分权配置并制衡政府监管权力。作为政府监管权力的一种,规范电力监管权力的电力监管权力配置制度,当然应该具备政府监管制度的以上特征。 第二章研究配置电力监管权力的理论依据,包括电力监管权力配置的正当性基础条件、价值目标和配置路径选择,解决以下三个最基本的理论问题:在什么样的条件下,才能够授权政府监管电力行业?授予政府电力监管权力的目的是什么?应该怎样具体配置电力监管权力? 经济学中传统的经济监管理论(公共利益理论、部门利益理论)、公共强制理论、法律不完备理论,解释了建立政府监管权力机制的正当性(实质合理性)问题。电力产业属于市场不能有效配置资源的特殊产业,,兼具自然垄断性与竞争性、公用性与不可替代性、正、负外部性、统一性与脆弱性等客观的经济与技术特征,这些特征为证明电力监管之存在具有正当性提供了事实上的根据。以前述理论为指导,以电力产业的客观特征为依据,可推导出配置电力监管权力的正当性基础条件有四:“电力行业存在着市场失灵、电力监管以维护公共利益为目的,电力监管是应对电力行业市场失灵最优的公共控制策略、人们不得不承担政府监管电力行业的成本”。只有在同时满足这四个条件的前提下,电力监管权力的配置才具有正当性,分别满足这四个条件的程度越高,电力监管权力配置的正当度越高,同时,若不能满足其中任何一个条件,则该电力监管权力配置就不具有正当性。 市场经济的效率性、经济法的社会本位与电力监管权力配置的正当性基础条件,决定了电力监管权力所追求的价值目标应该是公平和效率,二者之间既统一又冲突。配置电力监管权力的正当性基础条件及其所决定的价值目标,共同决定了效率与公平是电力监管权力配置制度应该遵循的内在理念,因此,促进效率与公平的实现程度是检验这些法律制度的实质合理性的内在依据。某条具体的电力监管权力配置规则,越有利于促进公平和效率价值的实现,该条规则的正当度越高。 现代电力监管职能的多样化、专业化特征使现代国家面临“应选择什么样的路径具体配置电力监管职能,才能更加合理”的问题。政治学中的权力制衡理论、经济学中的多委托代理理论与多重博弈协调理论为解决此问题提供了理论依据。基于这些理论,合理的电力监管权力配置路径是:应分权配置并使之相互制衡,但是分权应被限制在合理的范围内,并建立监管机构之间的合作机制与沟通渠道,应明确电力监管系统的总目标并将其合理地分解到各监管机构,并构建激励各监管机构愿意协调到意向均衡的激励机制。因此,在配置电力监管权力的路径选择上,分权制衡与沟通协调的尺度把握得越好,所电力监管权力配置的正当度越高。 第三章研究域外先进国家电力监管权力配置立法方面的得失。效率和公平价值对域外发达国家电力监管配置制度的影响已经无处不在;以效率和公平为价值目标,使二者相协调,是域外先进国家在电力监管权力配置立法在内在理念方面的基本经验和教训。域外先进国家有关的立法实践在为后进国家确立电力监管权力配置的制度表现方面提供的经验和教训主要有:电力监管权力配置的法定性,是有效实现监管目标,避免监管机构滥用权力的重要基础;采独立监管模式,实行政监分离,配置政策部门与专业电力监管机构之间的权力;分权配置专业电力监管机构与综合性监管机构之间的监管职能,并建立二者有效的协调沟通机制;在尊重本国当时电力行业的经济基础和法律背景等具体情况的前提下,配置专业电力监管机构与反垄断执法机构之间的权力,反垄断执法机构的作用应随着电力行业市场竞争机制的不断成熟而逐渐提升。后进国家配置电力监管权力的制度表现,吸取这些经验和教训的程度越高,其正当度可能越高。 由此,作为整个立论的大前提,前三章的内容为判断“怎样配置电力监管权力才是合理的乃至更优的”提供了理论上的标准,合理的乃至更优的电力监管权力配置应该是:1、具备政府监管权力之法理特征决定的政府监管制度之建构应具备的特征;2、同时满足四个正当性基础条件,并且,分别满足这四个条件程度越高,其正当度就越高;3、以效率和公平为价值目标,促进这些价值的实现程度越高,其正当度就越高;4、分权配置并使之相互制衡,建立沟通协调机制,分权制衡与沟通协调的程度越高,其正当度就越高;同时,越能吸取域外先进国家电力监管权力配置立法实践中的经验和教训,后进国家电力监管权力配置的正当度可能就越高。 作为整个立论的小前提,第四章研究中国电力监管权力配置实然状态中所存在的主要缺陷,为“为什么中国电力监管权力配置需要优化”提供事实依据。一方面,尽管与西方传统市场经济国家相较,中国电力行业的市场失灵有其自己的特点,但是,中国电力行业市场失灵的存在为中国配置电力监管权力提供了客观上的正当性基础条件;另一方面,中国电力监管权力配置的实然状态中存在着诸多具有中国特色的“政府失灵”现象,以满足另外三个正当性基础条件的程度为衡量标准,中国现行电力监管权力配置的正当度不高,有待优化。中国现行与电力监管价值有关的立法内容存在诸多缺陷,以有利于公平和效率价值的实现程度为衡量标准,中国现行电力监管权力配置的正当度也不高。尽管中国电力监管权力的配置格局经过了多次演变,但具体的配置格局依然存在诸多缺陷,新国家能源局仍无法走出原电监会监管无效的困境,以实现分权制衡与沟通协调的程度及吸取域外先进国家在电力监管权力配置方面的经验和教训的程度为衡量标准,中国现行电力监管权力配置的正当度仍然不高,有待优化。 作为全文的结论,第五章给出优化中国电力监管权力配置的具体方案,解决“应该怎样优化中国的电力监管权力配置”问题,最终为中国怎样才能走出电力监管无效困境的现实问题,提供具体的答案。中国电力监管权力配置的优化,应遵循满足并尽量同步提高影响电力监管权力配置正当度的各因素之满足程度的原则。具体而言,优化中国电力监管权力配置之内在理念的方案是:(1)在构建电力监管权力的配置制度时,尊重并反映政府监管权力的法理特征;(2)在构建电力监管权力的配置制度时,充分反映本国电力行业市场失灵的特点,通过“以维护公共利益为配置电力监管权力的目的,确保电力监管权力配置资源的有效性和监管本身的有效性,降低电力监管的成本”,纠正本国电力监管方面存在的“政府失灵”现象;(3)以公平和效率为电力监管权力配置的价值目标,完善对效率、公平价值的立法表述并设计处理效率与公平价值冲突的规则。优化中国电力监管权力配置之制度表现的方案是:(1)在新颁布的《能源法》及修订的《电力法》中,对电力监管权力进行配置,实现对电力监管权力配置的法定化。其内在理念和外在制度两方面。(2)按能源监管模式与独立监管模式组建能源部并在其中设置内部独立的能源监管委员会,前者作为电力监管的政策部门,后者作为专业电力监管机构,承担包括电力行业市场准入权及定价权在内的全部经济性监管职能;(3)由环境、安全等综合性监管机构承担电力行业全部的社会性监管职能。将电力行业非核电安全生产监管职能,配置给一般的综合性安全监管机构;成立核能安全综合性监管机构,承担核电安全生产监管职能;明确电力普遍服务义务监管职能的归属;(4)赋予能源部协调职能,建立以上各监管机构之间有效的协调和沟通机制;(5)按主导——制衡方式配置能源监管委员会与反垄断执法机构之间的权力,能源监管委员会对电力行业之垄断行为的事前、事后监管事务,都有管辖权;反垄断执法机构对能源监管委员会的事后监管权力的运行,享有复议权,有权撤销能源监管委员会的监管决定并依法作出新的监管决定。 全面系统采用以上优化方案,实现对电力监管权力配置之法律形式与实质的优化,将使中国走出电力监管无效的困境,实现对电力行业的有效监管。
[Abstract]:Chinese State Electricity Regulatory Commission since its establishment in 2003, has been in the supervision of invalid predicament, large power enterprises have long been in charge of the overhead power, the electric power industry market reform, so far still free in the power industry's edge. This state is led to the low efficiency of China's electric power industry, the lack of institutional reasons for sustainable development ability. In order to promote market-oriented reform of power industry, improve the efficiency of the electric power industry, enhance the ability of sustainable development of electric power industry in 2013, the institutional reform of the State Council, the revocation of the SERC, the electricity regulatory function is assigned to the newly established National Energy Bureau. The new national energy board can walk out of the original SERC supervision invalid hook? Or, how to get rid of the invalid Chinese electricity regulatory dilemma? Observed from the perspective of law, this Chinese realistic question answer depends on To explore the basic theory of regulation power distribution power: how reasonable and optimal allocation of electric power supervision power? Or, how should configure the electricity regulatory power, it has legitimacy and has a higher degree of legitimacy? (just as it is rational, while the higher degree is better.)
The purpose of this study was to optimize the China electricity regulatory power configuration (which is legitimate or more legitimate degrees) to provide a legal basis and system design, the three step in the path of research: first, through the establishment of electric power supervision power disposition ought to be in the theory of legitimate state, provide the theoretical basis for optimizing Chinese electricity regulatory power configuration; secondly, through the establishment of State Electricity Regulatory Chinese power distribution, to provide evidence for optimization of power supervision China configuration; finally, on the basis of the foregoing, considering its own characteristics China power industry, according to the existing configuration of power supervision Chinese's factual problems in the system design Chinese electricity regulatory power configuration optimization of concrete.
In addition to the introduction, this paper consists of five chapters, the logical structure of syllogism. Mining power supervision power disposition rationale and extraterritorial configuration of the state electricity regulatory power advanced legislation and part is the premise of the State Electricity Regulatory China part power allocation is the premise of small, China optimization scheme of electric power supervision power disposition part of the thesis is the conclusion. The following describes the logic thread of each part and the main content.
As part of the theoretical basis of the premise, including the first three chapters, the legal characteristics of the power of government supervision, internal and external performance and reasonable concept of better electricity regulatory power allocation in theory should be the relevant experience abroad, allocation of legislative power regulation on the real power of advanced countries and lessons, and to provide the theory on the criteria for the optimization of power supervision China configuration, which is the focus of this paper:
The first chapter defines the basic concepts related to the electricity regulatory authority, to solve the "electricity regulatory power is a kind of what kind of power". "Regulation" is a controversial concept, this article determined the "regulation" concept, is referred to as the "market supervision", refers to the market economy system under the condition, in order to correct the market failure, improve the state organs, through the formulation, execution of laws and regulations, the main market intervention activities. Government regulatory power is with the development of market economy and mature, a new power to replace the traditional judicial power of modern society in order to cope with the complex needs of the reality, is the public power, quasi judicial, initiative and the set of features. These features make it in theory and the traditional administrative power, judicial power of both the same and different, decided the new government regulation system and the traditional norms of public The similarities and differences of the power system. The characteristics of government supervision system in the above characteristics of the supervision right of the government decided reasonably should have: should ensure that the purpose of public interest and limited government supervision; government regulatory agencies should ensure that non political generated on the independence of the legal status of external, separation internal institutions, professional supervision personnel in knowledge; decentralization should configure and the restriction of government regulatory power. As a kind of government regulatory power, regulate the power regulation of power power regulation power distribution system, the above characteristics of course should have the government supervision system.
The second chapter studies the theory of power allocation of regulatory powers, including the legitimacy of power supervision conditions of power allocation, selection of value goal and configuration path, to solve the following three basic theoretical questions: under what conditions can authorize the government supervision of the power industry? What is the purpose of the power supervision power granted to the government? How should the specific configuration of the electricity regulatory authority?
The traditional economics theory of economic regulation (public interest theory, department interests theory, the theory of public enforcement of law), incomplete theory, explains the legitimacy of the establishment of government regulatory power mechanism (substantive rationality). Special industry electric power industry belongs to the market fails to allocate resources efficiently, both the natural monopoly and competition, public and irreplaceable, positive and negative externalities, economic and technical characteristics of unity and fragility of the objective, these features to prove the existence of power supervision has legitimacy provided in fact. According to the theory, the objective characteristics of the electric power industry as the basis, legitimacy conditions can be pushed export configuration of electricity regulatory power has four: "the electric power industry is a market failure, power supervision in order to protect the public interest for the purpose of power regulation is the optimal response to market failure public power industry Total control strategy, people have to bear the cost of the electricity industry government regulation ". Only in the premise of meet these four conditions, the electricity regulatory power configuration that has the legitimacy, the higher respectively satisfy these four conditions, the electricity regulatory power allocation while the degree is higher, at the same time, if not meet them any one of these conditions, the electric power supervision power disposition has no legitimacy.
The efficiency of the market economy, social standard and power supervision power disposition the legitimacy of the conditions of the economic law, determines the value goal of the electricity regulatory power should be pursuing fairness and efficiency, both between the two unity and conflict. The legitimacy of the value target of basic conditions and the power allocation of electric power supervision decision, together determines the efficiency and fairness is the intrinsic idea, power regulation power distribution system should be followed accordingly, promote the realization of efficiency and equality degree is to test these legal system intrinsic rationality basis. A specific power regulatory power allocation rules, more conducive to promoting the realization of fairness and efficiency value, the rule of justice the higher the degree.
The diversification of modern electricity regulatory functions of the professional characteristics of the modern country faces "should choose what kind of path specific allocation of electric power regulatory functions, can be more reasonable." the politics of power balance theory, economics of multiple principal-agent theory and multiple game coordination theory to solve the problem of providing a theoretical basis. Based on these theories, the electricity regulatory power configuration path is reasonable: decentralization and balance allocation, but decentralization should be limited in a reasonable range, and to establish cooperation mechanisms and channels of communication between regulators, should always targeted electricity regulatory system and use it reasonably decomposed into various regulatory agencies and the construction of incentive regulatory agencies to coordinate to the incentive mechanism of intention equilibrium. Therefore, the choice of the path allocation of electric power regulatory powers, decentralization and coordination of the ruler The better the degree of certainty is, the higher the legitimacy of power regulation power is.
The third chapter studies the allocation of legislative power of extraterritorial regulatory powers in advanced countries in terms of gains and losses. Affect the efficiency and the fair value of foreign developed country electricity regulatory disposition system has been everywhere; with efficiency and fairness as the value goal, so the two coordinate is foreign advanced countries in the allocation of legislative power, supervision power in the idea of the basic experience and lesson. The practice of legislation of extraterritorial advanced countries in providing for the developing countries to establish system of electric power supervision power disposition experience and lessons: qualitative electricity regulatory power configuration, is effective to achieve regulatory objectives, avoid important regulators of abuse of power; adopt independent supervision mode, the implementation of administrative supervision between the separation. The allocation of policy departments and professional electric power regulatory power decentralization; allocation of professional power regulatory organizations and comprehensive regulatory agencies Between the regulatory functions, and establish coordination mechanism two effective; in respect of domestic electric power industry was the economic foundation and legal background and other specific circumstances, the allocation of professional electric power regulatory institutions and the anti monopoly law enforcement agency of power between the anti-monopoly law enforcement agencies should be with the market competition mechanism in power industry continues to mature and gradually improve the system performance. The backward country allocation of electric power regulatory power, the higher the draw the experience and lessons of its proper degree may be higher.
Thus, as the whole premise of the argument, the first three chapters for the judgment of "how to configure the electricity regulatory power is reasonable and even better" provides a theoretical standard, reasonable and better power supervision power allocation should be: 1, the government decided to legal supervision power has the characteristics of government the construction of supervision system should have; 2, satisfy the four conditions of legitimacy, and the higher, respectively meet these four conditions, the proper degree is higher; 3, with efficiency and fairness as the value goal, promote the higher the degree of realization of these values, the proper degree is higher; 4, the allocation of decentralization and balance, establish communication and coordination mechanism, decentralization and coordination degree is high, its proper degree is higher; at the same time, the allocation of legislative power to absorb foreign advanced countries supervision practice and experience of teaching The legitimacy of power regulation power allocation in the backward countries may be higher.
As a premise of the argument, the fourth chapter studies the main defects of Chinese power supervision power disposition practice in the state, "why China electricity regulatory power configuration need to provide factual basis for optimization". On the one hand, while with the traditional western market economy countries compared to China, electric power industry market failure has its own characteristics. However, there are Chinese power industry market failure provides the legal basis for the objective conditions for allocation of electric power supervision power China; on the other hand, there are many Chinese with characteristics of "government failure" phenomenon China state electricity regulatory power configuration, in addition to meet the three conditions for the degree of legitimacy China measure, the current electricity regulatory power allocation while the degree is not high, needs to be optimized. The contents of the current legislation and supervision power value Chinese There are many defects, in order to realize the extent of benefit value of fair and efficiency as the standard, Chinese current regulatory power allocation while the degree is not high. Although the power regulatory power configuration China pattern through a lot of evolution, but the specific configuration of the pattern still has many defects, the new national energy administration still can not get out of the original electric power supervision will the invalid supervision dilemma, in order to achieve the balance of power and coordination degree and the experiences and lessons of foreign advanced countries in terms of the allocation of power supervision power level as the standard, Chinese current regulatory power allocation right is still not high, needs to be optimized.
As a conclusion, the fifth chapter gives the optimization scheme China specific power regulatory power configuration, solve "how to optimize the electricity regulatory power allocation problem China, finally China realistic problem how to get out of the plight of the power supervision is invalid, provide specific answers. China optimization electricity regulatory power configuration, should follow
【学位授予单位】:西南政法大学
【学位级别】:博士
【学位授予年份】:2014
【分类号】:D922.294;D922.67
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