大股东控制、审计质量与内部控制重大缺陷的披露——基于贵糖股份的案例研究

发布时间：2018-01-10 07:39

本文关键词：大股东控制、审计质量与内部控制重大缺陷的披露——基于贵糖股份的案例研究　出处：《管理案例研究与评论》2017年03期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：在内部控制重大缺陷与潜在的私人收益(例如,更加便利的盈余操控)相关时,上市公司控股股东和管理层有隐瞒内部控制重大缺陷的强烈动机。本文通过贵糖股份的案例揭示了在上市公司被大股东控制,且股权集中的"壕沟效应"压倒"利益协调效应"的情况下,控股股东可以通过控制董事会、监事会和审计委员会的人选而使内部控制信息披露的监督机制失效,导致内部控制的重大缺陷无法得到及时的识别、披露和整改。但高质量审计师的引入,能够发挥保护中小股东权益的治理功能,揭露被隐瞒不报的内部控制的重大缺陷。监管者应高度关注大股东控制对于内部控制规范有效执行可能造成的不利影响,并为高质量审计师有效发挥治理作用创造更好的条件。
[Abstract]:Where major deficiencies in internal controls are associated with potential private gains (for example, more convenient earnings manipulation). The controlling shareholders and management of listed companies have strong motives to conceal the major defects of internal control. This paper reveals that the listed companies are controlled by large shareholders through the case of expensive sugar shares. And if the "trench effect" of concentrated equity overrides the "interest coordination effect", the controlling shareholder can control the board of directors. The board of supervisors and the audit committee make the supervision mechanism of internal control information disclosure ineffective, leading to the internal control of major defects can not be timely identified, disclosure and rectification. But the introduction of high-quality auditors. It can play the governance function of protecting the rights and interests of minority shareholders. Disclosure of major defects in unreported internal controls. Regulators should pay close attention to the possible adverse effects of large shareholder controls on the effective implementation of internal control norms. And for high-quality auditors to effectively play a governance role to create better conditions.
【作者单位】：中南财经政法大学会计学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金(71262013)
【分类号】：F239.4;F271;F406.7
【正文快照】： 0引言中国上市公司自2011年1月1日起开始强制执行由财政部等五部委发布的《企业内部控制基本规范》及其配套指引。这一规范体系的核心是借鉴美国萨班斯法案(Sarbanes-Ox-ley Act,SOX法案)的404条款,建立上市公司内部控制有效性的管理层自我评价与外部审计制度。衡量内部控制规

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