政府监管下的医疗器械供应链议价策略研究

发布时间：2018-03-08 16:35

本文选题：政府监管　切入点：医疗器械　出处：《北京交通大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：我国医疗器械在政策的支持下,发展步伐不断加快,医疗器械供应链成为重要研究对象。医疗器械行业是具有一定风险的行业,由于医疗器械故障造成相关人员伤害,患者治疗中断、错误治疗或患者健康恶化,将会对患者产生不可逆的损失,合理制定监管机制至关重要。同时,议价直接影响到产品的需求状况和企业的竞争优势,是供应链中任何企业都会面临的重要难题,研究医疗器械供应链议价是降低企业成本和提高企业收益的关键。本文通过参阅国内外相关领域的研究成果,分析现阶段对供应链议价研究所存在的不足,结合博弈论、议价理论和最优化理论,参照国内外研究经验和研究方法,并结合医疗器械供应链中企业实际议价的情况,展开了政府监管下的供应链议价策略研究。为了系统的讨论医疗器械供应链中制造商和供应商的议价情形,引入需求函数和政府奖惩函数,考虑议价能力的影响,分别构建“单一供应商”、“多供应商”两种模式下无政府监管和政府监管的制造商和供应商决策模型,运用最优化理论和议价理论分别求出两种模式下的最优解。对各个模式下不同决策模型的最优值进行对比,并通过灵敏度分析,讨论不同模式下政府监管和议价能力对制造商和供应商议价决策值的影响,得出以下结论:(1)政府监管对供应链的议价约束主要通过政府的单位奖惩因子和医疗器械事故概率影响的,与医疗器械的销售数量无关;(2)政府监管情形下,政府的激励力度能有效促进医疗器械销售量、制造商利润和供应商利润的增加;(3)政府监管下,单一供应商模式中,交易数量和制造商的利润受供应商议价能力的影响,表现为供应商的议价能力越高,交易量就越低,制造商的利润越小;交易价格和销售价格与供应商的议价能力呈负相关;多供应商模式中,交易量和制造商的利润随供应商议价能力的提高先增加后降低,存在最优值;交易价格、销售价格和供应商的利润总是和议价能力呈正相关。
[Abstract]:With the support of the policy, the development of medical devices in China has been accelerated, and the supply chain of medical devices has become an important research object. The medical device industry is an industry with certain risks, and the related personnel are injured because of the failure of medical devices. Interruption of patient treatment, wrong treatment or deterioration of patient's health will cause irreversible losses to patients. It is essential to establish a reasonable regulatory mechanism. At the same time, bargaining directly affects the demand of products and the competitive advantage of enterprises. It is an important problem that any enterprise will face in the supply chain. It is the key to reduce the cost and increase the profit of the enterprise to study the price negotiation of the medical device supply chain. This paper analyzes the shortcomings of the research on supply chain bargaining at the present stage, combining with game theory, bargaining theory and optimization theory, referring to the domestic and foreign research experience and research methods, and combining with the actual bargaining situation of the enterprise in the medical device supply chain. In order to systematically discuss the bargaining situation of manufacturers and suppliers in the medical device supply chain, the demand function and the government reward and punishment function are introduced to consider the influence of bargaining power. The decision models of manufacturers and suppliers under the two models of "single supplier", "multi-supplier" and "government supervision" are constructed respectively. Using the optimization theory and the bargaining theory, the optimal solutions of the two models are obtained, and the optimal values of different decision models in each model are compared, and the sensitivity analysis is carried out. This paper discusses the influence of government regulation and bargaining power on the bargaining decision value of manufacturers and suppliers under different models. The following conclusions are drawn: 1) the bargaining constraints of government supervision on the supply chain are mainly affected by the unit rewards and punishment factors of the government and the probability of medical device accidents, and are not related to the quantity of medical device sales. Government incentives can effectively promote sales of medical devices, increase of manufacturer's profit and supplier's profit) under the supervision of government, the quantity of transaction and the profit of manufacturer are influenced by the bargaining power of supplier under the single supplier model, under the supervision of the government, the quantity of trade and the profit of the manufacturer are influenced by the bargaining power of the supplier. The higher the bargaining power of the supplier, the lower the transaction volume and the smaller the profit of the manufacturer; the negative correlation between the transaction price and the selling price and the bargaining power of the supplier; in the multi-supplier model, The trading volume and the manufacturer's profit increase first and then decrease with the increase of the supplier's bargaining power, and there is an optimum value, and the transaction price, the sales price and the profit of the supplier are always positively correlated with the bargaining power.
【学位授予单位】：北京交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F426.4;R197.1

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