发电企业节能减排激励机制研究

发布时间：2018-03-13 01:16

本文选题：节能减排　切入点：发电企业　出处：《华北电力大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：当前,我国正处于全面落实科学发展观、建设环境友好型和资源节约型社会的战略转型期。随着中国电力产业结构的调整,新能源、清洁能源的不断开发利用,各发电企业面临全新的生产经营环境,企业如何根据市场条件的变化调整发展战略、转变经营机制,制定最优的节能减排方案,实施节能环保与经济效益并举策略,已成为发电企业发展的根本。我国企业追求的目标通常都集中在降低成本、提高产量或获取最大利润上,经常采用的是高投入、高消耗、高污染的粗放型传统发展模式,最终结果导致严重的资源能源浪费和环境污染。企业迫切需要制定合理的节能减排方法,妥善应对“偷懒”行为,改进现有激励机制,完善和健全公司治理结构,积极探索转型发展之路。其中,激励机制是公司治理的基本机制,与企业治理结构的完善,企业经营绩效的提高直接相关。发电行业作为能源消耗量最多、排放量最大的部门之一,与其他类型企业相比,更加需要改善节能减排策略。然而发电企业节能减排相关技术设备的生产成本太高,市场上也不具备价格优势,其工作的开展具有明显的动力缺乏性特征,仅靠市场机制无法解决。在政府环保政策引导下,这就要求集团制定更多有利于节能减排工作的政策,化解其外部性,激励发电企业积极地参与节能减排工作。为研究集团如何激励其发电企业积极开展节能减排工作,假定发电企业引入经济效益和节能减排效益,在环境信息不对称情况下实现有效控制道德风险和追求总效益最大化。在代理人从事多项任务时,为改变传统的企业单纯追求利润最大的单一目标,加入了节能减排任务,建立了一个具有多任务委托代理模型。按照目标规划的求解思路,研究了多任务背景下,两任务间相关性以及两任务相关性不同时,环境效益对经济成本影响因素系数、经济效益对环境效益影响因素系数、节能减排投入及绝对风险厌恶系数要求的变化对经济效益、最优节能减排效益激励影响。本文构建了发电企业的多任务委托代理模型,分析了在多重任务下对发电企业的节能减排激励问题,期望得到在此条件下的最优激励合同,为发电企业的节能减排激励机制提供理论依据。
[Abstract]:At present, our country is in the strategic transition period of carrying out the scientific development view and building an environment-friendly and resource-saving society. With the adjustment of China's electric power industry structure, the development and utilization of new energy and clean energy, The power generation enterprises are faced with a new production and operation environment. How to adjust the development strategy, change the management mechanism, formulate the best scheme of energy saving and emission reduction, and implement the strategy of energy saving, environmental protection and economic benefit according to the changes of market conditions. The goal of Chinese enterprises is usually to reduce the cost, increase the output or obtain the maximum profit, and often adopt the extensive traditional development mode of high input, high consumption and high pollution. The final result is serious waste of resources and energy and environmental pollution. Enterprises urgently need to formulate reasonable energy saving and emission reduction methods, properly deal with "lazy" behavior, improve the existing incentive mechanism, perfect and perfect the corporate governance structure. The incentive mechanism is the basic mechanism of corporate governance, which is directly related to the improvement of corporate governance structure and the improvement of business performance. One of the biggest emitters needs to improve energy conservation strategies compared with other types of companies. However, the production costs of energy-efficient and emission-related technology equipment for power generation companies are too high and there is no price advantage in the market. The development of its work has obvious characteristics of lack of power, which cannot be solved by the market mechanism alone. Under the guidance of the government's environmental protection policy, this requires the group to formulate more policies conducive to energy conservation and emission reduction, and to resolve its externalities. In order to study how to encourage the power generation enterprises to actively carry out energy conservation and emission reduction work, it is assumed that the power generation enterprises introduce economic benefits and energy saving and emission reduction benefits. Under the circumstance of asymmetric environmental information, we can effectively control moral hazard and pursue the maximization of total benefit. When the agent is engaged in many tasks, in order to change the traditional enterprise's pursuit of the single goal of maximum profit, it adds the task of energy saving and emission reduction. In this paper, a multi-task principal-agent model is established. According to the idea of goal programming, the factors influencing the economic cost under the multi-task background are studied, such as the correlation between the two tasks and the correlation between the two tasks. The influence factor coefficient of economic benefit on environmental benefit, the change of energy saving and emission reduction input and absolute risk aversion coefficient requirement have influence on economic benefit and incentive of optimal energy saving and emission reduction benefit. In this paper, the multi-task principal-agent model of power generation enterprise is constructed. This paper analyzes the incentive problem of energy saving and emission reduction for power generation enterprises under multiple tasks, and expects to obtain the optimal incentive contract under this condition, which provides a theoretical basis for the incentive mechanism of energy saving and emission reduction in power generation enterprises.
【学位授予单位】：华北电力大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F426.61;F206

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