投资效率视角下青岛海尔股权激励效果评价与优化研究

发布时间：2018-04-20 07:42

本文选题：青岛海尔 + 股权激励　；参考：《湘潭大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：股权激励机制作为解决公司两权分离后所有者和经营者目标不一致的一项长期制度安排,通过影响激励对象的各项行为,进而影响公司业绩。而投资行为是企业管理层最重要的决策之一,对公司业绩及未来发展有着重大的影响;投资效率是衡量投资行为是否行之有效的重要指标。我国上市公司实施股权激励计划的时间并不长,其长期绩效没有充分显现出来。本文研究股权激励对公司投资效率的影响,正是通过研究公司在实施股权激励方案后,管理层是否会注重公司的长远发展进而选择有利于公司长期绩效的投资项目。因此,从投资效率的角度,分析企业的股权激励政策就成为了企业必要性的考验。本文首先介绍了研究背景及意义、国内外的研究现状和相关概念和理论;其次选取我国家电行业的翘楚——青岛海尔股份有限公司为案例,通过分析2006—2015年该公司10年投资和财务方面的数据,将其与未实施企业均值作对比分析,进而判断青岛海尔实施股权激励对投资效率的影响。接下来对青岛海尔的股权激励实施效果进行评价,发现其效果并不理想。这主要是存在两个方面的问题:其一是青岛海尔制定的股权激励方案在业绩考核指标、激励对象、激励期限等方面存在不合理的问题;其二是公司内部治理结构的不完善。针对青岛海尔公司股权激励方案所存在的问题,本文提出优化对策:首先,制定合理且有效的股权激励计划方案对其激励效果存在至关重要的影响,公司应采用多元化的薪酬与股权相结合的激励模式;同时采用财务与非财务指标相结合作为行权考核条件,并引入惩罚性条件对激励对象进行考核;通过自筹资金与激励资金相结合的方式来解决资金来源问题。其次,企业的相关配套措施对公司实施股权激励同样十分重要,公司在加强监管的同时,通过建立行权保证金制度来加强对高管的约束,并且进一步完善公司的信息披露水平。
[Abstract]:The equity incentive mechanism is a long-term institutional arrangement to solve the problem that the owners and managers have different goals after the separation of the two rights. It affects the behavior of the incentive objects and then affects the performance of the company. Investment behavior is one of the most important decisions of enterprise management, which has a great impact on the performance and future development of the company, and investment efficiency is an important index to measure whether the investment behavior is effective or not. The long-term performance of the listed companies in China is not fully manifested because of the short time of implementing the equity incentive plan. This paper studies the impact of equity incentive on the investment efficiency of the company. It is through the study of whether the management will pay attention to the long-term development of the company and choose the investment project which is conducive to the long-term performance of the company after the implementation of the equity incentive scheme. Therefore, from the perspective of investment efficiency, the analysis of corporate equity incentive policy has become the test of the necessity of enterprises. This paper first introduces the research background and significance, domestic and foreign research status and related concepts and theories, and then selects Qingdao Haier Co., Ltd., the leading household appliance industry leader in China, as a case study. By analyzing the investment and financial data of the company from 2006 to 2015, this paper compares it with the average value of unimplemented enterprises, and then judges the influence of Qingdao Haier's equity incentive on the investment efficiency. Then it evaluates the effect of equity incentive of Qingdao Haier, and finds that its effect is not ideal. This is mainly due to two problems: one is that there are unreasonable problems in performance evaluation index, incentive object, incentive period and so on in the equity incentive scheme formulated by Qingdao Haier; the other is the imperfection of the internal governance structure of the company. In view of the problems existing in the equity incentive scheme of Qingdao Haier Company, this paper puts forward the optimization countermeasures: firstly, the establishment of a reasonable and effective equity incentive plan has a vital impact on its incentive effect. The company should adopt the incentive mode of the combination of multiple salary and stock right, adopt the combination of financial and non-financial indexes as the condition of exercise right assessment, and introduce punitive conditions to assess the incentive object. Through self-financing and incentive funds to solve the problem of funding sources. Secondly, the relevant measures are also very important for the implementation of equity incentives. While strengthening supervision, the company through the establishment of the exercise margin system to strengthen the executive constraints, and further improve the level of information disclosure of the company.
【学位授予单位】：湘潭大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F426.6;F272.92;F406.7

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