海信电器股权激励方案实施效果研究

发布时间：2018-04-25 13:14

本文选题：股权激励 + 公司高管　；参考：《湘潭大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：现代企业制度下经营权和所有权分离产生了代理问题,资本主义发达国家通过股权激励来防止这一现象的发生,希望消除股东和经理人之间的矛盾,使公司经营步入正常轨道,共同促进企业绩效上升。随着中国经济的蓬勃发展,效仿该制度的企业越来越多,股权激励也进入到一个“黄金时期”,研究股权激励对日后我国上市公司实施股权激励方案具有一定的现实意义。文章主要探究股权激励对于公司绩效是否起到应有作用,选取海信电器作为本文的研究对象,在阐述股权激励的理论基础上,对其股权激励三次行权的结果分析后发现海信电器存在代理行为。通过财务分析法对海信电器在股权激励前后的2009-2017年的盈利能力、偿债能力、成长能力、营运能力的数据分析后,发现海信电器在股权激励期间公司业绩表现良好及其市场状况较佳都极有可能是其高管操纵所致,其公司业绩在激励方案实施后并没有相应得到提升;作者还发现海信电器高管设置短期的有效期、行权期间低买高卖股票来获得个人所得税的减免,进一步使其利益最大化;文章还对海信电器在证券市场的表现进行了分析,在剔除其他宏观干扰环境下,验证其股权激励方案并未发挥应有作用。通过研究海信电器的案例,作者认为海信电器股权激励方案存在这些问题:内部治理结构不完善;业绩考核指标过于简单;行权、减持高管操控严重;激励对象设定过于集中。因此应该规范我国企业实施股权激励计划,完善上市公司的内部治理,落实内部监督约束机制,合理设计递延性的股权激励方案,适当培育职业经理人储备空间,设计递延性的股权激励方案,对经理人定期业绩考核,以此防止股权激励沦为新时期经济体制下企业高管或股东之间谋求私利的新工具,从而才能有助于我国企业和经济市场良好发展。作者在案例上选用了兼具上市公司和国有企业性质的海信电器,当前中国处于经济体制改革的变革时期,国有企业作为中国改革的重要部分,势必要求我们对此重视,研究其公司内部治理问题对于以后能够切实地解决中国国企绩效低下、缺乏竞争力的问题。
[Abstract]:Under the modern enterprise system, the separation of management right and ownership has caused the agency problem. The capitalist developed countries prevent this phenomenon by means of equity incentive, hoping to eliminate the contradiction between shareholders and managers, and make the company operate on a normal track. Jointly promote enterprise performance rise. With the vigorous development of Chinese economy, more and more enterprises emulate the system, and equity incentive has entered a "golden period". The study of equity incentive has certain practical significance for the future implementation of equity incentive scheme of listed companies in China. This paper mainly explores whether equity incentive plays a due role in corporate performance, selects Hisense Electric as the research object of this paper, and expounds the theoretical basis of equity incentive. After analyzing the results of three exercise of equity incentive, it is found that Hisense Electric has agency behavior. After analyzing the data of Hisense Electric's profitability, solvency, growth capacity and operating capacity in 2009-2017 before and after equity incentive through financial analysis, It is found that the good performance of Hisense Electric during the period of equity incentive and its better market condition are probably caused by the manipulation of its executives, and its performance has not been promoted correspondingly after the implementation of the incentive scheme. The author also finds that Hisense executives set short term of validity, buy low and sell stocks in order to obtain personal income tax relief during the exercise of power, and further maximize the benefits of Hisense, and analyze the performance of Hisense Electric in the stock market. The equity incentive scheme does not play its due role in eliminating other macroscopical disturbance environment. By studying the case of Hisense Electric, the author thinks that there are some problems in the scheme: the internal governance structure is not perfect; the performance appraisal index is too simple; the exercise of power, the reduction of executive control is serious; the incentive object is set too centralized. Therefore, we should standardize the implementation of equity incentive plan for Chinese enterprises, perfect the internal governance of listed companies, implement the internal supervision and restraint mechanism, reasonably design deferred equity incentive schemes, and properly cultivate the professional managers' reserve space. To design a deferred equity incentive scheme to assess managers' performance regularly, so as to prevent equity incentive from becoming a new tool for seeking personal interests among executives or shareholders in the new economic system. Only then can help our country enterprise and the economic market good development. In the case, the author chooses Hisense Electric, which is both listed company and state-owned enterprise. At present, China is in the period of economic system reform. As an important part of China's reform, the state-owned enterprise is bound to require us to attach importance to it. The study of internal governance can effectively solve the problem of low performance and lack of competitiveness of Chinese state-owned enterprises in the future.
【学位授予单位】：湘潭大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F426.6;F272.92;F406.7

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