制造业上市公司高管薪酬、盈余管理对会计稳健性的影响研究

发布时间：2018-01-06 08:43

本文关键词：制造业上市公司高管薪酬、盈余管理对会计稳健性的影响研究　出处：《哈尔滨商业大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：制造业是支撑经济增长的重要领域。近年来,中国在由"制造大国"向"制造强国"转型,因此,制造业上市公司的健康发展意义重大。在制造业上市公司中,高管薪酬一直居高不下,高管会因为薪酬动机而进行盈余管理。此外,为了保证经济的健康稳定的发展,学术界也十分的关注会计稳健性的研究。为了解决这样一系列的问题,以制造业上市公司为基点,详细的探讨了制造业上市公司高管薪酬、盈余管理对会计稳健性的影响问题。首先通过对国内外学者在相关领域的成果进行回顾,总结和归纳学者们已完成了的研究成果。对高管薪酬、盈余管理、会计稳健性的相关概念进行了界定,梳理所需要的相关理论。将委托代理理论、信息不对称理论、激励理论、最优契约理论作为研究的理论依据。然后通过对高管薪酬、盈余管理、会计稳健性的现状进行总结,并对三者之间的影响机理进行分析。再次,通过实证模型的构建,以制造业上市公司从2010年到2015年,共计6548组数据作为研究样本,进行实证检验。通过实证分析,制造业上市公司高管薪酬与盈余管理之间存在着正相关关系,即制造业上市公司的高管薪酬越高会使得盈余管理的幅度越大。制造业上市公司盈余管理与会计稳健性之间存在着负相关关系,即盈余管理幅度增大会降低公司的会计稳健性。制造业上市公司高管薪酬与会计稳健性之间存在着负相关关系,即高管薪酬过高也使得会计稳健性下降。为了保证制造业上市公司的会计稳健性水平不受损害,需要对制造业上市公司的高管薪酬进行限制,同时也需要规范制造业上市公司的盈余管理行为,防止过度盈余管理行为的发生。最后,从宏观和微观的角度分别提出了改善制造业上市公司高管薪酬、盈余管理对会计稳健性影响的措施。
[Abstract]:Manufacturing industry is an important field to support economic growth. In recent years, China is transforming from a "manufacturing power" to a "manufacturing power". Therefore, the healthy development of listed manufacturing companies is of great significance. Executive compensation has been high, executives will be motivated by earnings management. In addition, in order to ensure the healthy and stable development of the economy. Academia is also very concerned about accounting conservatism research. In order to solve such a series of problems, the manufacturing listed companies as the basis point, a detailed discussion of the manufacturing listed companies executive compensation. The impact of earnings management on accounting conservatism. Firstly, by reviewing the achievements of domestic and foreign scholars in related fields, summarizing and summarizing the research results that scholars have completed. For executive compensation, earnings management. The related concepts of accounting conservatism are defined, and the relevant theories are combed out. The principal-agent theory, information asymmetry theory and incentive theory are introduced. The optimal contract theory as the theoretical basis for the study. Then through the executive compensation earnings management accounting conservatism of the status quo and analysis of the impact mechanism between the three. Again. Through the construction of empirical model, the manufacturing listed companies from 2010 to 2015, a total of 6548 groups of data as research samples, empirical test. There is a positive correlation between executive compensation and earnings management of listed manufacturing companies. That is, the higher the executive compensation of listed companies in manufacturing industry, the larger the margin of earnings management. There is a negative correlation between earnings management and accounting conservatism of listed manufacturing companies. That is, the increase of earnings management will reduce the accounting conservatism. There is a negative correlation between executive compensation and accounting conservatism of listed manufacturing companies. In order to ensure that the level of accounting conservatism of listed manufacturing companies is not damaged, it is necessary to restrict the executive compensation of listed manufacturing companies. At the same time, we also need to regulate the earnings management behavior of listed manufacturing companies to prevent excessive earnings management behavior. Finally, from the macro and micro point of view, we propose to improve the executive compensation of listed manufacturing companies. The measures of earnings management's influence on accounting conservatism.
【学位授予单位】：哈尔滨商业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F272.92;F406.7;F425

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