筛选不同竞争类型零售商的贸易信用合同设计研究
发布时间:2018-02-09 19:25
本文关键词: 贸易信用 逆向选择 供应链 信息不对称 出处:《管理科学学报》2014年10期 论文类型:期刊论文
【摘要】:考虑了信息不对称环境下资金约束供应链中贸易信用合同的设计问题.其中,零售商面临资金短缺困境,对自身的竞争类型具有信息优势;供应商愿意为资金短缺的零售商提供贸易信用.本文基于高低不同类型零售商的保留收益信息,将零售商的竞争环境分为三种类型,即高度竞争、适度竞争和低度竞争.据此,供应商应用筛选方法设计合同甄别不同竞争环境的零售商类型,提高自身和供应链的整体收益.研究还表明,在信息不对称的情况下,适度竞争环境中,贸易信用合同能实现供应链整体收益最大化.
[Abstract]:This paper considers the design of trade credit contract in the supply chain with capital constraint under asymmetric information environment, in which retailers face the dilemma of capital shortage and have information superiority to their own competition type. Suppliers are willing to provide trade credit for retailers with insufficient funds. Based on the reserved income information of different retailers, this paper divides the competition environment of retailers into three types: high competition, moderate competition and low competition. The supplier applies the screening method to design the type of retailer in different competitive environment to improve the overall profit of the supplier and the supply chain. The research also shows that in the context of information asymmetry, in a moderately competitive environment, Trade credit contract can maximize the overall income of supply chain.
【作者单位】: 上海海事大学经济管理学院;复旦大学管理学院;
【基金】:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71172039;71102043;70972046) 教育部新世纪优秀人才支持资助项目(NCET-10-0340) 教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金资助项目(11YJC630153) 上海海事大学科研基金资助项目(20120084) 上海海事大学重点学科资助项目(XR0101)
【分类号】:F713.32;F715.5
【参考文献】
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