财务柔性、内部控制与非效率投资

发布时间：2018-04-20 07:59

本文选题：财务柔性 + 投资不足　；参考：《山东大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：投资作为企业最重要的经济活动之一,贯穿于企业的整个生命周期中,是影响其未来发展的重要因素。正确的投资决策可以给企业注入更多现金流,提升企业价值,反之则可能会给企业带来无法挽回的损失。在现实中由于委托代理冲突与信息不对称的存在,公司的非效率投资行为十分普遍。因此如何改善投资效率,抑制企业非效率投资行为是一个亟待解决的问题。在当前全球化进程之中,企业面临越发复杂的经济环境,财务柔性的概念应运而生,加之我国正处在经济转型与升级的关键时刻,不确定性风险随之加重,不少企业通过储备一定水平的财务柔性以应对突发事件,及时获得资金支持,把握有利的投资时机。同时,我国企业的内部控制体制逐渐完善,高质量的内部控制可以提高公司内部管理水平,及时发现并纠正投资决策与执行过程中的偏差,防止管理层选择投资净现值小于0或者舍弃净现值大于0的项目。基于以上背景,本文探究财务柔性是否可以在实际中改善上市公司的投资效率,同时将内部控制纳入分析框架,结合上市公司的产权性质,深入探讨内部控制对公司财务柔性与非效率投资关系的影响。论文采用理论分析与实证检验结合的方法,首先界定内部控制、财务柔性、非效率投资等概念,通过对国内外有关财务柔性、内部控制和非效率投资关系的文献进行整理并加以评述,为实证检验提供理论基础。其次,选择2012-2015年我国沪深两市A股制造业上市公司为研究对象,分别探讨财务柔性对企业投资不足以及过度投资的影响,并检验了内部控制对财务柔性与非效率投资关系的治理效应,以期为改善我国上市公司的投资效率,进而逐步提升公司价值提供理论和数据依据。本文的主要结论如下:(1)财务柔性储备越少,公司投资不足现象越严重,有效的内部控制可以在一定程度上缓解信息不对称,从而减轻因财务柔性储备水平较低而导致的投资不足现象;(2)公司储备财务柔性的水平越高,过度投资现象越严重,高质量的内部控制可以减轻公司面临的代理冲突,因此抑制公司对财务柔性储备的过度投资。(3)进一步区分产权性质后,本文研究发现相较于国有控股公司,内部控制对财务柔性与非效率投资关系的治理效果在非国有控股公司中更明显。因此,合理储备财务柔性与良好的内部控制机制相配合,能更有效地解决上市公司的非效率投资问题。最后,本文根据理论上和实证上的研究结论,从完善内部控制制度、合理储备财务柔性等方面提出了建议,并为后续研究提供了新的方向。
[Abstract]:As one of the most important economic activities, investment runs through the whole life cycle of an enterprise and is an important factor affecting its future development. The correct investment decision can inject more cash flow and enhance the value of the enterprise, otherwise it may bring irreparable losses to the enterprise. In reality, due to the existence of principal-agent conflict and information asymmetry, the inefficient investment behavior of companies is very common. So how to improve the investment efficiency and restrain the non-efficient investment behavior is an urgent problem to be solved. In the current process of globalization, enterprises are facing more and more complex economic environment, the concept of financial flexibility came into being, coupled with the fact that China is at a critical moment of economic transformation and upgrading, the uncertainty risks are aggravated. Many enterprises reserve a certain level of financial flexibility to deal with emergencies, timely access to capital support, grasp the favorable investment opportunities. At the same time, the internal control system of our country's enterprises is gradually consummated, the high quality internal control can improve the internal management level of the company, discover and correct the deviation in the process of investment decision and execution in time. Prevent management from choosing projects where NPV is less than 0 or if NPV is greater than 0. Based on the above background, this paper explores whether financial flexibility can improve the investment efficiency of listed companies in practice, and bring the internal control into the analysis framework, combined with the property rights of listed companies. This paper probes into the influence of internal control on the relationship between financial flexibility and inefficient investment. This paper uses the method of theoretical analysis and empirical test to define the concepts of internal control, financial flexibility, inefficiency investment and so on. Internal control and inefficient investment relations are reviewed and reviewed to provide a theoretical basis for empirical testing. Secondly, we choose China's A-share manufacturing listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2012 to 2015 to study the impact of financial flexibility on the underinvestment and over-investment of enterprises. The paper also examines the governance effect of internal control on the relationship between financial flexibility and inefficient investment in order to provide theoretical and data basis for improving the investment efficiency of listed companies in China and gradually enhancing the company value. The main conclusions of this paper are as follows: (1) the less flexible financial reserves, the more serious the underinvestment phenomenon is. Effective internal control can alleviate the information asymmetry to some extent. The higher the level of financial flexibility, the more serious the over-investment phenomenon is, and the higher the internal control quality is, the less the agency conflict the company faces, and the lower the level of financial flexibility, the more serious the over-investment phenomenon is, and the higher the level of financial flexibility is, the more serious the over-investment phenomenon is. Therefore, after restraining the over-investment of financial flexible reserve in the company. (3) further distinguishing the property right nature, this paper finds that compared with the state-owned holding company, The governance effect of internal control on the relationship between financial flexibility and non-efficiency investment is more obvious in non-state holding companies. Therefore, reasonable reserve financial flexibility and good internal control mechanism can effectively solve the problem of inefficient investment of listed companies. Finally, according to the theoretical and empirical research conclusions, this paper puts forward some suggestions from the aspects of perfecting the internal control system and reasonable reserve financial flexibility, and provides a new direction for further research.
【学位授予单位】：山东大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F425;F406.7

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