基于特殊资产视角的福耀玻璃管理权安排优化研究

发布时间：2018-05-17 00:24

本文选题：家族企业 + 特殊资产　；参考：《湘潭大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：管理权安排一直是家族企业在传承中面临的首要问题之一,是现今公司财务与公司治理领域的热点。随着研究的深入,这一问题愈发被人们重视起来。人们之所以重视这个问题,主要是因为管理权安排是保护家族企业特殊资产的最有效途径,而特殊资产则是家族企业取得较好业绩(相对于非家族企业)的主要原因,是家族企业价值的主要来源。家族企业应当如何安排管理权取决于该企业对特殊资产的依赖程度,换言之,特殊资产对企业价值的影响决定了管理权安排的方向。本文通过案例研究的方式以福耀玻璃为例探讨了这一主题。文章回顾了家族企业治理的相关文献,以委托代理理论与特殊资产理论为基础,使用案例研究法,结合我国经理人市场背景、产权继承制度、银行放贷制度,凭借国泰安与Wind数据库中的公开数据,分析了福耀玻璃的管理权安排困境,阐明了特殊资产对福耀玻璃企业价值的影响,并以此为福耀的管理权安排提供了建议。研究发现,福耀玻璃中存在大量的特殊资产,包括经营理念、银商关系、政商关系等;这些资产对其企业价值的提升颇有助益。这种作用体现在了其对财务业绩的提升上,并潜在的影响着公司的股价。特殊资产对于财务业绩的影响,主要体现在了盈利能力、偿债能力、发展能力与经营能力四个方面;对股价的影响则主要体现在了市场对不同经理人就职消息的截然不同的反应上。而福耀的管理权安排困境的成因即在于忽视了特殊资产对企业的重要作用。针对福耀玻璃面临的管理权安排困境,文章提出了建议:首先,应当采取家族统管的方式对集团公司进行管理;其次,曹氏家族应增持股权以配合家族统管的管理模式,从而防止权责不配比与恶意收购等问题的出现;第三,应当完善经理人激励机制,以降低代理成本,在满足企业对经理人需求的同时,缓解代理问题;第四,应当警惕特殊资产的变迁,从而及时地把握特殊资产的动向,以期对其进行管理。本文的研究丰富了家族企业公司治理方面的文献。
[Abstract]:Management arrangement is one of the most important problems in the family business inheritance, and it is a hot spot in the field of corporate finance and corporate governance. With the development of research, people pay more and more attention to this problem. The reason why people attach importance to this problem is mainly because the management arrangement is the most effective way to protect the special assets of the family business, which is the main reason why the family business achieves better performance (compared with the non-family business). It is the main source of family business value. In other words, the influence of the special assets on the value of the enterprise determines the direction of the management right arrangement. This paper discusses this subject by case study with Fuyao glass as an example. Based on the principal-agent theory and the theory of special assets, the paper reviews the relevant literature on the governance of family enterprises, using the case study method, combining the market background of managers, the inheritance system of property rights, and the bank lending system. Based on the open data in Cathay and Wind database, this paper analyzes the dilemma of management power arrangement of Fuyao Glass, expounds the influence of special assets on the value of Fuyao Glass Enterprise, and provides some suggestions for Fuyao's management power arrangement. It is found that there are a large number of special assets in Fuyao glass, including business philosophy, relationship between banks and merchants, relationship between government and business, and so on. This effect is reflected in its financial performance, and potentially affect the company's stock price. The influence of special assets on financial performance is mainly reflected in four aspects: profitability, solvency, development ability and management ability. The effect on the stock price is mainly reflected in the market response to different managers' news. The reason of Fuyao's dilemma of management power arrangement lies in neglecting the important function of special assets to enterprises. In view of the dilemma of the management power arrangement faced by Fuyao Glass, the paper puts forward some suggestions: firstly, it should adopt the way of family management to manage the group company; secondly, the Cao family should hold more shares in order to cooperate with the management mode of family control. In order to prevent the rights and responsibilities of non-matching and malicious takeover and other issues; third, we should improve the incentive mechanism of managers, in order to reduce agency costs, while meeting the needs of managers, ease the agency problem; fourth, We should be on guard against the changes of special assets, so as to grasp the trend of special assets in time and manage them. The research in this paper enriches the literature on the corporate governance of family enterprises.
【学位授予单位】：湘潭大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F406.7;F426.71

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