集体所有权的代理行为与保障策略探微——基于獐子岛财务危机的案例研究

发布时间：2018-07-05 12:22

本文选题：集体所有制 + 集体所有权　；参考：《财会月刊》2016年19期

【摘要】：本文以獐子岛财务危机为背景,采用案例研究方法探讨了集体所有制企业的所有权代理行为及保障策略。研究表明:随着集体所有制企业向公司制转型,集体所有权与经营决策权逐渐分离,集体所有权中代理行为对集体资产安全的破坏性日益突显,有必要运用保障策略实现资产安全。诸如獐子岛经营过程中突发的财务危机,根源不在于抵抗自然灾害的能力不足,而在于企业内部权力制衡缺失引发的代理问题。优化股权结构,增强董事会治理的有效性,实现集体所有制公司成员所有权与决策权均衡配置,健全对集体所有权代理人的约束与监督机制,这些保障策略是实现集体资产保值、增值的重要方式。本文从集体所有权视角深化了对财务危机产生的理解,也为我国集体所有制企业有序转型提供了理论借鉴。
[Abstract]:Based on the financial crisis of Swertia, this paper discusses the ownership agency behavior and security strategy of collective ownership enterprises by using the case study method. The research shows that: with the transition of collective ownership enterprises to corporate system, collective ownership and management decision-making power are gradually separated, and agency behavior in collective ownership is increasingly destructive to collective asset security. It is necessary to use the safeguard strategy to realize the asset security. For example, the sudden financial crisis in Swertia Island lies not in the ability to resist natural disasters, but in the agency problem caused by the lack of balance of power in the enterprise. Optimize the ownership structure, enhance the effectiveness of board governance, realize the balanced allocation of ownership and decision-making power of the members of collective ownership companies, and improve the restraint and supervision mechanism for collective ownership agents. These safeguard strategies are an important way to maintain and increase the value of collective assets. This paper deepens the understanding of financial crisis from the perspective of collective ownership and provides theoretical reference for the orderly transformation of collective ownership enterprises in China.
【作者单位】：江西财经大学会计学院;中国人民银行南昌中心支行;南开大学商学院;
【基金】：教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目“长江学者和创新团队发展计划——公司治理研究创新团队”(批准号:13JJD630004)
【分类号】：F302.6

【相似文献】