基于博弈论的工程项目建设过程的沟通管理研究

发布时间：2018-01-18 08:39

本文关键词：基于博弈论的工程项目建设过程的沟通管理研究　出处：《华北电力大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：随着中国改革开放战略的顺利进行,建筑市场正在逐步完善,建筑业已发展成国民经济中的一个支柱产业。然而,建筑项目的建设和实施过程中,仍然存在如信息不对称、信息沟通不畅和各方利益分配不均等问题。要降低这些问题对项目各方利益的损害,就要科学管理各个沟通环节,优化沟通及决策过程。本文拟将博弈论运用于项目沟通管理,将项目不同阶段沟通过程中的影响因素及利益分配用数学模型的形式表达出来,分析各阶段影响因素和利益收益之间的关系,找出影响项目利益主体收益的因素,为决策者提供决策依据。本文将运用博弈论,分析建筑工程项目中的各利益主体之间的沟通,建立各利益主体之间的沟通博弈模型,并提出在项目生命周期各阶段的沟通中应选择的最优策略,实现多方利益的最优。本文在梳理国内外研究现状和相关理论的基础上,对项目各阶段的流程和内容加以分析,并从博弈的角度分析不同阶段的相关利益主体之间在沟通过程中的沟通策略及沟通博弈过程。最后在第四章通过建立博弈模型,确定博弈各方的收益函数、分析影响收益的主要因素、研究各阶段沟通博弈的最优策略组合等问题。在此基础上进一步构建科学合理的沟通管理模型。论文研究发现：不同阶段各利益主体利益最大化及最优的影响因素不同,各利益主体考虑的沟通策略不同,不同阶段适用的博弈模型类型也不同。在项目决策阶段,各博弈方(利益主体)以达成协议为目标,在政府对大型建设工程项目选择审查策略概率较大时,项目的整体效益与业主愿意支付社会效益成本的概率成正相关。针对大型建设工程项目或对周围环境影响较大的项目来说,政府的优惠政策是引导项目业主能够更多考虑社会效益的主要因素；在招投标阶段,通过业主风险类型和投标方报价分析看出,对于大型建设工程项目或公共项目,提高技术质量降低管理成本是能否中标的主要影响因素；在施工及验收阶段,各博弈方(利益主体)沟通过程是在已经达的协议下进行沟通,业主的收益与监理方和承包商的寻租概率成负相关,与业主的监控概率和监控有效性成正相关关系。监理方与施工方在与业主沟通过程中,是否合谋与业主对监理方的授权及业主自身的监督能力有很大关系。此外,还与准备阶段的招投标过程中达成的协议有关。最后在上述模型分析的基础上,建立各个阶段的沟通模型,总结如何使沟通博弈参与方达到利益最优化。
[Abstract]:With the smooth development of China's reform and opening up strategy, the construction market is gradually improving, and the construction industry has developed into a pillar industry in the national economy. However, the construction and implementation of construction projects in the process. There are still problems such as asymmetric information, poor information communication and unequal distribution of interests of all parties. To reduce the damage to the interests of all parties to the project, it is necessary to manage each communication link scientifically. This paper intends to apply game theory to project communication management and express the influencing factors and benefit distribution in different stages of the project in the form of mathematical model. This paper analyzes the relationship between the influencing factors and the benefits in each stage, finds out the factors that affect the profit of the main interests of the project, and provides the decision making basis for the decision makers. In this paper, the game theory is used to analyze the communication among the stakeholders in the construction project, and the communication game model between the stakeholders is established. And put forward in the project life cycle in the various stages of communication should choose the optimal strategy to achieve the best multi-interest. This paper reviews the domestic and foreign research status and related theories on the basis. Analyze the process and content of each phase of the project. And from the perspective of the game analysis of the different stages of the relevant stakeholders in the communication process of the communication strategy and communication game process. Finally in the 4th chapter through the establishment of a game model to determine the benefit of the parties to the game function. Based on the analysis of the main factors affecting the revenue and the study of the optimal strategy combination of the communication game in each stage, a scientific and reasonable communication management model is constructed. The paper finds that: different stages of the interests of the main interests maximization and optimal factors are different, different stakeholders consider different communication strategies. In the project decision-making stage, the game parties (stakeholders) aim to reach an agreement, when the probability of the government to choose a review strategy for large-scale construction projects is high. The overall benefit of the project is positively related to the probability that the owner is willing to pay the cost of social benefits. The preferential policy of the government is the main factor to guide the project owner to consider the social benefit more; In the bidding stage, through the analysis of the owner's risk type and the bidder's quotation, it can be seen that for the large-scale construction project or public project, improving the technical quality and reducing the management cost are the main influencing factors to win the bid. In the stage of construction and acceptance, the communication process of game parties (stakeholders) is carried out under the agreement reached, and the owner's income is negatively correlated with the rent-seeking probability of the supervisor and the contractor. There is a positive correlation with the monitoring probability and effectiveness of the employer. The supervisor and the constructor are communicating with the owner. Whether collusion is related to the owner's authorization to the supervisor and the owner's own supervisory ability. In addition, it is also related to the agreement reached in the bidding process of the preparatory stage. Finally, on the basis of the above model analysis. The communication model of each stage is established, and how to optimize the benefit of the participants in the communication game is summarized.
【学位授予单位】：华北电力大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F282;F426.92;F224.32

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