商业银行绩效与高管薪酬的相关性分析

发布时间：2018-01-02 10:32

本文关键词：商业银行绩效与高管薪酬的相关性分析　出处：《西南财经大学》2012年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：随着我国市场经济的不断深化和发展,现代企业制度所有权与经营权的分离使得企业资源的控制者——高级管理人员的薪酬越来越为人们所关注。银行作为经营货币商品的特殊企业,其高级管理人员薪酬的制定往往受到多方面因素的影响,加之近年来,我国商业银行逐渐实行市场化改革,高级管理人员薪酬的制定也越来越偏向市场化,而近年来,随着商业银行业绩的逐年攀升,高管们的薪酬也在显著增加,因此,有关银行高管薪酬的制定以及高管薪酬与银行绩效是否挂钩等问题也越来越多的成为了人们议论的话题。目前,我国已基本形成了以国有大型商业银行为主体,全国性股份制商业银行为新的生长点,城市商业银行为补充,各类银行并存和公平竞争的格局。在过去的几年里,我国商业银行总体发展迅速,并不断进行市场化改革,到目前为止先后共有16家银行在沪深证券交易所或香港联合交易所上市,另外还有多家银行正在筹备上市。近年来,我国商业银行业绩平稳且呈现上升态势,尽管07年底始于美国的一场金融危机给全球经济造成了巨大影响,在危机面前,不少曾经辉煌的金融企业遭受重创甚至破产倒闭,而我国银行业由于参与国际资本市场的程度并不深,加之政府采取有力措施,因而,我国商业银行在危机中并未受到太大影响。随着我国商业银行市场化程度的加深,银行高管的薪酬也在不断增加,就2010年而言,从16家上市商业银行公布的年报中看出,有半数以上银行高管的薪酬数额较前一年的增幅接近或超过10%。此外,另一个值得关注的现象是,尽管上市银行高管薪酬数额整体呈上升趋势,但不同银行高管薪酬的差距却越来越显著。在16家上市银行中，既有民生、深发展数位高管千万年薪的连年跳跃,也有工农中建几家国有大型商业银行平均不到200万年薪的缓慢爬行。差异如此之大不禁让人产生疑问：高管薪酬的制定与银行绩效是否挂钩以及在多大程度上挂钩?薪酬与绩效的挂钩程度是否受其他因素影响?这是一个广受关注且值得研究的问题,种种疑问需要我们在分析现实的基础上,结合具体实证研究来解答。本文在借鉴国内外学者研究成果的基础上,结合我国银行业实际情况,使用理论与实证相结合的方法,分析和探讨了我国上市商业银行绩效与高管薪酬的相关性以及其他因素对绩效和薪酬相关性的影响。本文共分为五个部分：第一章是导论部分。本部分主要阐述了文章的研究背景、研究的目的和意义、国内外关于绩效与高管薪酬相关性问题研究的文献综述,说明了研究的主要内容和研究方法。文献综述部分分别从企业绩效与高管薪酬的相关性和银行绩效与高管薪酬的相关性两方面对国内外相关文献进行梳理,指出他们研究结论的共识与分歧,为本文的研究内容明确方向。第二章讨论了薪酬和绩效的概念与相关理论。本章共分为两小节,第—小节主要介绍了薪酬的概念与构成。第二小节首先对绩效的概念进行阐释,接着追溯了绩效评价的理论渊源,对比较基础的绩效评价理论：目标管理理论和激励理论进行了介绍。在第二小节的最后一部分,我们对目前比较常用的绩效评价指标做了描述,主要指标有：每股收益(EPS)、总资产收益率(ROA)、Tobin’s Q、和经济增加值(EVA),每个指标都能够从某一方面对绩效做出描述,我们在对不同指标进行比较后,选择总资产收益率(ROA)作为本研究所选用的度量指标。第三章主要对我国商业银行高管薪酬和银行绩效的现状进行了分析。本章分为两部分,第一部分分析了近几年我国商业银行高管薪酬的变动情况。我们选取了上市银行行长、副行长、董事会成员、监事会成员、董事会秘书、首席风险官和首席财务官等为研究对象,并取每家上市银行年薪最高的三位高管的薪酬的平均值作为观察值,选取2007年到2010年作为观察年份。根据从上市商业银行年度报告中得到的数据显示,16家上市银行高管薪酬在2007年整体相对较高,而2008年和2009年两年里多数银行高管薪酬呈现下降趋势,在2010年薪酬整体走势又趋于上升。另外,相同年份里,不同银行高管间薪酬差异显著,此外,同一家银行里不同高管之间的薪酬同样存在差距,这种差距主要表现在从境外引进的管理者和本土管理者之间的薪酬数额上。本章第二部分主要分析了近几年我国商业银行绩效的变动情况。从2007年到2010四年间,我国16家上市商业银行整体绩效相对稳定,波动幅度不大,其中,工行、建行、中行和农行四家国有大型商业银行的总资产收益率呈现稳中上升趋势,金融危机并未对其盈利能力造成明显影响。而以招行、浦发和中信为代表的一些中小型股份制商业银行的总资产收益率则呈现先降后升的趋势。我们可以粗略的看出我国上市商业银行绩效与高管薪酬总体上走势一致,当然,银行绩效与高管薪酬的具体相关程度我们还要在接下来的实证分析中得到验证。第四章是文章的实证部分。本章主要通过建立模型,对2007年到2010年我国上市商业银行绩效与高管薪酬数据进行回归分析,进而对二者的相关性做出描述。由于受到来自行政方面因素的影响程度不同,我们将上市银行分为国有大型商业银行和中小型股份制商业银行两类,分别进行实证研究。研究结果表明我国国有大型商业银行和中小型股份制商业银行绩效与高管薪酬都呈现正相关性,但后者绩效与薪酬的相关程度高于前者。在对影响银行绩效与高管薪酬相关性的因素进行分析后,我们发现,第一大股东持股比例对国有大型商业银行和中小型股份制商业银行绩效与高管薪酬的相关性都起到强化作用。而前一期的高管薪酬水平对两类银行当期的绩效与高管薪酬的相关性都起到弱化作用。另外,银行规模和不良贷款率都能够对中小型股份制商业银行的绩效与高管薪酬的相关性产生弱化作用,但是这两个因素对国有大型商业银行绩效与高管薪酬的相关性的影响却比较小。此外,董事会独立性和银行资本充足率这两个因素对国有大型商业银行和中小型股份制商业银行绩效与高管薪酬的相关性者不产生明显影响第五章主要总结了文章的研究结论并提出政策建议。主要分为两个部分,第一部分对实证研究的结论进行解释,第二部分提出政策建议。建议主要包括：1.继续完善年薪制,使高管年薪与银行绩效和风险充分挂钩；2.银行业绩考核指标复合化,为建立高管薪酬激励机制提供可靠依据；3.减少行政干预,使高管薪酬形成机制更加市场化；4.加强银行董事会的独立性,充分发挥独立董事的监督作用。本文采用理论与实证相结合的方法对我国商业银行绩效与高管薪酬的相关性进行了分析。影响银行高管薪酬与绩效的因素很多,也很复杂,限于商业银行资料来源的局限性,本文的研究尚不能给出一个透彻完整的结论,只是对该问题做了些尝试性探索,文中的有些观点和论述可能不是很成熟,还需要在以后的学习和研究中继续完善。
[Abstract]:With the deepening and development of China's market economy, the separation of ownership and management of modern enterprise system makes the control of enterprise resources, senior management pay more and more attention. As a special commodity business bank currency, making its senior management remuneration is often influenced by many factors, and in recent years, the gradual implementation of market-oriented reform of China's commercial banks, remuneration of senior managers are also more and more to the market, but in recent years, with the performance of commercial bank is increasing year by year, executives pay has increased significantly, therefore, the bank executive compensation plan and executive compensation and bank performance is linked to other more and more problems has become a topic of discussion.
At present, China has basically formed the main state-owned large commercial banks, national joint-stock commercial banks as a new growth point of the city commercial banks to supplement, all banks coexist and fair competition pattern. In the past few years, China's commercial banks overall rapid development and continuous market the reform, so far a total of 16 banks listed in Shanghai Stock Exchange and Hongkong stock exchange, in addition to a number of banks are preparing for listing. In recent years, the performance of China's commercial banks and steady upward trend, although the 07 at the end of the year begins with a financial crisis in the United States has a tremendous impact on the global economy, in the before the crisis, many have brilliant financial enterprises suffered heavy losses or even bankruptcy, while China's banking industry because of the involvement of the international capital market is not deep, coupled with the government to take effective measures, therefore, I China's commercial bank has not been much affected in the crisis. With the degree of China's commercial bank market deepening, the bank executive compensation is also increasing, as of 2010, announced that from the 16 listed commercial banks in the annual report, more than half of bank executives pay the amount of the previous year's growth rate or more than 10%. in addition, another noteworthy phenomenon is that although the listed bank executive compensation amount of the overall upward trend, but the executive compensation gap of different banks has become increasingly significant. In the 16 listed banks, both the people's livelihood, Shenzhen Development of several senior executives million annual successive jumps, there are workers and peasants in the construction of several large state-owned commercial banks on average less than 2 million a year slow crawl. So much difference can not help but doubt: the development of executive compensation and bank performance is a hook and a hook in the extent of compensation? Is the degree of performance related to other factors? This is a widely concerned and worth studying problem. We need to answer questions based on the analysis of reality and concrete empirical research.
In this paper, on the basis of research results of scholars at home and abroad, combined with the actual situation of China's banking industry, using a combination of theoretical and empirical analysis, and discusses the influence of correlation between bank performance and executive compensation of listed and other factors on the relationship between performance and compensation. This paper is divided into five parts:
The first chapter is the introduction part. This part mainly expounds the research background, purpose and significance of the study, literature review research on the correlation between executive compensation and performance problems, explains the main content and method of the research. The literature review section are facing the domestic and foreign relevant literature was combed from the correlation between corporate performance and executive compensation the correlation between bank performance and executive compensation and the two party, and pointed out the differences in their research conclusions as the research contents of this consensus, a clear direction.
The second chapter discusses the concept of salary and performance and related theories. This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section mainly introduces the concept of compensation and composition. The second section firstly expound the concept of performance, and then traces the theoretical origin of performance evaluation, performance evaluation on the basis of comparison of the theory of objective management theory and the incentive theory are introduced. In the last part of the second section, we present the performance evaluation indexes commonly used are described, the main indicators are: earnings per share (EPS), the rate of return on total assets (ROA), Tobin s Q, and the economic value added (EVA), each index can make description of the performance on the one hand, we are comparing different indicators, select the rate of return on total assets (ROA) as a metric used in this study.
The third chapter analyzes the main status of the performance of China's commercial bank executive pay and bank. This chapter is divided into two parts, the first part analyzes the changes of compensation in our country's commercial bank executives in recent years. We selected the listed bank president, vice president, members of the board of directors, members of the board of supervisors, the Secretary of the board of directors, the chief risk officer and chief financial officer as the research object, and take the average value of each of the three listed banks in the annual salary of the highest executive pay as the observation value, from 2007 to 2010 as the observation year. According to the listed commercial banks in the annual report data show that 16 listed banks in 2007 relative to the overall executive compensation high, while in 2008 and 2009 two years of executive compensation for most banks showed a downward trend, in 2010 the overall trend of compensation and tend to rise. In addition, the same year, different banks high tube salary In addition, with a significant difference between different bank executives pay the same gap, the gap is mainly reflected in between imported from overseas managers and local managers compensation. The second part of this chapter mainly analyzes the changes in recent years, the performance of commercial banks in China from 2007 to 2010 four. From the 16 listed commercial banks in China's overall performance is relatively stable, volatility is not, among them, ICBC, CCB, BOC and bank total assets of four large state-owned commercial bank rate showed a steady upward trend, the financial crisis did not cause significant impact on its profitability. The total assets of China Merchants Bank, Shanghai Pudong Development and as the representative of some small and medium-sized joint-stock commercial banks was decreased and then increased. We can roughly see China's listed commercial bank performance and executive compensation on a general trend Of course, of course, the specific correlation between bank performance and executive compensation should be verified in the following empirical analysis.
The fourth chapter is the empirical part of the article. This chapter mainly through the establishment of model, regression analysis was carried out in 2010 of China's listed commercial bank performance and executive compensation data of 2007, and then make a description of the relationship between the two. Due to the influence degree from administrative factors are different, we will be listed banks into large state-owned commercial banks small and medium-sized joint-stock commercial banks two categories, respectively for empirical research. The results indicated that the large state-owned commercial banks and joint-stock commercial bank performance and executive compensation have a positive correlation, but the extent of the performance and the salary is higher than the former. In the analysis of the factors affecting the correlation between bank performance and executive compensation later, we found that related to the proportion of the largest shareholder of large state-owned commercial banks and joint-stock commercial bank performance and executive compensation Can play the role of reinforcement. The correlation between the level of executive compensation issue on the two types of bank current performance and executive compensation have a weakening effect. In addition, the size of the bank and the bad loan rate can correlation on the performance and executive compensation in small joint-stock commercial banks have weakened, but the impact of this relationship two factors of large state-owned commercial bank performance and executive compensation is relatively small. In addition, the board does not affect the independence and the bank capital adequacy ratio of the two factors of large state-owned commercial banks and joint-stock commercial bank performance and executive compensation.
The fifth chapter summarizes the research conclusion and puts forward policy suggestions. Mainly divided into two parts, the first part explains the conclusions of empirical studies, the second part puts forward policy suggestions. The suggestions mainly include: 1. to improve the salary system, the annual salary of executives and bank performance and risk fully linked; 2. bank performance evaluation index composite and provide a reliable basis for the establishment of executive compensation incentive mechanism; 3., reduce administrative intervention, making executive compensation more market-oriented; strengthen the independence of the 4. board of directors of the bank, give full play to the supervisory role of independent directors.
This paper uses the combined method of theoretical and empirical relevance of our commercial bank performance and executive compensation is analyzed. Many factors affecting executive compensation and performance, is also very complex, limited to the limitations of the data source of commercial bank, this paper is not to give a thorough and complete conclusion, just for this made a tentative exploration in this paper, some views and opinions may not be very mature, also need to in the future study and research continue to improve.

【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F832.33;F272.92;F224

【参考文献】