机构投资者对上市公司关联交易的影响研究

发布时间：2018-01-02 20:40

本文关键词：机构投资者对上市公司关联交易的影响研究　出处：《华南理工大学》2012年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：机构投资者是资本市场中一支不可忽视的力量。国内外的相关研究表明，机构投资者具有一定的公司治理效应。本文研究在我国市场上，机构投资者对上市公司关联交易的影响。这对于研究机构投资者能否作为一项公司治理机制，参与公司监管治理，降低关联交易水平，，保护中小股东利益以及如何进一步制定机构投资者在我国资本市场上的发展战略有着重要的理论和现实意义。本文通过文献综述，理清了技术路线，接着对我国机构投资者与上市公司关联交易现状和存在的问题进行分析，基于公司治理理论、委托代理理论以及股权结构理论的理论分析，提出本文的研究假设并构建多元线性回归模型。模型以上市公司关联交易总额作为被解释变量，以机构投资者规模、机构投资者异质性、机构投资者对实际控制人的股权制衡度作为解释变量，选取2008-2010年沪、深两市A股3005家非金融保险类上市公司作为研究样本，研究机构投资者对上市公司关联交易的影响。实证分析结果显示：（1）机构投资者规模与上市公司关联交易显著负相关。机构投资者规模由机构投资者持股与机构持股家数来衡量。其中，机构投资者持股与上市公司关联交易在10%的水平下显著负相关；机构持股家数与上市公司关联交易在10%的的水平下显著负相关。（2）压力抵抗型机构投资者持股与上市公司关联交易在10%水平下显著负相关；压力敏感型机构投资者持股与上市公司关联交易相关性不显著。（3）机构投资者对实际控制人的股权制衡度与上市公司关联交易在10%的水平下显著负相关。本文的研究结果具有以下意义：（1）研究结果表明机构投资者具有一定的公司治理效应，其发挥治理效应的重要途径之一是通过改变上市公司关联交易策略，降低关联交易水平，在维护自身利益同时客观上保护中小股东的利益。（2）机构投资者规模、压力抵抗型机构投资者持股、股权制衡度对上市公司关联交易有显著影响，研究结果对于正确评价机构投资者在公司治理中扮演的角色以及如何进一步制定机构投资者在我国的发展战略具有一定的参考价值。（3）本文的研究结果对于降低上市公司关联交易水平、如何构建和完善公司治理机制来缓解或解决企业的代理问题保护中小股东利益具有较强的现实意义。
[Abstract]:Institutional investors are an important force in the capital market. Relevant studies at home and abroad show that institutional investors have a certain corporate governance effect. The impact of institutional investors on related party transactions of listed companies. This is to study whether institutional investors can act as a corporate governance mechanism to participate in corporate governance and reduce the level of related party transactions. It is of great theoretical and practical significance to protect the interests of minority shareholders and how to further formulate the development strategy of institutional investors in China's capital market. Through literature review, this paper clarifies the technical route, and then analyzes the current situation and existing problems of related transactions between institutional investors and listed companies, based on the theory of corporate governance. Based on the theoretical analysis of principal-agent theory and equity structure theory, this paper puts forward the research hypothesis and constructs a multivariate linear regression model. The model takes the total amount of related party transactions of listed companies as the explanatory variable. Taking the size of institutional investors, heterogeneity of institutional investors and institutional investors' equity checks and balances on actual controllers as explanatory variables, we choose Shanghai from 2008 to 2010. There are 3005 non-financial insurance listed companies in Shenzhen and Shenzhen as samples. This paper studies the influence of institutional investors on affiliated transactions of listed companies. There is a significant negative correlation between the size of institutional investors and related party transactions of listed companies. The size of institutional investors is measured by the number of institutional investors holding shares and institutional holdings. There is a significant negative correlation between institutional investors' shareholding and related party transactions of listed companies at the level of 10%; There is a significant negative correlation between the number of institutional shareholding families and the affiliated transactions of listed companies at the level of 10%. 2) there is a significant negative correlation between the number of institutional investors holding shares and the affiliated transactions of listed companies at the level of 10%. There is no significant correlation between pressure-sensitive institutional investors' shareholding and related party transactions of listed companies. There is a significant negative correlation between institutional investors' equity checks and balances on actual controllers and related party transactions of listed companies at the level of 10%. The results of this paper have the following significance: 1) the results show that institutional investors have a certain corporate governance effect. One of the important ways to play the governance effect is to reduce the level of related party transactions by changing the related party trading strategy of listed companies. In safeguarding their own interests while objectively protecting the interests of minority shareholders) the size of institutional investors, pressure-resistant institutional investors holding shares, equity checks and balances have a significant impact on the related transactions of listed companies. The research results have certain reference value for correctly evaluating the role of institutional investors in corporate governance and how to further formulate the development strategy of institutional investors in China. The research results of this paper can reduce the level of related party transactions of listed companies. How to construct and improve the corporate governance mechanism to alleviate or solve the agency problem of enterprises to protect the interests of minority shareholders has a strong practical significance.
【学位授予单位】：华南理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F832.51;F224

【参考文献】