上市公司终极控制人、资金占用与投资不足的关系研究

发布时间：2018-01-05 13:25

本文关键词：上市公司终极控制人、资金占用与投资不足的关系研究　出处：《浙江财经学院》2012年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：我国上市公司股权集中，据估计，90%左右上市公司存在较为严重的终极控制人控制现象。绝大部分终极控制人通过金字塔结构实现了现金流权与控制权的分离，掌握股东大会超额控制权，为其侵占中小股东利益和公司利益，谋取控制权私有收益创造了条件。终极控制人滥用超额控制权，通过资金占用、关联交易等方式侵害公司利益的事件频频发生，对公司产生多种不利影响，其中非效率投资是在学术界备受关注的问题。本文从投资行为视角研究终极控制人的侵占问题，，追溯上市公司终极控制权以揭示非效率性投资问题，能更完整、更真实地体现两者的本质关系。终极控制人谋取控制权私有收益的路径很多，不同路径选择会对上市公司投资产生不同影响，如引起投资过度与投资不足。本文是站在资金占用这一路径选择下，研究终极控制人对上市公司投资效率的影响。通过资金占用这一“中间桥梁”，为更好地理解终极控制人对投资效率的影响提供了一个全新视角。本文首先梳理了国内外相关文献，阐述和界定相关概念，接着以信息不对称理论、委托代理理论、控制权私有收益理论为指导，深入分析终极控制人、资金占用、投资不足之间的关系，为本文的研究假设和实证检验奠定了基础。在实证检验部分，本文首先从2009至2011年间681家沪深A股上市民营公司中筛选出242家投资不足的公司，以此为观测值研究终极控制人两权分离与资金占用的内在联系，以及资金占用对投资不足的影响。在理论分析及变量选取中，本文综合考虑了终极控制人对上市公司的隧道效应及支持效应，这是本文的一大亮点。本文研究发现，资金占用行为会引起上市公司投资不足。终极控制人的现金流权能有效抑制资金占用行为，表现出强烈的支持效应，缓解投资不足。终极控制人的超额控制权对资金占用的正向影响并不显著，没有表现出强烈的隧道效应。通过引入超额控制权的平方项，发现超额控制权与资金占用呈现倒U型关系。超额控制权处于一定范围内时，终极控制人的隧道效应体现在对公司的资金占用上，引起投资不足。而当超额控制权超过一定范围后，资金占用量反而减少，对此现象，笔者认为最有力的解释是，超额控制权较大的终极控制人会倾向于资本投入以谋取私利，采用间接侵占方式，如关联交易、提供担保等，可能引起上市公司过度投资，而并非采用资金占用引起投资不足。
[Abstract]:It is estimated that the stock rights of listed companies are concentrated in China. There is a serious phenomenon of ultimate controller control in the listed companies about 90%. Most of the ultimate controllers realize the separation of cash flow rights and control rights through the pyramid structure and grasp the excess control rights of shareholders' general meeting. It creates conditions for them to encroach on the interests of minority shareholders and the interests of the company and to obtain the private income of control. The ultimate controller abuses the excess control right and takes up the funds through the use of funds. Related party transactions and other ways of infringing on the interests of the company occur frequently, which has a variety of adverse effects on the company. Among them, inefficient investment is a problem of great concern in academic circles. This paper studies the problem of the ultimate controller's encroachment from the perspective of investment behavior, and traces the ultimate control of listed companies to reveal the problem of non-efficient investment, which can be more complete. More true embodiment of the essential relationship between the two. There are many ways for the ultimate controller to obtain the private income of control, and different path choices will have different effects on the investment of listed companies. Such as overinvestment and underinvestment. This paper is based on the choice of the path of capital occupation, to study the ultimate control of the impact on the investment efficiency of listed companies, through the use of funds to occupy this "intermediate bridge". For a better understanding of the ultimate control of the impact of investment efficiency to provide a new perspective. This article first combs the domestic and foreign related literature, elaborates and defines the related concept, then with the information asymmetry theory, the principal-agent theory, the control private income theory as the instruction, deeply analyzes the ultimate controller. The relationship between capital occupation and insufficient investment lays a foundation for the study of hypotheses and empirical tests in this paper. This paper first selected 242 underinvested companies from 681 listed private companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen between 2009 and 2011. Taking this as the observation value, this paper studies the internal relation between the separation of the two rights of the ultimate controller and the capital occupation, as well as the influence of the capital occupation on the investment insufficiency, in the theoretical analysis and the selection of variables. In this paper, the tunnel effect and support effect of ultimate controller to listed company are considered comprehensively, which is one of the highlights of this paper. This paper finds that the behavior of capital occupation will lead to underinvestment of listed companies. The ultimate control of cash flow power effectively inhibits the behavior of capital occupation and shows a strong support effect. The ultimate controller's excess control has no significant positive effect on the capital occupation and does not show a strong tunnel effect. By introducing the square term of excess control. When the excess control right is in a certain range, the tunnel effect of the ultimate controller is reflected in the capital occupation of the company. The author thinks that the most powerful explanation for this phenomenon is that the excess control power exceeds a certain range and the amount of capital occupied decreases instead. The ultimate controller with greater excess control power will tend to invest capital for personal gain, adopt indirect encroachment methods, such as related party transactions, provide security and so on, which may lead to overinvestment of listed companies. It is not the use of capital to cause underinvestment.
【学位授予单位】：浙江财经学院
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F275;F832.51;F224

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