保荐代表人、证券监管与保荐质量的提高

发布时间：2018-01-13 04:00

本文关键词：保荐代表人、证券监管与保荐质量的提高　出处：《山东大学》2012年博士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：自2004年核准制下的保荐制度成为我国A股市场股票发行制度至今已有八年,保荐制度的实行对证券公司开展股票保荐与承销业务以及培养股票发行专业人才起到了重要作用。同时,保荐制度的设立也是股票发行由行政审批进一步向市场化转变的结果,为我国A股市场的健康发展发挥了积极的促进作用。但是自保荐制度实行以来,新股发行后上市公司屡因保荐工作不力而产生问题,保荐质量不稳定且难以得到保证,再者保荐制度内部矛盾也逐渐显露,制度中涉及的各行为主体之间的矛盾和冲突进一步制约了保荐工作的开展,造成新股发行效率持续走低的结果。2011年10月以来,证监会在换届后希望通过制度改革解决A股市场中存在的诸多问题。投资者对新股发行制度的改革呼声日渐强烈,证监会也把股票发行制度纳入改革范围。证监会主席郭树清在2011年末的一次内部会议中向证监会发行部官员和发审委委员们提出了“IPO不审行不行?”的疑问。新一轮的股票发行制度改革即将启动,保荐制度与监管机构对IPO项目采用的核准制都成为备受瞩目的改革目标。本文希望通过分析得出保荐制度和新股发行环节监管模式的改革路径。首先从制度的历史沿革出发对中国A股市场股票发行制度进行回顾,在分析股票发行制度源起和保荐制度实行的历史背景和设计理念后,从两个角度对保荐制度展开分析：一是从A股市场整体出发探究外部制度对保荐制度的影响,二是通过分析保荐制度中各方主体的行动策略,诠释各行为主体在不同利益诉求下的相互影响。通过上述两个角度明确保荐制度在实行过程中出现问题的外部动因和内部动因,发现保荐制度呈现出的问题并不能仅归因于制度设计缺陷,围绕A股市场的外部制度不健全也是造成保荐不力的原因。一直以来,我国A股市场监管体系中行政监管独大的局面造成了市场机制和司法机制不能在事前监管阶段和事后监管阶段发挥应有的作用,单一的行政监管策略不仅不能对A股市场起到全面保护的作用,其市场干预行为也阻碍了A股市场的健康发展,过度的行政管制造成了上市公司成为稀缺资源、保荐责任不明确、事前监管干预市场化选择和事后监管不足造成惩罚不足和规则不明等问题的出现。由此,在核准制下的保荐制度作为新股发行制度后,仍然存在着一些问题需要进一步地修正。其次对其他国家和地区使用保荐制度的证券市场进行介绍,并分析其实行保荐制度的动因和制度设计特点。选取三个特点鲜明的国家及地区——英国、香港和美国进行主要介绍。英国是第一个实行保荐制度的国家。香港则是中国保荐制度的参考模版。美国的NASDAQ市场实行的股票发行监管制度虽不是保荐制度,但是具有保荐制度的特点并对保荐制有积极的参考价值。该制度相对于传统的保荐制做出了更为详细的分工,权责分明、风险分散。在分析上述三个国家的基础上,对加拿大、韩国和新加坡三个国家进行简略分析,重点描述其保荐制度中独有的特色。然后对上述六国保荐制度特点与中国A股市场中的相关制度设计进行比较分析,进而探讨其对中国保荐制度起到的借鉴作用。研究结论理清了我国保荐制度与其所在市场环境之间的关系,明晰了保荐制度与外部市场环境的变革方向。再次以博弈分析为前文论述提供理论依据,第一个模型分析保荐代表人在优选上市公司的过程中监管机构对其的控制机制,模型化监管机构对保荐代表人的业务要求,将事前监管与事后监管纳入到博弈模型中,在监管机构合理应用既有制度的条件下,设计最优监管策略来规范保荐代表人的行为。设计该模型的基于如下两个目的,一是考察保荐代表人的义务——如何才能通过制度设计使保荐代表人履职尽责；二是通过分析证监会的监管措施和相关政策,进一步研究监管策略的实用性及出现的问题,并讨论监管发行制度去行政化的可行性。从模型分析得出,监管机构对问题IPO项目的相关责任人轻罚进一步造成了保荐不力的结果,模型还证明了监管机构只要能够合理配置事后监管的有效惩罚措施,就可以起到替代事前监管效用,减少行政监管对保荐工作的干预。第二个模型在上述模型的基础上加入了对保荐代表人能力的刻画,以此分析保荐代表人由于保荐能力不同对监管机制及对新股发行效率的影响。模型中建立的分析变量为今后建立保荐综合信息披露平台提供了关于保荐代表人能力的评价标准。第三个模型用以进一步明晰在新股发行阶段各行为主体之间的博弈关系。以该模型为核心较为系统的阐述了监管机构对保荐制度的作用机制,并通过分析不同情况的发行人对保荐能力不同的保荐代表人的选择,明确其选择机制以找到进一步提高保荐质量的途径。该模型解决以下两个问题,一是得出在最优监管强度下监管机构应如何解决新股发行中有关发行人与保荐代表人的合谋问题；二是给出合理的监管模式以确保高能力保荐代表人维持高水平保荐能力的同时,也能给予低能力保荐代表人提升能力的机会,提高保荐代表人市场的整体实力。通过模型分析还可以得出,现阶段并不具备取消核准制的条件,因为首先对保荐代表人的考核制度还未建立,保荐能力不同的保荐代表人无法区分,低能力保荐代表人的保荐行为需要核准制兜底；其次事后监管体系仍未发挥对事前监管的替代作用,低位阶的惩罚措施和惩罚不连贯性导致监管行为无法对保荐过程中的违法违规问题产生有效威慑。本文的主要理论贡献是：第一,丰富了学界关于保荐制度的研究,特别是保荐代表人这一制度设计的理论研究。分析指出事前行政监管的干预、事后监管的多层次监管体系尚未建立、A股市场板块设计问题、外部辅助制度不健全和IPO项目出现问题后对相关责任人的轻罚行为等问题都造成了保荐质量无法保证的现状。文章基于上述问题,根据中国股票发行监管制度的变革过程以及外国保荐制度中的先进经验对中国核准制下的保荐制度提出改革建议,使改革方向在兼顾中国当前国情的基础上,向高效率股票发行制度的方向转变。第二,在股票发行流程中明晰我国在不同历史阶段所采取的不同发行制度的运行机制。在与之前制度对比的过程中,分析各相关主体权力与义务的改变。然后逐步分析证监会监管政策的发展、保荐制度中保荐代表人的权力与义务以及保荐代表人与保荐公司的关系。把保荐代表人作为新股发行中的独立参与主体展开分析,并将其纳入到新股发行各方权力角逐中,提供关于新股发行阶段更为完善的理论分析框架。发现保荐制度运行效率过低不仅源于其制度设计中固有的漏洞,更与政府行政监管与保荐制度不能互补合作保证保荐质量有关。通过分析政府行政监管的监管策略,解释目前监管机构“重事前监管、轻事后监管”的原因,提出建立以行政监管为主导,市场机制和司法机制同时发挥作用的多层次事后监管体系以替代事前监管,这样既能解决事前监管对新股发行的干预问题,同时还能保证IPO项目的保荐质量。第三,构建博弈模型对保荐过程中各参与主体展开分析也是本文的创新之处。诚然在这方面已有相关文献涉及,但已有模型关于发行环节的设计不够全面,参与主体之间的互动不够真实。本文建立的理论分析模型不仅把保荐代表人作为分析主体,刻画其在新股发行阶段优选上市公司的行为,还通过在模型中引入监管机构作为保荐质量和保荐制度实行效率的控制者,刻画监管机构的作用。通过求解满足纳什均衡条件的保荐要求,作为监管机构控制保荐代表人行为的依据,从而将监管机构的作用内生于模型之中。另外,模型中涵盖证监会截至2011年4月出台的监管方案,模型对该方案的实行效果进行了理论预测,认为若不对证监会的具体监管行为和处罚力度进行改进,新实行的监管方案将不会对保荐代表人的保荐质量产生促进作用。
[Abstract]:Since 2004, under the approval system of sponsor system in China A stock market to become the stock issuance system has been eight years, the implementation of the sponsor system of securities companies to carry out stock sponsor and underwriting business and develop the stock issuance professionals played an important role. At the same time, the sponsor system is set up by the stock issuing administrative approval to market transition the results, played a positive role in promoting the healthy development of China's A stock market.
But since the implementation of the sponsor system since, after the issuance of new shares of listed companies frequently due to sponsor and lack of work problems, the quality is not stable and difficult to be guaranteed, and the sponsor system also gradually revealed the internal contradictions, contradictions and conflicts between the entities involved in the behavior of the system restricts the development work of the sponsor, causing the IPO efficiency continuously the results of.2011 decline since October, the Commission in general hope to solve the existing problems of A stock market through reform. Investors increasingly strong reform of the IPO system calls, the Commission has put the stock issuance system into the scope of reform. The Commission chairman Guo Shuqing in an internal meeting in late 2011 to the Commission will the issuance of officials and the IEC members proposed IPO without trial okay? "Question. A new round of reform of stock issuing system is about to start The approval system adopted by the sponsor system and the regulatory agency on the IPO project has become a major reform target.
This paper hopes through the analysis of the path of reform and IPO sponsor system supervision mode. Firstly, the historical evolution of the system of review of the system of stock China A stock market issue, in the implementation of the stock issuance system analysis of the origin and the historical background of the sponsor system and design concept, the sponsor system analyzes from two aspects: one is the effect from the A stock market as a whole study of external system on the sponsor system, through the analysis of the two is the main parties in the system of action strategy, mutual influence the interpretation of various actors in different interest demands. Through the above two aspects clear sponsor system external causes and internal causes of the problems in the implementation process. Found the sponsor system presents problems and cannot be solely attributed to the defects of the system design, the external system of A stock market is not perfect is caused by the lack of sponsor The reason has been the supervision system in China A stock market supervision administrative monopoly situation caused by the market mechanism and the judicial system can not play its due role in the pre regulation stage and post regulation stage, administrative supervision strategy not only on single A stock market play a comprehensive role in protection, the behavior of market intervention hinder the healthy development of A stock market, excessive administrative control of listed companies has become a scarce resource, the responsibility is not clear, there prior regulatory intervention market choice and supervision problems caused by lack of sufficient punishment and rules is unknown. Thus, under the approval system of sponsor system as the IPO system, there are still some problems need to be further modified.
Followed by the introduction of other countries and regions, the use of the sponsor system of securities market, and analyze the implementation of the sponsor system and motivation system design features. Select three distinct characteristics of the countries and regions in Britain, Hongkong and the United States are mainly introduced. Britain is the first implementation of the sponsor system in the country. Hongkong is the Chinese sponsor system the reference template. NASDAQ system of the United States market implementation of stock issuance is not the sponsor system, but has the characteristics of the sponsor system and the sponsor system has a positive reference value. The system relative to the traditional sponsor system made more detailed division of labor, accountability, risk diversification. Based on the analysis of the three countries. A brief analysis on, Canada, South Korea and Singapore three countries, focusing on the description of the unique characteristics of the sponsor system. Then the six characteristics of the sponsor system Compared with the related system design China A stock market, and to discuss the China of sponsor system is helpful to clarify the research conclusion. The relationship between system and the market environment in China, clarifies the direction of change sponsor system and the external market environment.
Again in the game analysis provides a theoretical basis for the previous discussion, the first model to analyze the regulatory process in the preferred sponsor representative of listed companies on the control mechanism, model of regulatory requirements on the sponsor representative of the business, the ex ante regulation and supervision into the game model, the rational use of existing regulatory agencies the system under the condition of optimal regulation strategy is designed to regulate the sponsor representative behavior. The following two objective design based on the model, one is to study the sponsor representative Obligation -- how to through the design of the system to sponsor representative duty; the two is through the analysis of the Commission's regulatory measures and related policies, further Practicality Study on the supervision strategy and problems, and discuss the feasibility of supervision to the administration of the issuance system. Obtained from the analysis model of IPO to regulators The responsible person light penalty caused further sponsor poor results, the model also proves that regulators can effectively punitive measures as long as reasonable allocation of supervision afterwards, it can replace the prior regulatory effectiveness, reduce the administrative supervision of the sponsor's intervention. The second model with the description of the sponsor representative ability based on the model on this analysis of the sponsor representative due to sponsor ability of different effect on the regulation mechanism and efficiency of the new shares issued. Analysis of variables in the model established provides a sponsor representative capability evaluation criteria for the future establishment of the comprehensive information disclosure platform.
The third model to further clarify the issue of game between the various actors in the new stage. The model is the core of a systematic exposition of the mechanism of regulators on the sponsor system, and through the analysis of the different circumstances of the Issuer on the ability of different sponsor representative selection, the selection mechanism to find further the way to improve the quality of the model. To solve the following two problems, one is that regulatory agencies in optimal regulation strength should be how to solve the issue of new shares of the issuer and the sponsor representative of the collusion problem; two is given a reasonable supervision mode to ensure high ability to maintain a high level of sponsor sponsor representative capacity at the same time, also can give low ability to sponsor representative promotion opportunities, increasing the overall strength of the sponsor representative of the market. Through the analysis of the model can also be obtained, at the present stage Do not have to cancel the approval conditions, because the first sponsor representative of the assessment system has not been established, the ability to distinguish between different sponsor representatives, low ability to sponsor representative of the sponsor to reveal the approval system; secondly the post regulatory system has yet to play a role in substituting for the supervision, low order punishment and the punishment is not coherent behavior cannot lead to regulation on the issue of illegal sponsor generated in the process of effective deterrence.
The main theoretical contributions of this paper are:
First, to enrich the academic research on the sponsor system, especially the theoretical study of the system design. The representative analysis pointed out that the ex ante administrative regulation and intervention, multi-level supervision system after the regulation has not yet been established, A stock market plate design, external auxiliary system is not perfect and the IPO project of light punishment behavior the responsibility of the problem after problems have caused a sponsor status can not guarantee the quality. Based on the above problems, according to the change process of the system of China stock issuance and the foreign advanced experience of the system of Chinese approval system under the sponsor system reform proposals put forward to the direction of reform in the base of the China current situation, change the stock issuing system to the direction of high efficiency.
In second, the stock issuance process in our country clear in different historical stages to different distribution system operation mechanism. In the process and the system prior to contrast analysis, the relevant subjects of rights and obligations and then gradually change. Analysis of the development of the Commission's regulatory policies, the relationship between rights and obligations of the sponsor representative of the sponsor system and the representative of the sponsor and sponsor company. The sponsor representative as the issue of new shares in the independent participants to analyze and integrate them into the power of each race in the IPO, the IPO stage provides a more perfect theoretical framework. The low efficiency of the system not only found the source in the system's inherent design more loopholes, and government supervision and sponsor system cannot guarantee the quality of complementary cooperation. Through the analysis of the administrative supervision supervision strategy, explain the current Regulators "ex ante regulation, cause light supervision afterwards, proposed the establishment of administrative supervision oriented, market mechanism and judicial mechanism and play role multi-level supervision by the system to replace the ex ante regulation, so as to solve the problem of the prior regulatory intervention of the IPO, but also guarantee the quality of the IPO project.
Third, to build a game model on the process of the participation of the main analysis is the innovation of this paper. Of course in this literature relates to, but there are aspects of the issue of model design is not comprehensive, the interaction among the participants is not true. The theoretical analysis model is established in this paper is not only the sponsor representative is used as the main analysis, characterization in the IPO stage selection behavior of listed companies, but also by introducing control regulators in the model as the sponsor and the sponsor system to implement quality efficiency, describe the supervision role. By solving the Nash equilibrium conditions meet the requirements of sponsor, as regulators control the sponsor representative behavior according to the regulatory role born in the model. In addition, the model covers the Commission as regulatory scheme introduced in April 2011, the model of the scheme. A theoretical prediction is made for the row effect. If we do not improve the specific supervision behavior and punishment intensity of the SFC, the new supervision scheme will not promote the sponsor's sponsorship quality.

【学位授予单位】：山东大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F832.51

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