地方官员治理与城市商业银行的贷款行为

发布时间：2018-01-14 21:27

本文关键词：地方官员治理与城市商业银行的贷款行为　出处：《南开大学》2012年博士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：政府对银行的所有权在世界范围内广泛存在，由此导致了作为股东的政府对银行贷款的干预行为。对政府股东经济后果的研究也由早期的“发展观”演进至目前引起广泛关注的“政治观”，即认为政治家会基于自身的政治动机而非社会福利控制银行信贷的配置，从而不利于银行和金融体系的发展。大量的研究从政府股东的宏观影响、个体效应以及银行行为等方面考察了这一问题，也得出了较为丰富和一致的成果。然而需要指出的是，目前对此问题的研究仍将政府看做一个整体，试图从政府的层面探讨其对银行贷款的作用来证实政府股东的“政治观”。而我们认为政府行为只是一种表面结果，更深层次的则是官员行为。政府本身是一个抽象的“黑箱”，其所表现出来的各种特征其实是作为实体的官员动机的体现，正是官员将自身的政治目的嵌入到作为股东的政府之中，才使得政府股东表现出“政治性”。从这个意义上讲，目前的研究事实上只见政府不见官员，未能将政府行为推进到背后的实质性个体——官员，并没有提供“政治观”的直接证据。因此对政府股东“政治观”的研究需要从“政府与银行”深入到“官员与银行”，这有助于我们从根源上理解政府与银行的关系。而我国的城市商业银行（以下简称为城商行）是检验这一问题的合适样本，因为一方面，在我国的行政型治理体制下，地方政府不仅拥有城商行的控股权，而且也控制着城商行高管人员的任免，这使得作为地方政府实质性个体的官员有足够的能力来干预城商行的贷款行为。另一方面，在我国地方官员围绕GDP增长为主的晋升锦标赛体制下，地方官员的治理特征会影响地方经济增长，而作为推动经济增长的重要资金来源，地方官员有强烈的动力来干预银行贷款；特别是在目前地方政府投资来源受限的情况下，城商行就进一步成为地方官员推动经济增长、实现政治晋升的重要手段。基于以上逻辑，本文将视角从政府拓展到官员，探讨了地方官员治理特征对城商行贷款行为的影响，以期为政府股东的“政治观”提供直接而有力的证据。论文的研究思路和框架遵循从规范到实证的研究范式。在第一章的引言中介绍了论文的研究问题、研究方法等之后，第二章分别从政府股东的经济后果以及地方政府激励与经济增长两个方面对国内外相关研究进行了评述，在此基础上通过对我国地方政府与银行关系制度演进的分析，从理论上阐述了本文的逻辑框架。第三章开始进入了实证分析部分，本文的样本为我国2006-2009年城商行及所在城市市委书记的对应样本，我们手工收集了相关的城商行年报及官员的个体特征资料，从地方官员治理特征包括晋升激励、来源、任期、去向、更替等角度考察了其对银行贷款的影响。第三章研究了地方官员晋升压力的作用，结果表明晋升压力会显著影响城商行的贷款行为，而官员任期也会对二者关系有显著作用。同时，晋升压力也会通过特定的贷款行为引致不良贷款，且在官员考核体系中增加环境、民生指标的比重能够有效抑制不良贷款的累积。基于官员异质性和激励异质性的分析，第四章从地方官员来源、任期、去向等特征而第五章从官员更替视角研究了其对城商行贷款的影响。结果表明不同来源、任期、去向官员辖内的城商行信贷投放存在较大差异；而官员的更替会导致城商行较快的贷款增长，且这种效应会因官员和城市特征而有所差异。第六章则进一步考察了银行内部治理机制对官员任期与贷款关系的作用，结果表明官员任期与城商行贷款投放显著正相关，且官员董事这一特殊的政治关联方式会强化官员任期与贷款投放的关系。最后第七章为全文的结论。总体而言，本文突破了以往对政府与银行关系的研究，从官员与银行的视角考察了地方官员治理特征对城商行贷款的影响，表明官员的各种治理特征会对银行贷款产生重要而显著的影响，为政府股东的“政治观”提供了直接证据。同时本文创新性的将已有对省级官员的研究拓展到地市级，并且将对官员治理的研究从影响经济发展的宏观层面深入到企业行为的微观视角。本文的研究意味着，在理论上对政府股东和政府行为的研究需要从官员这一全新且本质的视角出发，而在实践上实现城商行的可持续发展应主要从增加地方官员的干预难度和弱化干预动力两个方面着手。
[Abstract]:Government ownership of banks is widespread in the world, which leads to the behavior of government intervention as a shareholder of bank loans to the government. The shareholders the economic consequences of the research from the early "development" evolution to the present caused widespread concern of the "political concept", namely that politicians will own political motivation based on the non allocation of social welfare control of bank credit, which is not conducive to the development of the banking and financial system. A large number of studies from the macro effects of government shareholders, individual effect and bank behavior were investigated this problem, also have a more rich and consistent results. However, it is necessary to point out that the current study of this issue will the government as a whole, to explore its effect on bank loans from the government level to confirm the government shareholder "political view." but we think the government behavior is just a The surface, the deeper is the official behavior. The government itself is an abstract of the "black box", the characters shown is reflected as the entity of the official motivation, it is their own political officials will be embedded into the government as a shareholder, the government shareholders demonstrate "political". In this sense, the present study actually saw no government officials, failed to advance to the government behavior behind the substantial individual officials did not provide direct evidence of political views. So the research on government shareholders "political concept" from "government and bank" deeply "officials and bank", which helps us to understand the relationship between the government and from the root of the bank.
China's City Commercial Bank (hereinafter referred to as the city firm) is to test the appropriate samples of this issue, because on the one hand, the administrative governance system of our country, holding power to the local government not only has the city firm, but also control the appointment and removal of the city firm executives, which makes the loan behavior as the place government officials of the individual's ability to intervene in the city firm. On the other hand, in the promotion tournament system of China's local officials around the GDP growth mainly under the governance characteristics of local officials will affect local economic growth, and as an important source of funds to promote economic growth, local officials have a strong incentive to the intervention of bank loans; especially in the current local government investment limited, the city firm will further become the local officials to promote economic growth, an important means to realize the political promotion based on. From the perspective of logic, this paper extends the perspective from the government to the officials, and explores the influence of local officials' governance characteristics on the loan behavior of city commercial banks, in order to provide direct and powerful evidence for the government shareholders' "political outlook".
The research ideas and the framework follows from specification to empirical research paradigm. In the first chapter, the introduction introduces the research questions, research methods, the second chapter respectively from the economic consequences of the government shareholder and local government incentives and economic growth on the two aspects of domestic and international related research were reviewed, on the basis of through the analysis of the evolution of the relationship between the local government and the bank system of our country, the framework of this paper. The third chapter in the part of empirical analysis, the sample for our 2006-2009 City firm and city party secretary of the corresponding sample, we collect the data of annual report and the individual characteristics of the city firm officials the manual, from local officials governance characteristics including promotion incentive, source term, whereabouts, replacement and studied the impact on bank loans.
The third chapter studies the role of local officials' promotion pressure. The results show that the promotion pressure will significantly affect the lending behavior of city commercial banks, and the official term will have significant effect on the relationship between the two. At the same time, the pressure will be promoted through the specific loan behavior caused by bad loans, and the increase of environment in the official assessment system, the cumulative livelihood index the proportion of non-performing loans can effectively inhibit. Analysis of heterogeneity and heterogeneity of official incentive based on the fourth chapter, from the source to local officials, term, and characteristics such as the fifth chapter from the perspective of officials change to study their impact on city commercial loans. The results show that the different source term, to the jurisdiction of the city commercial bank credit officers there is a big difference; and the officials of the replacement will lead the city firm rapid loan growth, and the effect for officials and city characteristics vary. The sixth chapter further The effects of bank internal governance mechanism on the relationship between officials and the results show that the loan term, officials tenure and city commercial lending was a significant positive correlation, and official board of this special political association will strengthen the relationship between tenure and official lending. Finally, the seventh chapter is the conclusion of this paper.
Overall, this paper breaks the previous research on the relationship between government and banks, the influence of local officials on governance characteristics of city commercial loans from officials and bank angle, shows that all officials will affect the governance characteristics of important and significant for bank loans, providing direct evidence for government shareholders "political view." at the same time this paper will research on provincial officials to expand the micro perspective and Research on, officials from the macro level of economic development into the enterprise behavior. This study means that the theoretical research of government shareholder and government behavior need to proceed from this new and essential from the perspective of officials, and realize the sustainable development of city commercial banks should be mainly from the two aspects of increasing difficulty and weakening power intervention of local officials to intervene in practice.

【学位授予单位】：南开大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：D630;F832.4

【引证文献】