中国上市公司高管激励与公司绩效研究

发布时间：2018-01-17 13:38

本文关键词：中国上市公司高管激励与公司绩效研究　出处：《重庆大学》2012年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：高管激励问题的产生来源于现代企业所有权和经营权的相互分离，高级管理者与股东之间存在着目标不一致、信息不对称等代理问题，现代企业经营的复杂性和不确定性更是加剧了这一问题的严重性，而通过签订一份契约，设计和执行一套良好的激励机制，更有效解决上市委托代理问题。在人才是第一生产力的知识时代，人才竞争是企业之间的最主要竞争，而公司高管是企业中最稀缺也是最重要的人力资源，如何有效地吸引并留住高管进而增加企业的价值已经成为企业求发展的关键，高管激励正是起着这样一种作用。本文主要分析了中国上市公司高管激励与公司绩效之间的关系，并将上市公司通过终极控股原理分为国有上市公司和民营上市公司两个类型，并研究了国有上市公司高管的物质激励、政治激励与公司绩效的关系，民营上市公司高管的政治激励与公司绩效关系，并且研究了民营上市公司高管政治身份对公司经营带来的优势。对于国有上市公司来说，研究结果发现，国有上市公司高管的薪酬激励不能显著改善公司绩效，而股权激励与公司绩效之间存在正的相关关系，总体上政治激励与公司绩效之间存在正的相关关系。公司高管持股普遍不高，股权激励作为一种有效的激励方式没有被很好利用。上级职能部门对公司绩效的认可更多是给予董事长政治上的晋升，总经理物质上的回报。而当存在晋升机会的时候，绩效对物质报酬的边际贡献下降，此时物质激励和政治激励之间存在着替代关系。对于民营上市公司来说，研究结果发现，对民营上市公司高管实施政治激励是对物质激励的一种有效补充，政治激励在一定程度上也能有效激励民营上市公司高管认真经营企业，但是政府干预民营上市公司的经营显著不利于公司绩效。并且，我们发现当民营上市公司高管获得政治身份后，能为公司带来融资便利性，在政府干预强烈的地区，这种高管政治身份的融资便利性更加显著。
[Abstract]:The problem of executive incentive comes from the separation of ownership and management right of modern enterprises. There are some agency problems such as inconsistent objectives and asymmetric information between senior managers and shareholders. The complexity and uncertainty of modern enterprise management aggravate the seriousness of this problem, and by signing a contract, design and implement a set of good incentive mechanism. In the knowledge age where talent is the first productive force, talent competition is the most important competition among enterprises, and company executives are the scarcest and most important human resources in enterprises. How to effectively attract and retain executives and then increase the value of enterprises has become the key to the development of enterprises, executive incentive is playing such a role. This paper mainly analyzes the relationship between executive incentive and corporate performance of listed companies in China, and divides the listed companies into state-owned listed companies and private listed companies through the ultimate holding principle. And studied the material incentive of the senior executives of the state-owned listed companies, the relationship between the political incentives and corporate performance, and the relationship between the political incentives and corporate performance of the senior executives of private listed companies. It also studies the advantages brought by the political identity of private listed companies to the management of the company. For the state-owned listed companies, the results show that the executive compensation incentives of state-owned listed companies can not significantly improve corporate performance, but there is a positive correlation between equity incentives and corporate performance. Overall, there is a positive correlation between political incentives and corporate performance. Equity incentive as an effective incentive method has not been used very well. The recognition of corporate performance by higher functional departments is more to give the chairman of the political promotion. When there are opportunities for promotion, the marginal contribution of performance to material reward decreases, and there is a substitute relationship between material incentive and political incentive. For private listed companies, the results of the study found that the implementation of political incentives to private listed company executives is an effective supplement to material incentives. To a certain extent, political incentives can also effectively encourage executives of private listed companies to seriously manage enterprises, but government intervention in the management of private listed companies is significantly detrimental to corporate performance. We find that when private listed company executives obtain political identity, it can bring financing convenience for the company. In the regions where government intervention is strong, the financing convenience of this kind of executive political identity is more significant.
【学位授予单位】：重庆大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F832.51;F272.92;F224

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