中小板上市公司高管减持信号传递效应研究

发布时间：2018-01-19 21:47

本文关键词： 高管减持中小板上市公司信号传递效应　出处：《华南理工大学》2012年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：相较于普通投资者而言，上市公司高管掌握着本家上市公司更多的真实、有效信息，同时对有关公司前景以及行业的发展趋势也有着相对准确的把握。信号传递理论认为，由于信息的不对称和市场的不完全有效，高管的减持行为可以成为一种有效传递内部信息的工具，来达到内部管理者与外部投资者的信息均衡，投资者也可以根据市场的反应来判断公司的发展状况和质量。由于中国证券市场发展尚未成熟，公司的治理结构尚不完善，，中小板上市公司高管减持行为的研究也未得到国内学者和管理部门的充分重视，因此对中小板上市公司高管减持行为信号传递效应进行研究分析具有一定的现实意义。本文在信号传递理论、委托代理理论和有效市场理论的研究基础上，以我国中小板上市公司高管股票减持股票行为作为研究对象，对我国中小板上市公司高管的减持行为的现状以及原因进行总结，并且结合2008-2010年我国中小板上市公司经济数据，采用事件研究法，分析我国中小板上市公司高管减持信息的披露与股票异常收益率的关系，研究中小板高管减持的信号传递效应，并使用2011年数据对结果进行稳健性检验，最终得出本文的结论。研究结果表明：1.中小板上市公司高管减持行为信号传递效应较差。2.中小板上市公司高管减持股票占流通股比例越大，越易于在减持公告日后造成负的异常收益，而减持股票占流通股比例越小，则该种信息的传递变得相对不明确。3.中小板上市公司高管减持频率显著影响减持事件信号传递效应。最后，根据实证结果，对如何进一步规范中小板高管的减持行为的监管，增强减持行为的信号传递效应方面提了一些合理化建议。
[Abstract]:Compared with ordinary investors, executives of listed companies hold more real and effective information about their listed companies. At the same time, we also have a relatively accurate grasp of the prospects of the company and the development trend of the industry. The theory of signal transmission holds that because of the asymmetry of information and the incomplete effectiveness of the market. The behavior of executive reduction can become an effective tool to transfer internal information to achieve the information balance between internal managers and external investors. Investors can also judge the development and quality of the company according to the reaction of the market. Because the development of Chinese securities market is not mature, the corporate governance structure is not perfect. The research on the behavior of executive reduction in small and medium-sized listed companies has not been paid enough attention by domestic scholars and management departments. Therefore, it is of practical significance to study and analyze the signal transmission effect of executive reduction behavior in small and medium board listed companies. Based on the research of signal transmission theory, principal-agent theory and efficient market theory, this paper takes the stock reduction behavior of senior executives of small and medium-sized board listed companies as the research object. This paper summarizes the current situation and reasons of the reduction behavior of the senior executives of the small and medium-sized board listed companies in our country, and combines the economic data of China's small and medium-sized board listed companies from 2008 to 2010, adopts the event research method. This paper analyzes the relationship between the disclosure of the information of senior management reduction and the abnormal return on stock of the small and medium-sized board listed companies in China, studies the signalling effect of the reduction, and uses the data of 2011 to test the stability of the results. Finally the conclusion of this paper. The research results show that the small and medium-sized board listed company executive reduction behavior signal transmission effect is poor .2. the small and medium-sized board listed company executive reduction shares in the proportion of outstanding shares is larger. The easier it is to cause negative abnormal returns after the announcement of the reduction, and the smaller the proportion of shares in circulation. Then the transmission of this kind of information becomes relatively unclear. 3. The frequency of senior management reduction of small and medium-sized board listed companies has a significant impact on the signal transmission effect of the reduction event. Finally, according to the empirical results, this paper puts forward some reasonable suggestions on how to further regulate the regulation of the reduction behavior of senior executives in small and medium-sized boards, and enhance the signaling effect of the reduction behavior.
【学位授予单位】：华南理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F832.51

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