我国上市公司会计稳健性与非效率投资行为的关系研究

发布时间：2018-01-22 12:35

本文关键词： 会计稳健性过度投资投资不足实际控制权人性质　出处：《山东财经大学》2012年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：会计稳健性是财务报告中的重要的原则，新会计准则更是将其明确定位为一项会计信息质量特征，近年来受到了会计学者越来越多的关注。当前关于会计稳健性的研究主要集中在是否存在及影响因素上，对其经济后果的研究是少之又少。而非效率投资作为信息不对称和委托代理情况下代理成本增高的典型表现形式，会侵害股东和债权人的利益，进而影响到公司价值已经成为公司财务领域的共识。本文试图从会计稳健性这一视角出发，考察上市公司的非效率投资行为，研究会计稳健性和非效率投资的关系。本文根据信息不对称和委托代理理论，在文献回顾和理论分析的基础上提出了会计稳健性与非效率投资之间关系的假设，选取2008-2010年我国沪深两市A股制造业上市公司作为样本，分别以累计三年负非经营性应计项和Richardson (2006)模型为基础衡量会计稳健性和非效率投资，运用描述性统计分析、相关性检验统计分析和多元线性回归等计量分析方法对会计稳健性与非效率投资的关系进行了检验，并进一步考察了实际控制权人性质是如何影响会计稳健性与非效率投资行为的关系。论文的研究发现主要是：（1）会计稳健性明显能抑制过度投资的发生；（2）会计稳健性会导致投资不足行为，但是这种影响并不显著；（3）实际控制权人的的性质并未影响会计稳健性抑制过度投资的行为；（4）会计稳健性整体上具有抑制非效率投资的作用。本文为理解会计稳健性的经济后果提供了新的经验证据，，并拓展了改善非效率投资行为的研究思路。
[Abstract]:Accounting conservatism is an important principle in financial reporting, and the new accounting standards clearly position it as a quality characteristic of accounting information. In recent years, more and more attention has been paid by accounting scholars. At present, the research on accounting conservatism is mainly focused on the existence of accounting conservatism and its influencing factors. The research on its economic consequences is very few, but the non-efficient investment, as a typical manifestation of the increase of agency cost under asymmetric information and principal-agent situation, will infringe on the interests of shareholders and creditors. This paper attempts to investigate the inefficient investment behavior of listed companies from the perspective of accounting conservatism. The relationship between accounting conservatism and inefficient investment is studied. Based on the information asymmetry and principal-agent theory, this paper puts forward the hypothesis of the relationship between accounting conservatism and inefficient investment on the basis of literature review and theoretical analysis. From 2008 to 2010, China's A-share manufacturing companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets were selected as samples. The accounting conservatism and non-efficiency investment are measured on the basis of accumulative negative non-operating accruals and Richardson 2006) models, and descriptive statistical analysis is used. The relationship between accounting conservatism and inefficient investment is tested by statistical analysis of correlation test and multivariate linear regression. The relationship between accounting conservatism and inefficient investment behavior is further investigated. The main findings of this paper are: (1) Accounting conservatism can obviously restrain the occurrence of overinvestment; Accounting conservatism will lead to underinvestment behavior, but this effect is not significant; (3) the nature of actual controlling person does not affect the behavior of accounting conservatism to restrain overinvestment; This paper provides new empirical evidence for understanding the economic consequences of accounting conservatism and extends the research ideas to improve the behavior of non-efficient investment.
【学位授予单位】：山东财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F233;F832.51;F224

【引证文献】