我国上市公司关联交易及动因的实证研究

发布时间：2018-02-01 02:02

本文关键词： 上市公司关联交易盈余管理实证研究　出处：《山西大学》2012年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：我国的关联交易问题是伴随证券市场的发展而提出的。它与初步发展的中国资本市场和以股份制改造为核心的企业改制存在着天然的联系。中国的公司内外部环境不完善为关联交易提供了滋长的环境,上市公司的关联交易相当普遍且金额巨大。许多研究证据表明中国目前的内外部环境不能限制控股股东通过关联交易操纵利润和侵害中小股东。大量非公允关联交易的存在,扭曲了资本市场资源配置的功能,误导投资者错误投资理念的形成。尽管关联交易一直是我国证券市场的焦点问题,但由于其数据收集比较困难以及自身的复杂性,缺少大样本的实证研究。因此,本文在此领域进行探索。本文首先在对相关文献回顾的基础上,对关联交易和盈余管理进行了概述,阐明了关联交易的界定标准并界定了盈余管理的相关概念；同时回顾了国内对关联交易监管的发展历程,指出国内上市公司及其关联方利用关联交易进行盈余管理动因。在实证中,以2010年沪深两市披露重大关联交易并被出具无保留审计意见的A股非金融类上市公司为样本,对样本是否利用关联交易进行盈余管理作实证分析；并根据文中阐述的理论动机提出影响上市公司利用关联交易进行盈余管理的几个影响因素：扭亏动机、存在控股股东以及改善资产负债率,针对此影响因素进行实证研究。结果发现：样本上市公司明显存在利用关联交易进行盈余管理的行为,并且有扭亏动机的公司、存在配股的公司及改善其资产负债率的行为,关联交易盈余管理动机明显。本文的研究表明,要从根本上解决关联交易问题,必须从两方面入手：既要完善企业信息披露制度又要完善中小股东保护制度,使上市公司真正成为独立自主的企业,而不是其他企业或部门的附属品。
[Abstract]:The related party transaction problem in China is brought forward with the development of the securities market. It has a natural relationship with the initial development of China's capital market and the reform of enterprises with the core of shareholding system transformation. The internal and external ring of Chinese companies. The imperfect environment provides a growing environment for related party transactions. The related party transactions of listed companies are quite common and the amount of money is huge. Many research evidences show that the current internal and external environment in China cannot restrict controlling shareholders from manipulating profits and infringing small and medium-sized shareholders through related party transactions. The existence of a deal. It distorts the function of capital market resource allocation and misleads the formation of investors' wrong investment idea, although related party transaction has always been the focus of our securities market. However, due to the difficulty of data collection and the complexity of its own, there is a lack of empirical research on large samples. Therefore, this paper explores this field. Firstly, based on the review of relevant literature, this paper summarizes the related transactions and earnings management, clarifies the definition criteria of related party transactions and defines the relevant concepts of earnings management; At the same time, it reviews the development of domestic regulation of related party transactions, and points out that domestic listed companies and their related parties use affiliated transactions for earnings management motivation. In 2010, Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets disclosed significant related party transactions and were issued unqualified audit opinion of A-share non-financial listed companies as a sample, whether the sample use related party transactions for earnings management for empirical analysis; According to the theoretical motivation described in this paper, the paper puts forward several factors that affect the earnings management of listed companies by using related party transactions: the motivation to turn losses, the existence of controlling shareholders and the improvement of the ratio of assets and liabilities. Empirical research on this factor. The results show that: the sample of listed companies obviously use related party transactions for earnings management behavior, and there is a turnaround motivation of the company. Companies with rights issue and the behavior of improving their asset-liability ratio have obvious motivation for earnings management in affiliated transactions. The research in this paper shows that in order to solve the problem of related party transactions fundamentally, we must start from two aspects: we should improve the system of enterprise information disclosure and the protection system of minority shareholders. To make the listed company truly independent and independent, and not a subsidiary of other enterprises or departments.
【学位授予单位】：山西大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F275;F832.51;F224

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