金融行业高管薪酬外部公平性、在职消费与公司业绩

发布时间：2018-02-23 22:27

本文关键词： 限薪令金融行业高管货币薪酬高管货币薪酬外部公平性在职消费公司业绩　出处：《山东大学》2012年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：随着2007年年报中高管年薪的公布,中国平安保险董事长马明哲年薪超过6000万,此信息一披露,更引起了社会公众对金融行业高管“天价薪酬”的广泛关注。金融行业高管高薪问题不只是公司代理成本问题,而已经上升为社会公平问题。根据新浪网站的调查“2010年全国两会,你最关注什么话题”的调查结果,公众对“收入差距及收入分配改革问题”的关注程度位居榜首。跟据近几年的中国企业高管薪酬调查报告,金融行业一直稳居榜首。Wind数据显示,2010年,金融行业高管薪酬最高,农林牧渔业行业高管薪酬最低。如果将金融行业支付高管团队的平均总薪酬与非金融行业相比较,前者的每家公司高管平均总薪酬为2483万元,后者平均为368万元,前者是后者的7倍。在2010年的政府工作报告中表明,我国的经济社会发展指导思想已从“效率优先、兼顾公平”过渡到“注重社会公平”阶段。而引起社会公众共同关注的金融行业高管高薪问题正是与此文件精神相悖,针对这种现状,自2009年2月份开始,财政部便连续下发《金融类国有及国有控股企业绩效评价暂行办法》、《关于金融类国有和国有控股企业负责人薪酬管理有关问题的通知》、《金融类国有及国有控股企业负责人薪酬管理办法(征求意见稿)》和《规范国有金融机构高管人员薪酬分配秩序》等多个文件。2010年3月,为实施更为严格的薪酬管制,银监会发布实施《商业银行稳健薪酬监管指引》。在金融危机的背景下,对于金融行业的薪酬管制不只是我国的特例,在美国、法国等世界各国都已开始颁布适合各自国情的金融行业“限薪令”。在国内外“限薪令”的制度背景下,本文研究我国金融企业高管货币薪酬及其外部公平性的现状,并通过建立模型分析二者与在职消费的关系,以探究货币薪酬的限制效果是否通过在职消费这类隐性收入所化解。在此基础上,进一步研究高管薪酬及其外部公平性、在职消费三者与公司业绩的关系,从公司利益的角度,探究薪酬管制对金融企业的影响。通过数据收集、模型建立以及数据分析,得出以下结论： (一)高管货币薪酬与在职消费之间存在同增同减的关系,支持所有者虚位理论。 (二)虽然高管货币薪酬影响在职消费,但是高管货币薪酬外部公平性与在职消费之间不存在显著性关系。 (三)虽然2010年银监会出台了《商业银行稳健薪酬监管指引》,将绩效工资与风险控制指标相挂钩,但高管薪酬与财务杠杆之间并不存在显著性关系。 (四)我国金融行业高管持股比例低甚至普遍为零持股,这表明了我国高管薪酬激励方式的单一性,缺乏股权激励这种长期激励方式的运用。 (五)高管货币薪酬水平与公司业绩存在双向的正相关关系。 (六)高管薪酬的外部公平性与公司绩效之间存在显著负相关关系,这一现象是由金融行业的薪酬管制现状的特殊性造成的。 (七)在职消费与公司业绩存在不显著的负相关关系,从一定程度上说明了在职消费对公司绩效存在负面影响。最后,本文在数据分析结果与实证结论的基础上,分别从公司层面和制度层面,对金融行业高管薪酬激励体制的设计与政府薪酬管制的现状提出了具有针对性的七条建议。同时,指出了本文研究的不足以及未来研究方向的展望。
[Abstract]:As executives announced the 2007 annual report of the annual salary, chairman of Ping An insurance China Ma Mingzhe annual salary of more than 60 million, the disclosure of this information, the more aroused public attention to the financial industry executives "salary". The financial industry executives paid not only agency cost problem, and has given rise to the problem of social equity. According to the 2010 national NPC and CPPCC investigation of sina, the results of the survey what you most concerned about the topic, the public attention to the income gap and income distribution reform "topped the list.
According to the investigation report of Chinese executive compensation in recent years, the financial industry has been ranked in the top.Wind data show that in 2010, the highest executive pay in the financial industry, animal husbandry and fishery industry executive compensation. If the minimum average total pay in the financial industry to pay the team compared with the non financial sector, the average total compensation of each company executives of the former the latter is 24 million 830 thousand yuan, an average of 3 million 680 thousand yuan, the former is 7 times of the latter.
Show that in 2010 the government work report, economic and social development concept to guide our country has changed from "efficiency first, fairness" to "social justice". The financial industry executives paid problem caused by the common concern of the public is contrary to the spirit of the document, in view of this situation, since the beginning of 2009 February then, the Ministry of Finance for the state-owned and state-controlled financial enterprises issued "Interim Measures for performance evaluation of < >, state-owned and state-controlled financial enterprises who pay management issues related to notice", "financial state-owned and state holding enterprises responsible for salary management approach (Draft)" and "national norms financial institution executives salary distribution order > multiple file.2010 in March, for the implementation of more stringent regulation, the CBRC issued the" Commercial Bank Supervisory Guidelines on sound compensation in the financial crisis. Under the background of the machine, the salary regulation for the financial industry is not only a special case of our country, but also in the US, France and other countries all over the world has begun to promulgate the financial industry "salary limit order" which is suitable for their respective national conditions.
At home and abroad the institutional background of salary under the situation of executive monetary and financial enterprises in China compensation and external equity of this paper, and through the establishment of model to analyze the relationship between the two and on-the-job consumption, to limit the effect on monetary compensation through on-the-job consumption this kind of hidden income resolve. On this basis, further research on the executive compensation and external equity, the relationship between consumption three and the performance of the company, the company from the perspective of interests, explore the impact of compensation regulation on financial enterprises. Through data collection, data modeling and analysis, draw the following conclusions:
(a) between executive monetary compensation and perquisite consumption have the same relationship increase with the decrease of the support of owners phantom theory.
(two) although executive monetary compensation affects on-the-job consumption, there is no significant relationship between executive monetary compensation external equity and on-the-job consumption.
(three) although the CBRC issued the guidelines for the stable remuneration of commercial banks in 2010, it linked the performance pay with risk control indicators, but there was no significant relationship between executive pay and financial leverage.
(four) the shareholding ratio of Chinese financial industry executives is low or even zero shareholding. This indicates the singleness of executive compensation incentive mode in China, and the lack of long-term incentive mode of equity incentive.
(five) there is a two-way positive correlation between the level of executive monetary remuneration and the performance of the company.
(six) there is a significant negative correlation between executive compensation external equity and company performance. This phenomenon is caused by the particularity of the salary regulation status in the financial industry.
(seven) there is an insignificant negative correlation between on-the-job consumption and company performance, to a certain extent, the negative impact of on-the-job consumption on corporate performance is shown to a certain extent.
Finally, this paper based on the data analysis and empirical results on separately from the company level and system level design, status of financial industry executive compensation incentive system and government compensation regulation proposed seven suggestions. At the same time, pointed out the shortcomings of this study and future research directions.

【学位授予单位】：山东大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F832.2;F272;F224

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