现金流权视角下大股东侵占对上市企业资本配置决策的影响研究

发布时间：2018-02-24 15:05

本文关键词： 大股东侵占资本配置风险性资产投资无风险资产投资　出处：《管理工程学报》2010年04期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：基于企业资本配置的理论阐释,以无风险资产与风险性资产投资为研究对象,将大股东侵占因素内生到企业价值期权模型之中,数值分析大股东的侵占行为对企业资本配置决策和企业价值的影响。研究结果表明:(1)大股东的侵占行为是导致上市企业资本配置行为扭曲、资本配置非效率的一个重要原因;(2)大股东的侵占行为导致上市企业对风险性资产投资的非效率"挤占";(3)大股东的侵占水平与无风险资产的配置比例正相关,与风险性资本的配置比例负相关;(4)大股东的侵占水平与企业价值负相关,现金流权比例的增大降低了大股东的侵占水平,提升了企业价值。
[Abstract]:Based on the theoretical explanation of enterprise capital allocation, taking risk-free assets and risky assets investment as the research object, the major shareholder encroachment factor is endogenous into the enterprise value option model. The numerical analysis of the influence of the large shareholder's encroachment behavior on the capital allocation decision and enterprise value shows that the embezzlement behavior of the large shareholder leads to the distortion of the capital allocation behavior of the listed enterprises. An important reason for the inefficiency of capital allocation is that the encroachment behavior of large shareholders leads to the inefficient "crowding out" of risky assets investment by listed enterprises) the level of embezzlement of large shareholders is positively related to the allocation of risk-free assets. It is negatively correlated with the allocation ratio of risk capital (4) the encroachment level of large shareholders is negatively correlated with the enterprise value, and the increase of cash flow right ratio reduces the encroachment level of large shareholders and promotes the enterprise value.
【作者单位】：重庆大学经济与工商管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70772100;70771118) 教育部博士点基金资助项目([2006]226号)
【分类号】：F275;F832.51;F224

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