基于公司治理视角的企业非效率投资行为研究

发布时间：2018-03-01 08:07

本文关键词： 非效率投资股东-管理层代理冲突终极股东-小股东代理冲突融资约束产权性质　出处：《华东师范大学》2012年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：投资作为企业重要的财务决策,对公司成长和社会资源配置效率均有重要的作用。在完美资本市场条件下,企业投资决策仅取决于项目的净现值,企业投资支出仅取决于公司的投资机会,然而现实中,偏离企业最优投资规模的投资过度和投资不足均大范围的存在,学界将这些行为统称为非效率投资。本文对股东-管理层代理冲突、终极股东-小股东代理冲突和融资约束对非效率投资的影响进行了规范性分析,提出以下理论假设：管理层建立企业帝国的偏好将引发投资过度,其风险厌恶特征将引发投资不足；终极股东获取控制权私有收益的动机将引发投资过度；融资约束程度越高,企业投资不足程度越严重。本文以2004-2010年A股上市公司为基础样本进行实证检验,并根据终极股东控制权与现金流权分离度与终极股东产权性质对样本分组,并进一步检验。在终极股东控制权与现金流权未分离的样本中,终极股东为国家的样本表现为过度投资,主要原因为管理层具有建立企业帝国的偏好,且企业融资约束程度较轻；终极股东为国有法人的样本不存在显著的非效率投资现象,显示出较好的公司治理效果,原因在于管理层治理水平较好,且企业融资约束程度较低；终极股东为非国有法人和个人的样本表现为投资不足,主要原因为融资约束程度较高。在终极股东控制权与现金流权分离的样本中,终极股东为国家的样本表现为过度投资,原因主要在于终极股东缺位,管理层仍有扩张动机；终极股东为国有法人的样本表现为过度投资,主要由于终极股东有扩大投资以获取控制权私有收益的动机,且企业融资约束程度较低；终极股东为非国有法人或个人的样本未表现出明显的投资过度或不足,主要因为终极股东有获取控制权私有收益的动机,但企业融资约束程度较高,两者对投资规模的影响相反,因而叠加效应不确定。实证结果验证了两类代理冲突和融资约束对投资行为存在影响,同时也为产权性质差异对管理层行为特征与融资约束程度的影响提供了经验证据,据此,本文提出以下政策建议：完善投资者权益保护的法律法规体系；完善独立董事制度,约束内部人控制行为；完善信息披露制度,确保投资者知情权；建立有效的国企经理人市场,完善国企分红制度；大力发展债券市场,缓解民营企业融资约束。
[Abstract]:Investment as an important financial decision of the company business, an important role in growth and efficiency of the allocation of social resources. All in perfect capital market conditions, the net present value of investment decisions depend only on project investment opportunities, business investment spending depends only on the company, but in reality, deviating from the optimal investment scale enterprises and over investment investment exist widely in academic circles, these are called non efficiency investment.
In this paper, the shareholders and management agency conflict, the influence of ultimate shareholders and Minority Shareholders Agency Conflict and financing constraints on non efficiency investment of normative analysis, put forward the following hypothesis: the management to set up a business empire preference will lead to excessive investment, the risk aversion characteristics will lead to insufficient investment; the ultimate shareholders to obtain private benefits of control the motivation will lead to excessive investment; the higher the degree of financing constraints, insufficient investment is more serious.
Based on the sample of 2004-2010 years A share listed companies, this paper conducts an empirical test, and further tests the samples based on the separation of ultimate shareholders' control rights and cash flow rights and the property rights of ultimate shareholders.
In the ultimate shareholders' control rights and cash flow rights are not separated in the sample, the ultimate shareholder of the state sample is the main reason for the excessive investment, management has set up a business empire preference, and the degree of financing constraints is lower; the ultimate shareholder is the state-owned corporate sample does not exist in the non efficiency of investment significantly, display better corporate governance, because the management level of management is better, and the degree of financing constraints is low; the ultimate shareholder is non-state-owned legal person and individual samples, manifested in the lack of investment, the main reason for the high degree of financing constraints.
In the sample of ultimate shareholders' control rights and cash flow rights separation, the ultimate shareholder is the sample of countries for over investment, the reason mainly lies in the absence of ultimate shareholders, management is still expanding motivation; the ultimate shareholder is the state-owned corporate samples showed excessive investment, mainly because the ultimate shareholder has to expand investment to obtain private benefits of control the motivation and the degree of financing constraints is low; the ultimate shareholder is non-state-owned corporate or individual samples showed no obvious investment excessive or insufficient, mainly because the ultimate shareholders have the motivation to obtain private benefits of control, but the higher the degree of financing constraints, the two effects on the scale of investment on the contrary, so the superimposed effect of uncertainty.
The empirical results show that two types of agency conflicts and financing constraints has an impact on investment behavior, but also for the property influence on the characteristics and the degree of financing constraints management behavior provides empirical evidence, therefore, this paper puts forward the following suggestions: perfecting the system of investor protection laws and regulations; improve the system of independent directors, internal constraints control behavior; improve the information disclosure system to ensure investors' right; establish effective managers of state-owned enterprises and market, improve the bonus system of state owned enterprises; vigorously develop the bond market, private enterprises to ease financing constraints.

【学位授予单位】：华东师范大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F275.5;F832.51;F224

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