控股股东行为与公司价值关系的实证研究

发布时间：2018-03-08 13:54

本文选题：控股股东　切入点：代理行为　出处：《沈阳工业大学》2012年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：近年来控股股东行为的频繁发生，严重的侵害了中小投资者的利益，损害公司的整体价值，与公司价值最大化这样一个目标背道而驰。严重影响了我国资本市场的投资效率，因此，识别和研究上市公司控股股东代理行为对上市公司的影响已迫在眉睫。本文以控股股东行为对公司价值的影响作为切入点，把控股股东代理行为分为五个维度，分别是控股股东操纵上市公司信息披露行为，控股股东关联交易行为，控股股东影响上市公司独立性行为，控股股东投融资行为以及控股股东增减持行为。选取2010年沪市、深市主板上市的公司为样本，首先运用假设检验的方法，以五种维度为分组依据，对存在控股股东代理行为与不存在控股股东代理行为的上市公司托宾Q值进行检验，验证控股股东代理行为存在与否公司价值的变化是否具有显著性。其次，用上市公司净资产收益率代替托宾Q值对假设检验的结果进行稳健性分析，验证对托宾Q值的检验是否具有可靠性。经过稳健性分析，，本文得出了以下结论：即在存在控股股东操纵公司信息披露行为的上市公司中，公司价值的变化并不显著，而在存在关联交易、影响上市公司独立性、投融资及增减持行为的上市公司中，公司价值的变化具有显著性的结论。最后，选取2010年沪市、深市上市公司，共1856个样本。把样本公司分为六组，分别为具有五种控股股东代理行为的上市公司及不具有控股股东代理行为的公司，把上市公司的托宾Q值从低到高分为12组。运用对应分析的方法，验证控股股东代理行为与上市公司价值的相关性。通过验证，发现不存在控股股东代理行为的上市公司其对应的公司价值高于存在控股股东代理行为的上市公司。
[Abstract]:The frequent occurrence of controlling shareholder behavior in recent years has seriously infringed on the interests of small and medium-sized investors, damaged the overall value of the company, and ran counter to the goal of maximizing the company value. It has seriously affected the investment efficiency of our country's capital market. Therefore, it is urgent to identify and study the influence of controlling shareholder agency behavior on listed companies. Based on the influence of controlling shareholder's behavior on company value, this paper divides the controlling shareholder's agency behavior into five dimensions: controlling shareholder manipulating information disclosure of listed company and controlling shareholder's related transaction behavior. The behavior of controlling shareholders influencing the independence of listed companies, the behavior of investing and financing of controlling shareholders, and the behavior of increasing and decreasing holding of controlling shareholders are selected as the samples of companies listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange in 2010 and listed on the main Board of Shenzhen Stock Exchange, and the method of hypothesis test is used first. On the basis of five dimensions, this paper tests the Tobin Q value of listed companies with or without controlling shareholder agency behavior. Secondly, using the return on net assets of listed companies to replace Tobin Q value to analyze the robustness of the results of hypothesis test. After robust analysis, this paper draws the following conclusions: in listed companies with controlling shareholders manipulating the disclosure of company information, the change of company value is not significant. However, in the listed companies with related party transactions, which affect the independence, investment and financing of listed companies, and increase or decrease their holdings, the change of corporate value has a significant conclusion. Finally, we select 1856 samples of listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets in 2010. The sample companies are divided into six groups, which are listed companies with five kinds of controlling shareholder agency behavior and companies without controlling shareholder agency behavior. The Tobin Q value of listed company is divided into 12 groups from low to high. By using the method of correspondence analysis, the correlation between controlling shareholder's agency behavior and the value of listed company is verified. It is found that the value of listed companies without agency behavior of controlling shareholders is higher than that of listed companies with controlling shareholder agency behavior.
【学位授予单位】：沈阳工业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F275;F832.51;F224

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