双重委托代理下物流金融服务创新及其激励机制研究

发布时间：2018-03-10 08:25

本文选题：物流金融服务创新　切入点：双重委托代理关系　出处：《南开大学》2012年博士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：随着物流金融服务在我国的迅猛发展，越来越多的中小企业通过物流金融运作获得了银行贷款授信而改善了企业的资金链；同时，众多知名的物流企业和银行都因提供物流金融服务找到了新的利润增长点。然而，在物流金融服务发展过程中，由于金融机构、融资企业和物流企业三方参与主体间的信息不对称，使处于信息劣势的金融机构、物流企业面临着很多业务风险，如融资企业造假违约、物流企业监管不力、物流企业与融资企业合谋欺骗等现象均影响着金融机构提供物流金融融资服务的积极性。由于金融机构往往通过制定严格规定，最大限度地将部分风险责任转嫁给物流企业，而对物流企业的报酬激励不够等诸多因素的限制，，一些物流企业参与高级的物流金融服务模式的积极性。换言之，激励机制的不完善制约着物流金融服务创新的发展。基于上述研究背景，本文以物流金融服务创新模式以及物流金融服务三方参与主体之间的契约关系为研究对象，以委托代理理论和激励机制设计理论为理论基础，综合运用归纳分析和演绎分析、定性分析与定量分析以及案例研究和比较分析等多种研究方法，在双重委托代理下对物流金融服务创新及其激励机制进行研究。具体而言，在对传统物流金融服务的各种模式进行系统归纳和比较分析的基础上，首先识别了不同运作模式下物流金融服务的双重委托代理关系；进而，在对物流金融服务创新的内在动力进行分析的基础上，在营运流程视角下较为系统地研究了物流金融服务创新的主要模式，并在信息不对称下对中国台湾地区物流金融服务创新进行了案例分析；最后，对物流金融服务创新三方参与主体的行为进行了博弈均衡分析，尝试在双重委托代理关系下构建了一套物流金融服务创新的有效激励约束机制，进而提出了完善我国物流金融服务委托代理激励机制的对策建议并进行了研究展望。
[Abstract]:With the logistics financial services in China's rapid development, more and more small and medium-sized enterprises through the logistics financial operation to obtain a bank loan credit and improve the enterprise's capital chain; at the same time, many well-known logistics companies and banks for providing logistics financial services to find new profit growth point. However, in the process of logistics financial services in the development of the financial institutions, financing enterprises and the three party logistics enterprises in the information asymmetry between subjects, the financial institutions in the inferior position of information, logistics enterprises are facing a lot of business risks, such as financing fraud breach, logistics enterprise supervision, actively logistics enterprises and financing enterprises are affected by the phenomenon of conspiracy to defraud financial institutions provide logistics finance service. Because financial institutions often make strict regulations, to maximize the risk responsibility to the logistics enterprise, and There are many factors such as insufficient reward and incentive for logistics enterprises, and some logistics enterprises take part in the initiative of advanced logistics financial service mode. In other words, the imperfection of incentive mechanism restricts the development of logistics financial service innovation.
Based on the above research background, this paper takes the service innovation mode of financial logistics and three party logistics financial service contract relationship between the main body as the research object, using principal agent theory and incentive mechanism design theory as the theoretical basis, the comprehensive use of inductive analysis and deductive analysis, qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis, case study and comparative analysis and other research methods in the dual agency, to conduct a study on the logistics financial services innovation and incentive mechanism. Specifically, the basic system of induction and comparative analysis of the traditional model of logistics in a variety of financial services, the first to identify double principal-agent relationship between logistics financial services in different operation mode; then, on the base of analyzing internal power on the innovation of logistics financial services, in the operation process from the perspective of a more systematic research on the logistics financial services innovation The main mode, case analysis and the innovation of logistics financial services in Taiwan Chinese under asymmetric information; finally, the three party logistics financial services innovation in the main behavior of the game equilibrium analysis, try in the dual principal-agent relationship to construct a set of logistics financial services innovation and effective incentive mechanism, and then put forward the countermeasures and suggestions of perfecting the logistics financial services agency incentive mechanism and the research prospects.

【学位授予单位】：南开大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F259.2;F832

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