机构投资者的投票权与流通股东的利益实现——来自股改事件的经验证据

发布时间：2018-03-13 08:51

本文选题：投票权代理　切入点：投票权交易　出处：《山西财经大学学报》2010年12期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：借鉴投票权代理及交易理论,将股改博弈划分为流通股东内部博弈和流通与非流通股东之间博弈两个阶段,分别考察机构投资者行使投票权对流通股东的股改收益预期、股改方案满意度及股改总收益三个方面的影响,借此判断机构投资者在股改中是维护还是损害了流通股东的利益。研究表明:一方面,参与股改的流通股东普遍相信机构投资者能够维护他们的利益;另一方面,在与非流通股东的股改博弈中,机构投资者也确实起到了维护流通股东利益的积极作用。结论认为,在我国上市公司的股改事件中,机构投资者的投票权控制有利于流通股东的利益实现。
[Abstract]:Referring to voting right agent and transaction theory, the share reform game is divided into two stages: the internal game of circulating shareholders and the game between circulating and non-circulating shareholders. In order to judge whether institutional investors maintain or impair the interests of circulating shareholders in the stock reform, the research shows that, on the one hand, The circulating shareholders involved in the reform generally believe that institutional investors can safeguard their interests. On the other hand, in the game of share reform with non-circulating shareholders, institutional investors do indeed play an active role in safeguarding the interests of circulating shareholders. In the stock reform of listed companies in China, the voting rights control of institutional investors is beneficial to the realization of the interests of circulating shareholders.
【作者单位】：厦门大学经济学院;
【基金】：教育部人文社会科学规划基金项目“证券投资基金运行与资本市场稳定研究”(07JA790032)
【分类号】：F832.51

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