基于关联交易的上市公司掏空、支持与资本投资研究
本文选题:掏空 切入点:支持 出处:《华南理工大学》2012年硕士论文 论文类型:学位论文
【摘要】:在当前控股股东掏空上市公司是大股东与中小股东矛盾的主要表现。由于我国的特色,关联交易作为大股东占用上市公司资金的一种方式,大股东通过关联交易占用上市公司资金的问题被学者和监管机构广泛关注。与此同时近年来我国投资规模的过大同样引起学者和监管机构广泛关注。本文从关联交易的角度,采用2007-2010年通过关联交易进行资金占用的样本数据,,对上市公司掏空、支持行为与资本投资的关系进行重点研究,考察了上市公司控股股东掏空、支持行为对上市公司资本投资的影响,同时研究不同控股股东性质下上市公司掏空、支持行为对资本投资的不同影响。 本文通过理论分析与实证检验相结合的方式对我国基于关联交易的上市公司掏空、支持与资本投资的关系进行研究,通过相关文献的回顾,在对大小股东利益冲突的理论分析的基础上,分析掏空、支持与资本投资的作用机理,进而提出研究假设。实证检验主要对掏空组、支持组、以及掏空、支持组分别按产权性质进行分组后的国有控股与非国有控股组,支持组按是否ST分组后的ST组与非ST组,分别进行回归分析,并得出结论:1、存在掏空行为的上市公司资本投资与关联方掏空程度显著负相关,即关联方占用上市公司资金越多,上市公司的资本投资越少。2、考虑到不同产权性质下研究结果可能存在差异,分组进行研究发现:尽管二者都是负相关,但与国有控股上市公司相比,非国有控股上市公司被关联方占用资金越多,上市公司的资本投资越少的敏感性越强(贝它系数越大)。3、存在支持行为的上市公司资本投资与关联方支持程度显著正相关,即上市公司获得关联方资金越大,越可能推动增加资本投资。4、同样考虑我国特殊的产权性质,分组研究发现:二者都是正相关,但与国有控股上市公司相比,非国有控股上市公司获得关联方支持越大对增加资本投资的敏感性越强(贝它系数越大)。5、与非ST上市公司相比,ST上市公司关联方支持的增大推动资本投资的增加。
[Abstract]:At present, the majority shareholder emptying the listed company is the main manifestation of the contradiction between the large shareholder and the minority shareholder. Because of the characteristics of our country, the affiliated transaction is a way for the majority shareholder to occupy the capital of the listed company. The problem that large shareholders occupy the funds of listed companies through related party transactions has been widely concerned by scholars and regulators. At the same time, the excessive scale of investment in China in recent years has also aroused widespread concern of scholars and regulators. Using the sample data of capital occupation through related party transactions from 2007 to 2010, this paper focuses on the relationship between tunneling, supporting behavior and capital investment of listed companies, and examines the controlling shareholder tunneling of listed companies. The influence of support behavior on capital investment of listed companies is studied. At the same time, the different influence of supporting behavior on capital investment is studied. Through the combination of theoretical analysis and empirical test, this paper studies the relationship between tunneling, support and capital investment of listed companies based on affiliated transactions in China. Based on the theoretical analysis of the conflict of interest between large and small shareholders, this paper analyzes the mechanism of tunneling, support and capital investment, and then puts forward the research hypotheses. The support group was divided into state-owned holding group and non-state-owned holding group according to the nature of property right, and the support group was analyzed by regression analysis according to whether St group and non-St group were divided into St group and non-St group, respectively. It is concluded that the capital investment of listed companies with tunneling behavior is negatively correlated with the degree of associated party tunneling, that is, the more capital of listed companies occupied by related parties, the more the capital of listed companies is occupied by related parties. The smaller the capital investment of listed companies is, the more different the research results may be under different property rights, and the results of the study are as follows: although both of them are negatively correlated, they are compared with the state-controlled listed companies. The more the capital is occupied by the related party, the more sensitive the capital investment of the listed company is (the bigger the Beta coefficient is. 3). The capital investment of the listed company with supporting behavior is positively correlated with the degree of related party support. That is, the larger the capital of the listed company, the more likely it is to increase the capital investment. Considering the special property right of our country, the group study found that both of them are positive correlation, but compared with the state-owned holding listed company. The greater the support of affiliated parties, the stronger the sensitivity of non-state holding listed companies to increasing capital investment (the larger the Beta coefficient is, the greater the relative party support of St listed companies is compared with the non-St listed companies, and the higher the capital investment is.
【学位授予单位】:华南理工大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2012
【分类号】:F233;F832.51
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