基于演化博弈模型的网络联保贷款探析

发布时间：2018-03-23 03:37

本文选题：网络联保贷款　切入点：道德风险　出处：《湖南大学》2012年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：在资本市场上，由于信息不对称，银行放贷时面临着逆向选择、道德风险、审计成本和合约执行四大难题。这些难题使得银行选择不向那些难以提供担保和抵押的中小企业提供贷款，从而导致信贷市场失灵。而以往的研究已经证明，联保贷款对于信贷市场失灵发挥了重要作用。联保贷款从诞生至今的短短几十年中，便因其惊人的高还款率对缓解贫困的卓越表现吸引了各界人士的广泛关注。其中孟加拉乡村银行的成功受到各国政府的重视，，包括美国在内的50多个发展中国家和发达国家纷纷效仿，试图将这一新型的信贷模式移植本国。正是受到Yunus教授联保贷款模式的启发，同时，结合我国实际国情，中国建设银行与阿里巴巴于2007年合作推出了一项无抵押无实物担保的中小企业贷款模式——网络联保贷款。这一我国自主创新的新型贷款模式能否像联保贷款一样获得成功，如果能成功，又是如何有效提高资本市场的资源配置效率就构成了本文的主要研究目的。本文旨在就网络联保贷款能否得到广泛开展和影响资本配置原因的道德风险方面，从长期一般均衡角度，对网络联保贷款能否有效规避道德风险问题，从而缓解信贷市场的失灵，以及它是如何发挥作用的进行了探讨。为此，从长期演化角度，就联保体内企业间建立了两个道德风险模型，对企业获得贷款后的投资生产活动以及横向监督行为进行了分析，结果模型证明在长期一般均衡中，投资生产活动与短期联保贷款的结论一致，能够有效避免企业的“搭便车”行为，现有理论中的宣称联保贷款“搭便车”行为普遍盛行的说法是错误的。但在对横向监督行为的研究中发现，其结论与联保贷款不一致，在长期一般均衡中，网络联保贷款的横向监督行为存在严重的道德风险问题，“搭便车”行为普遍盛行。并且，就各因素变化从长期角度对博弈结果的影响进行了分析。紧接着，从长期演化角度，就联保体与银行间是否愿意采取网络联保模式进行贷款建立了一个博弈模型，分析得出网络联保贷款中的网络信息披露机制使得联保体倾向于不与银行合作，即在长期角度，不愿意采取网络联保进行贷款，这一结论为现实中网络联保贷款出现的叫座不叫好的情况提供了理论依据。由于国内相关研究的贫乏，本文研究结果将会对网络联保贷款今后的实践发展及后续研究起到一定的借鉴作用。
[Abstract]:In the capital market, because of information asymmetry, banks are faced with adverse selection and moral hazard in lending. Audit costs and contract enforcement are four major challenges that have led banks to opt out of lending to small and medium-sized enterprises that find it difficult to provide guarantees and mortgages, leading to a failure in the credit market. UNPROFOR loans played an important role in the failure of the credit market. In the short decades since its inception, UNPROFOR loans have attracted wide attention from all walks of life because of their remarkable performance in alleviating poverty, and the success of Grameen Bank of Bangladesh has attracted the attention of governments. More than 50 developing and developed countries, including the United States, are trying to transplant the new credit model to their own countries. It was inspired by Professor Yunus's UNPROFOR loan model, and at the same time, combined with the actual situation of our country, In 2007, China Construction Bank and Alibaba jointly launched an unsecured, unsecured loan model for small and medium-sized enterprises, the network UNPROFOR loan. Can this new type of loan model, which is independent and innovative, be as successful as the UNPROFOR loan? If successful, how to improve the efficiency of resource allocation in capital market is the main purpose of this paper. The purpose of this paper is to discuss whether the network UNPROFOR loan can be widely carried out and the moral hazard which affects the reason of capital allocation, and whether the network UNPROFOR loan can effectively avoid the moral hazard from the point of view of long-term general equilibrium. In order to alleviate the failure of the credit market, and how it is to play a role is discussed. Therefore, from the perspective of long-term evolution, two moral hazard models are established for the enterprises in UNPROFOR, and the investment and production activities and horizontal supervision behavior of enterprises after obtaining loans are analyzed. The results show that the models are in the long-term general equilibrium. Investment in production activities is consistent with the conclusion of short-term UNPROFOR loans, which can effectively avoid the "hitchhiking" behavior of enterprises. It is wrong to claim in the existing theories that the "hitchhiking" behavior of UNPROFOR loans is prevalent. However, in the study of horizontal supervision, it is found that the conclusions are inconsistent with UNPROFOR loans and are in general equilibrium in the long run. There are serious moral hazard problems in the horizontal supervision of network UNPROFOR loan, and the "hitchhiking" behavior is prevalent. Furthermore, the influence of various factors on the game result is analyzed from a long-term perspective. Then, from the perspective of long-term evolution, a game model is established on whether or not the UNPROFOR and the banks are willing to take the network model to make loans. The analysis shows that the network information disclosure mechanism in the network protection loan makes UNPROFOR tend not to cooperate with the bank, that is, in the long run, it is unwilling to take the network protection to make the loan. This conclusion provides a theoretical basis for the situation that network UNPROFOR loan does not win popularity in reality. Due to the paucity of relevant research in China, the results of this paper will be useful for the future development of network UNPROFOR loan and its follow-up research.
【学位授予单位】：湖南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F830.5;F224.32

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