投资者有限理性与信息披露的资本成本效应

发布时间：2018-04-23 02:32

本文选题：异质信念 + 有限理性　；参考：《系统工程》2013年01期

【摘要】：在行为金融框架下研究上市公司信息披露的资本成本效应,分析投资者有限理性和异质信念对上市公司信息披露决策的影响,揭示上市公司有限信息披露的机理。研究表明:针对不同的投资者信念差异环境,上市公司具有不同的最优信息披露数量决策,上市公司在最优数量内进行信息披露才能带来负向的资本成本效应。上市公司信息披露的资本成本效应随信念差异的不同而变化,当投资者过度自信导致信念差异时,上市公司进行信息披露的负向资本成本效应最大。投资者过度自信时,最优信息披露数量随理性投资者比重的提高而减少,投资者反应不足时,则相反。信息精度越高,最优信息披露数量越大。
[Abstract]:Under the framework of behavioral finance, this paper studies the capital cost effect of information disclosure of listed companies, analyzes the influence of investors' limited rationality and heterogeneous beliefs on the decision of information disclosure of listed companies, and reveals the mechanism of limited information disclosure of listed companies. The research shows that the listed companies have different optimal information disclosure decisions according to the different environment of investors' beliefs, and only when the listed companies disclose information within the optimal number can bring negative capital cost effect. The capital cost effect of information disclosure of listed companies varies with the differences of beliefs. When investors overconfidence leads to belief differences, the negative capital cost effect of information disclosure of listed companies is the largest. When investors are overconfident, the amount of optimal information disclosure decreases with the increase of the proportion of rational investors, but when investors are not responding enough, the reverse is true. The higher the accuracy of information, the greater the amount of optimal information disclosure.
【作者单位】：北京航空航天大学经济管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71071010)
【分类号】：F224;F233;F832.51

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