IPO公司盈余管理动因与治理研究

发布时间：2018-04-27 12:57

本文选题：首次公开发行 + 盈余管理　；参考：《华中科技大学》2012年博士论文

【摘要】：首次公开发行市场是一个特殊的市场，发行双方“契约磨擦”与“沟通阻碍”的存在导致IPO公司盈余管理是一个非常普遍的现象。综观相关文献，国内外对于IPO中盈余管理问题的研究主要集中于二个方面，一是IPO公司盈余管理动因研究；二是IPO盈余管理治理机制研究。关于盈余管理动因的属性，会计学界有两种不同的观点：信号观和机会主义观。盈余管理究竟是有益的，还是有害的？还是一个有待回答的理论和实证问题。不论是机会主义观还是信号观，都会导致利益再分配效应。盈余管理行为会引发契约关系人之间财富的重新分配，并且过分的盈余管理容易演变成会计欺诈和内幕交易等非法行为，影响到资本配置效率，甚至导致市场失败。探讨IPO公司盈余管理的动因与治理，有利于促进IPO市场的健康持续发展。在文献综述的基础上，本文运用统计模拟的方法，首先比较各盈余管理应计利润计量模型的检验效果；然后运用实证方法，探讨IPO公司盈余管理的动机；最后检验证券监管制度的变迁对IPO公司盈余管理的约束。本文的主要研究内容有三个方面：运用统计模拟的方法，本文通过测试各模型产生第一类错误和第二类错误的频率，比较基本琼斯模型、修正琼斯模型、无形资产琼斯模型、前瞻性修正琼斯模型、收益匹配琼斯模型、现金流量琼斯模型、非线性琼斯模型等七种常用的截面操纵性应计利润模型在中国资本市场的检验效果。研究发现，在中国资本市场上，基本琼斯模型、修正琼斯模型和无形资产琼斯模型相对较优，它们所犯第一类错误和第二类错误的频率较小，但在收入操纵检测上，修正琼斯模型检验能力更突出；现金流量琼斯模型、非线性琼斯模型虽然检验盈余管理的能力较强，但是存在较为严重的第一类错误，易夸大中国上市公司盈余管理的程度。前瞻性修正琼斯模型计算复杂，存在第一类错误，而且检验盈余管理的能力上比修正琼斯模型没有明显的提高；收益匹配琼斯模型对于费用操纵的检验能力较差。综合各项检测结果发现中国证券市场上，分年度分行业回归的截面修正琼斯模型在模型的设定和盈余管理的检验能力方面表现更佳。本文利用“承销商声誉”划分好企业与差企业，分析企业类型、IPO公司盈余管理水平与IPO后股票异常业绩之间的相关性。结果发现无论是高声誉的承销商所承销的好企业，还是低声誉的承销商所承销的差企业，其上市前一年盈余管理水平都显著为正，且与企业类型没有显著相关性，表明IPO公司盈余管理是一种普遍策略。但通过IPO后股票异常业绩与IPO公司盈余管理水平相关性的进一步检验，发现对于差企业，IPO后异常股票业绩与IPO公司盈余管理水平之间有显著的负相关性，而对于好企业，这种显著的负相关性并不存在。总体的实证结果支持企业类型决定IPO公司盈余管理动因属性的理论分析。表明对于好企业，盈余管理是传递企业未来业绩的信号，而对于差企业，，盈余管理是一个机会主义行为。这一发现为盈余管理的机会主义观与信号观的争议提供了一种可能的解释，也在一定程度上，证明了中国IPO市场承销商声誉机制的有效性。基于中国IPO公司管制诱发型盈余管理动因的考虑，本文根据中国证券发行制度演变，运用应计利润模型和实质盈余管理模型来计量IPO公司盈余管理水平，通过描述性统计和多元回归方法，分析证券发行制度市场化进程对于中国IPO公司盈余管理程度和方式的动态影响。研究发现随着证券发行制度由审批准转向核准制，通道制转向保荐制，IPO公司盈余管理水平显著下降。在盈余管理方式的研究上，本文发现在中国IPO市场上，应计盈余管理和实质盈余管理是显著正相关，并没有发现，Cohen et al.(2008)等西方研究文献所证明的随着监管制度的加强，应计管理和实质盈余管理方式相互替代，此消彼长的趋势。总体的实证结果表明核准制的实施，可以约束IPO公司机会主义盈余管理的行为，系统提高中国上市公司质量。本文通过对IPO盈余管理常用计量模型的检验能力的分析，发现分年度分行业回归的截面修正琼斯模型在模型的设定和盈余管理的检验能力方面表现更佳，为盈余管理研究的模型选择提供了一种依据。另外对IPO公司盈余管理动因的实证分析，为盈余管理的机会主义观与信号观的争论提供了一种可能的解释，也在一定程度上，证明了中国IPO市场承销商声誉机制的有效性。同时从制度变迁的角度，研究IPO公司盈余管理行为，验证了证券发行制度的市场化的完善能有效约束IPO公司机会主义盈余管理，为证券发行制度进一步向注册制发展提供了证据。
[Abstract]:The initial public issue market is a special market. The existence of "contract friction" and "communication barrier" between the two sides lead to the IPO company earnings management is a very common phenomenon. In a comprehensive view of the related literature, the research on the problem of earnings management in IPO is mainly focused on two aspects, one is the motivation research of the earnings management of IPO company. The two is the study on the management mechanism of IPO earnings management. There are two different views on the attribute of earnings management motivation: the concept of signal and opportunism. Is the earnings management beneficial or harmful? It is still a theoretical and empirical question to be answered. Whether it is opportunist or signal, it will lead to profit. Profit redistribution effect. Earnings management will lead to the redistribution of wealth between contracts, and excessive earnings management can easily evolve into illegal activities such as accounting fraud and insider trading, affecting the efficiency of capital allocation and even the failure of the market. The motivation and governance of the earnings management of IPO companies will be beneficial to the promotion of the IPO market. Health continues to develop.
On the basis of the literature review, this paper uses the method of statistical simulation to compare the test results of the earnings management accrued profit measurement model, and then uses the empirical method to explore the motivation of the earnings management of IPO company. Finally, it examines the constraints of the change of the securities regulatory system on the surplus management of IPO company. The main contents of this paper are the contents of this paper. Three aspects:
Using the method of statistical simulation, this paper compares the basic Jones model, the Jones model, the Jones model of intangible assets, the prospective modified Jones model, the revenue matching Jones model, the Jones model of the cash flow, the Jones model of the cash flow, the nonlinear Jones model and so on by comparing the basic Jones model, the Jones model, the invisible asset, the invisible assets, the Jones model of the cash flow, the Jones model of the cash flow, and the nonlinear Jones model. In the Chinese capital market, the basic Jones model, the revised Jones model and the Jones model of intangible assets are relatively superior in China's capital market, and the frequency of the first and the second types of errors is smaller, but the correction of the Jones model is more effective in the revenue manipulation detection. Prominent, cash flow Jones model, nonlinear Jones model, although the ability of checking earnings management is strong, but there is a more serious first type of error, easy to exaggerate the degree of earnings management of Chinese listed companies. Forward looking correction Jones model is complex, there is a first type of error, and the ability to test earnings management is more than the revised Joan. There is no obvious improvement in the model, and the income matching Jones model is less able to test the cost manipulation. The comprehensive testing results show that the cross sectional revision of the Jones model in the annual division of China's securities market has better performance in the model setting and the ability to check the earnings management.
This article uses the "underwriter reputation" to divide the enterprise and the poor enterprise, and analyzes the correlation between the type of enterprise, the earnings management level of IPO company and the abnormal performance of the stock after IPO. The result shows that the good enterprises which the underwriters have underwritten by the high reputation, or the poor underwriters underwrite the poor enterprises, have the earnings management water of the first year of the market. There is no significant correlation between leveling and enterprise type, which indicates that the earnings management of IPO company is a universal strategy. However, through the further test of the correlation between abnormal performance of stock and the level of earnings management of IPO company after IPO, it is found that there is a significant negative phase between the abnormal stock performance and the earnings management level of the IPO company after the IPO. The significant negative correlation does not exist for good enterprises. The overall empirical results support the theoretical analysis of the attribution of earnings management in IPO companies. It shows that for good enterprises, earnings management is a signal to transfer the future performance of the enterprise, while for the poor enterprises, earnings management is an opportunistic behavior. Now it provides a possible explanation for the opportunism view of earnings management and the dispute of the signal view, and to a certain extent, it proves the effectiveness of the reputation mechanism of the Chinese IPO market underwriter.
Based on the reasons for the management of the earnings management of the IPO company in China, this paper uses the accrued profit model and the real earnings management model to measure the earnings management level of IPO companies according to the evolution of China's securities issuance system. Through descriptive statistics and multiple regression methods, this paper analyzes the market process of the certificate issuing system for the Chinese IPO company. The study found that the earnings management level of IPO company decreased significantly with the transfer of securities issuing system from approval to approval system and channel system to sponsor system. In the study of earnings management, this paper found that the accrued earnings management and the real earnings management are significant positive correlation in the Chinese IPO market. It is not found that the Cohen et al. (2008) and other western research documents have proved that with the strengthening of the regulatory system, the accrued management and the substantial earnings management are replaced by each other, the trend of the trend. The overall empirical results show that the implementation of the approval system can restrict the behavior of the opportunistic earnings management of the IPO company and systematically improve the public market in China. Quality of the Department.
Through the analysis of the testing ability of the IPO earnings management model, this paper finds that the cross sectional revision of the Jones model is better in the model setting and the ability to check the earnings management. It provides a basis for the model selection of the earnings management research. In addition, the motivation of the earnings management of the IPO company is true. The evidence analysis provides a possible explanation for the opportunistic view of the earnings management and the view of the signal. To a certain extent, it proves the effectiveness of the reputation mechanism of the Chinese IPO market underwriters. At the same time, the study of the earnings management behavior of the IPO company from the perspective of institutional change proves that the market of the securities issuance system can be improved effectively. Restricting the opportunistic earnings management of IPO company provides evidence for the further development of the securities issuance system to the registration system.

【学位授予单位】：华中科技大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F275;F832.51;F224

【参考文献】