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中国国有控股商业银行公司治理研究

发布时间:2018-05-01 02:26

  本文选题:国有控股商业银行 + 公司治理 ; 参考:《中共中央党校》2012年博士论文


【摘要】:健全有效的公司治理是国有控股商业银行健康可持续发展的基础,一个好的公司治理应该是能够适应公司所处的外部人文环境和自身特点,促使其实现科学决策、执行有效、监督有力,利益相关者都能获得最大利益。任何一种公司治理都是由公司内外能够对公司施加影响的权利主体构成的,这些权利主体的行为模式和思维习惯实质上就构成了该种公司治理模式的特点。席卷全球的金融危机促使国际社会对商业银行的公司治理进行深刻反思。欧美等发达国家许多金融行业的百年老店一夜之间轰然倒塌,曾经一度完善的公司治理和内部监督制衡没能很好地阻止公司的违规行为或者预示到公司的重大危机。痛定思痛,无论是理论界还是实务界,大家逐渐形成了共识,即公司治理并不存在一个成熟完善的模式,“刹那的光辉不代表永恒”,公司治理尤其是商业银行的公司治理需要跟随形势的发展变化不断加以改进和完善,需要和外部经济金融环境的变化和公司自身的发展“相时而动”。本文以中国国有控股商业银行公司治理为研究对象,努力挖掘影响国有控股商业银行公司治理外部和内部的主要因素,对中国国有控股商业银行公司治理的一些本质特征和特殊矛盾进行剖析,针对中国国有控股商业银行公司内部治理和外部治理存在的种种问题,提出通过构建良好的外部治理制度环境和改善内部治理运作方式等,不断推动完善国有控股商业银行的公司治理。 本文的研究注重理论与实践相结合,尤其注重总结中国国有控股商业银行实施股份制改造几年来在建立健全公司治理方面的探索和实践经验,力图提出有针对性的意见和建议。论文除引言外,共分八章: 引言是论文的整体介绍与导读部分,主要从选题背景与意义、研究思路和方法等对论文进行整体性介绍和导读。 第一章是关于公司治理的内涵。本章重点探讨公司治理的涵义和功能解析,论文的创新之处在于提出公司治理有内部治理和外部治理之分。本章还阐述了公司治理的一些代表性理论,并分析了公司治理和控制、管理的区别与联系,包括公司治理与公司可持续发展的关系等。 第二、三章阐述现代商业银行的外部和内部治理架构。重点介绍了作为公司特殊形式的现代商业银行的外部和内部治理架构的构成与功能分析。在外部治理结构中,重点对东西方人文思想的差异进行了比较分析;关于内部治理结构,中国国有控股商业银行除建立了现代商业银行公司内部治理所共有的股东大会、董事会、独立董事、监事会和高级管理层等,还有中国特色的党委会、职代会等。第三章最后还对国际监管机构对稳健商业银行公司治理的几个原则与特征进行了介绍。论文的主要创新观点就是,无论是外部治理结构还是内部治理结构,公司治理都具有鲜明的地域特征。 第四章首先论述了作为公司特殊形式的商业银行公司治理的特殊性,然后分别介绍了英美、德日以及亚洲国家(主要是新加坡)商业银行公司治理结构的显著特点,包括内外部治理的结构和体制特征等,从中提出可供我国商业银行尤其是国有控股商业银行内外部治理借鉴的内容。本章最后介绍了商业银行公司治理的新动向。随着经济全球化和金融市场一体化,商业银行的公司治理模式逐渐趋同,次贷危机也促使各方对国际商业银行的公司治理模式进行深入反思,各国的商业银行也越来越重视完善公司治理。 第五、六章通过阐述中国国有控股商业银行公司治理的发展历程、内部治理和外部治理取得的进展以及存在的问题等,对中国国有控股商业银行的公司内外部治理结构进行深入剖析。同时概括了中国国有控股商业银行公司治理的本质特征,包括国有控股商业银行实施股份制改造,建立健全公司治理结构过程中所形成的一些基本特征以及存在的几个突出矛盾。 第七、八章对如何完善中国国有控股商业银行外部治理和内部治理提出建议和思考。 本文的主要观点和结论: 1.从控制到治理,涉及到管理的固有观念以及责权利相匹配的问题。健全的公司治理要求公司的各个权利主体要尽责、尽权,在行使自身权利的同时也要为公司长期可持续发展提供支持和保障,不能为了行使权利而为所欲为。良好的治理模式要实现我们党所说的民主集中制,既有利益相关者的共同参与,也有重大决策的相对集中,从而保障公司的权利与责任系统良性运转,始终处于正确的发展轨道。 2.公司治理是内部治理和外部治理的有机统一体,内部治理和外部治理的关系应当是相互关联、互为促进的。外部治理是内部治理的基础,虽然处于相对被动的地位,但它是公司治理结构的基础条件和首要前提,其作用在于使公司经营活动时刻面临外界评价的压力,促使公司经营者行为自律。内部治理则是外部治理的延伸,它是根据外部治理的条件所产生的公司内部的根本性制度安排,它在整个公司治理体系中处于相对核心的地位,其作用就是通过恰当的机制促使公司内部治理各个权利架构规范活动。 3.随着现代公司的日益发展壮大,单纯股东治理的缺陷逐步显现,同时各方面对公司社会责任的要求日益强化,利益相关者在公司治理中的地位越来越多地得到重视。利益相关者共同参与治理是公司治理发展的必然趋势,网络等新经济的兴起也使各利益相关者得以更全面地参与公司治理。政府、银行、中介机构及社会公众等外部利益相关者日益成为公司外部治理的重要组成部分,他们积极关注并广泛参与上市公司的治理,逐渐成为外部市场监控的重要补充。 4.内部治理结构主要指公司内部通过组织程序所明确的股东大会、董事会、监事会和高级经理层等公司内部权利架构之间的利益分配和权利制衡关系。无论是相关法律法规,还是公司章程、董事会和监事会议事规则等公司内部制度都对公司内部权利架构的职责和义务做出明确规定。作为公司外部治理架构的延伸和内生性制度安排,内部治理在具有更多共性机构的同时,由于权利主体行为的差异,也往往带有一国治理模式的特殊性。 5.作为国有控股商业银行,更加需要有一个良好的外部治理环境,改善国有控股商业银行的治理与改善政府的公共治理及推进政府改革是分不开的。其目的是要形成一套适应于市场发展趋势的治理结构和管理体制,这种改革的有效性在很大程度上取决于政府能否以积极和明智的方式行使所有者职权。国家在国有控股商业银行公司治理中应该扮演一个明智的、负责的和积极进取的所有者角色。 6.国有控股商业银行的公司治理不仅取决于国家经济发展水平、商业银行发展阶段和一国市场经济的发育程度等因素,还与该国的政治制度、人文思想、行为模式等非经济因素密切相关,具有一国的特色和个性特征,并不存在放之四海而皆准的公司治理模式。各国由于自身的体制和国情等千差万别,公司治理面临的问题不尽相同,都需要结合自身所处的发展阶段,在长期实践过程中不断探索完善。尤其是国有控股商业银行,脱胎于一般的国有企业,一开始就肩负着非常特别的任务,面临特殊的环境和矛盾关系。如何在遵循现代公司治理一般原则,又不脱离中国国情的基础上,探索将国有控股商业银行面临的特殊困难转化为有利优势,需要深入解决一些根本性的体制障碍问题。 7.百年不遇的金融危机表明,国际上不同股权结构下的公司治理模式有所不同,各有特点和利弊。公司治理模式的差异缘于多方面因素,并受不同的政治、经济、法制、文化等环境因素的综合影响,没有绝对标杆性的公司治理模式,,也没有一种永恒不变的固定模式。作为中国金融体系中的特殊机构,国有控股商业银行的公司治理应当是一个动态和持续完善的过程。我们应当在深入分析自身内外部治理缺陷的基础上,认真研究探索国有控股商业银行公司治理运行的规律,促进国有控股商业银行决策科学、监督有效、执行有力的公司治理结构的形成,为国有控股银行实现科学发展提供强有力的保障。 本文的创新与贡献: 一是过去的公司治理研究主要偏重公司治理模式的研究,很少从影响公司治理的内外部因素入手。本文在认识公司治理本质含义的基础上,从公司治理的内外部影响因素入手,将影响公司治理的人文思想、行为模式以及出资人体制等有机结合起来,从而使公司治理研究的范围有所拓展和深化。 二是学术界偏重公司治理的内部架构问题,而忽略了公司治理的外部环境。本文认为公司治理是外部治理和内部治理的有机结合体,偏废任何一方都会造成公司治理研究的缺陷。 三是从公司的外部治理出发,研究了国有控股商业银行面临的外部治理要素。在国有控股商业银行公司治理结构中,国有资本出资人体制,控股权的取舍以及关于公司治理的相关法律制度体系等等都需要因应国有控股商业银行改革发展的变化而不断加以研究和完善。 四是从实践经验出发,深入剖析了国有控股商业银行公司内部治理架构,包括加强董事会的决策职能,强化监事会的监督职能,处理好制衡与效率的关系以及更好地发挥党委会、职代会等特色内部治理结构的功能作用等。 五是围绕国有控股商业银行公司治理的现实和迫切问题,就如何完善公司治理、推进公司治理功能作用的有效实现做了探讨,提出了有针对性的建议,力图对实践工作有所帮助和指导。 本文的局限性: 公司治理问题是一个持续完善的事物,需要根据形势的发展变化不断改进。由于对相关知识缺乏系统的研究,加上作者的实践经验还很有限,本文对公司治理问题的研究可能缺乏系统性,某些观点表述可能不够清晰。尤其是有利于公司治理的政治法律制度建设、作为公司治理主体经济人的行为模式等的研究需要对政治制度、法律体系等领域有更深的思考和研究,作者提出的一些观点和意见还有待理论的支持和实践的检验。在现有体制下,如何营造国有控股商业银行公司治理的良好外部环境,充分发挥内部监督制衡作用等问题尚需结合实际进一步深入研究。作者将本着科学务实的精神和态度,在今后的工作和学习中继续不断开展研究和探索。
[Abstract]:The sound and effective corporate governance is the basis of the healthy and sustainable development of the state-owned holding commercial banks. A good corporate governance should be able to adapt to the external humanistic environment and own characteristics of the company, to promote its scientific decision-making, effective implementation, strong supervision, and the best interests of the stakeholders. Any kind of corporate governance All of them are composed of the rights subject which can influence the company both inside and outside the company. The behavior patterns and thinking habits of these rights bodies constitute the characteristics of the corporate governance model in essence. The global financial crisis has prompted the international community to reflect on the corporate governance of commercial banks. One hundred years old stores in the financial industry collapsed overnight, and the once perfect corporate governance and internal supervision and balance failed to prevent the company's irregularities well or foreshadowed the major crisis of the company. A perfect model, "a flash of brilliance does not represent eternity", corporate governance, especially the corporate governance of commercial banks, needs to be improved and perfected by the development and changes of the situation, and the change of the external economic and financial environment and the development of the company itself. This article is based on the governance of the Chinese state-owned holding commercial bank. In order to study the main factors that affect the external and internal governance of the state-owned holding commercial banks, this paper analyzes the essential characteristics and special contradictions of the corporate governance of the state-owned holding commercial banks in China, and puts forward the various problems existing in the internal governance and external governance of the state-owned holding commercial banks in China. Building a good external governance system environment and improving internal governance operation mode, and constantly promote the improvement of state-owned commercial banks' corporate governance.
This study pays more attention to the combination of theory and practice. It pays special attention to summarizing the exploration and practical experience of China's state-owned holding commercial banks in the establishment and improvement of corporate governance in the past few years, trying to put forward pertinent opinions and suggestions. Besides the introduction, the thesis is divided into eight chapters.
The introduction is the introduction and introduction part of the thesis. It mainly introduces the background and significance of the topic, and the research ideas and methods.
The first chapter is about the connotation of corporate governance. This chapter focuses on the analysis of the meaning and function of corporate governance. The innovation of this chapter lies in the point that the corporate governance has internal and external governance. This chapter also expounds some representative theories of corporate governance, and analyzes the corporate governance and control, the difference and connection of management, including the management and management. The relationship between corporate governance and the sustainable development of the company.
The second, third chapter expounds the external and internal governance structure of modern commercial banks. It focuses on the analysis of the structure and function of the external and internal governance structures of modern commercial banks as a special form of the company. In the external governance structure, the emphasis is on the comparative analysis of the differences between the East and the west, and the internal governance structure. The state-owned holding commercial banks have established the common shareholders' meeting, the board of directors, the independent directors, the supervisory board and the senior management, as well as the Party committee with Chinese characteristics, and the functional meeting of the modern commercial banks. In the third chapter, several principles and characteristics of the international regulatory agency on the corporate governance of stable commercial banks are also made. The main innovative point of the paper is that corporate governance has distinct regional characteristics, both external governance structure and internal governance structure.
The fourth chapter first discusses the particularity of corporate governance in the special form of the company, and then introduces the remarkable characteristics of the corporate governance structure of the British and American, Germany and Japan and the Asian countries (mainly Singapore), including the structure and institutional characteristics of the internal and external governance, which can be provided for the commercial banks of our country in particular. This chapter introduces the new trend of corporate governance in commercial banks at the end of this chapter. With the economic globalization and financial market integration, the corporate governance model of commercial banks gradually converges, and the subprime crisis has also prompted the various parties to reflect on the corporate governance model of the international commercial banks. Commercial banks in China also pay more and more attention to improving corporate governance.
The fifth, sixth chapter analyzes the development process of the corporate governance of the state-owned holding commercial banks in China, the progress of internal governance and external governance and the existing problems, and analyzes the internal and external governance structure of the state-owned holding commercial banks in China. At the same time, the essence of the corporate governance of the state-owned holding commercial banks in China is summarized. Characteristics, including the reform of the shareholding system by the state-owned holding commercial banks, the basic features formed in the process of establishing and improving the corporate governance structure and several outstanding contradictions.
The seventh, eighth chapter puts forward suggestions on how to improve the external governance and internal governance of state-owned commercial banks in China.
The main points and conclusions of this article are as follows:
1. from control to governance, it involves the inherent concept of management and the matching of responsibility and responsibility. Sound corporate governance requires the various rights subjects of the company to do their duty and to do their right. While exercising their own rights, they should also provide support and guarantee for the long-term sustainable development of the company. The model should realize the democratic centralism that our party said, with the participation of the stakeholders and the relative concentration of major decisions, so as to ensure the sound operation of the right and responsibility system of the company, and always in the correct track of development.
2. corporate governance is the organic unity of internal governance and external governance. The relationship between internal governance and external governance should be interrelated and mutually promoted. External governance is the basis of internal governance. Although it is in a relatively passive position, it is the basic piece of corporate governance and the primary premise, and its role is to make the company operating. The dynamic time is facing the pressure of external evaluation to promote the self-discipline of the company operators. Internal governance is the extension of external governance. It is the fundamental institutional arrangement within the company based on the conditions of external governance. It is in the relative core position in the whole corporate governance system, and its role is to promote the public through the proper mechanism. Internal management of various rights framework activities.
3. with the growing development of modern companies, the defects of simple shareholder governance are gradually emerging, and the demands for corporate social responsibility are increasingly strengthened in all aspects. The status of stakeholders in corporate governance is becoming more and more important. The common participation of stakeholders in governance is the inevitable trend of the development of corporate governance, and the new economy, such as the network. The rise also makes the stakeholders participate in corporate governance more comprehensively. The external stakeholders, such as the government, the bank, the intermediary and the public, have become an important part of the external governance of the company. They are actively concerned and extensively involved in the governance of the listed companies, and are gradually becoming an important supplement to the monitoring of the external market.
4. the internal governance structure mainly refers to the distribution of interests and the balance of rights between the shareholders' meeting, the board of directors, the board of supervisors and the senior manager level, as defined by the organizational procedure, and the internal system of the company, whether related to the relevant laws and regulations, the articles of association, the board of directors and the rules of the board of supervisors, etc. The responsibilities and obligations of the internal rights framework of the company are clearly defined. As an extension and endogenous institutional arrangement of the external governance structure of the company, internal governance has more common institutions, while the differences in the behavior of the rights subject often have the special character of a state governance model.
5. as a state-owned holding commercial bank, it is more necessary to have a good external governance environment, to improve the governance of the state-owned commercial banks and to improve the government's public governance and to promote the reform of the government. The purpose is to form a set of governance structures and management systems adapted to the trend of the market development, and the effectiveness of this reform. To a large extent depends on whether the government can exercise the power of the owner in a positive and wise way. The state should play a wise, responsible and aggressive owner role in the governance of the state-owned holding commercial bank.
6. the corporate governance of state-owned holding commercial banks not only depends on the level of national economic development, the development stage of commercial banks and the development degree of a country's market economy, but also closely related to the non economic factors such as the political system, the humanistic thought and the behavior pattern of the country, and has the characteristics and characteristics of a country and does not exist in the four seas. The corporate governance model is all right. All countries are different because of their own system and national conditions. The problems facing the corporate governance are not the same. They all need to combine their own development stage and continue to explore and improve in the long term practice. Special tasks are faced with special environment and contradiction relations. How to follow the general principles of modern corporate governance, and on the basis of China's national conditions, to explore the transformation of the special difficulties faced by the state-owned holding commercial banks into favorable advantages, and to solve some fundamental institutional obstacles in depth.
The 7. unmet financial crisis shows that the corporate governance model under different ownership structures in the world has different characteristics and advantages and disadvantages. The difference of corporate governance model is due to various factors, and is influenced by different political, economic, legal and cultural environmental factors, and there is no absolute benchmarking model of corporate governance. As a special institution in the Chinese financial system, the corporate governance of the state-owned holding commercial banks should be a dynamic and continuous improvement process. On the basis of in-depth analysis of internal and external governance defects, we should conscientiously study and explore the law of the management of the corporate governance of the state-owned holding commercial banks. The decision science of the state-owned holding commercial banks, the effective supervision and the formation of strong corporate governance structure will provide a strong guarantee for the state holding banks to realize the scientific development.
The innovation and contribution of this article:
First, the research of corporate governance in the past mainly focuses on the research of corporate governance model, and rarely starts with the internal and external factors that affect corporate governance. On the basis of understanding the essence of corporate governance, this paper starts with the internal and external factors of corporate governance, and has the humanistic thoughts, behavior patterns and capital contribution system that affect corporate governance. With the combination of machines, the scope of corporate governance research has been expanded and deepened.
The two is that the academic circle emphasizes the internal structure of corporate governance, but neglects the external environment of corporate governance. This paper holds that corporate governance is an organic combination of external governance and internal governance, and that any side will cause the defect of corporate governance research.
Three, starting from the external governance of the company, this paper studies the external governance elements of the state-owned holding commercial banks. In the corporate governance structure of the state-owned holding commercial banks, the human system of capital contribution to the state-owned capital, the choice of the controlling right and the relevant legal system of the corporate governance are all required for the reform of the state-owned holding commercial banks. The changes in the exhibition are constantly studied and perfected.
Four, from the practical experience, the internal governance structure of the state-owned holding commercial bank is deeply analyzed, including strengthening the board of directors' decision-making function, strengthening the supervisory function of the board of supervisors, dealing with the relationship between the balance and efficiency, and giving full play to the function function of the internal governance structure of the Party committee and the professional meeting.
The five is around the realistic and urgent problems of corporate governance of state holding commercial banks, and how to improve corporate governance and promote the function of corporate governance.

【学位授予单位】:中共中央党校
【学位级别】:博士
【学位授予年份】:2012
【分类号】:F832.33

【引证文献】

相关硕士学位论文 前1条

1 张雷;沈阳市国有商业银行公共服务职能建设的问题及对策研究[D];沈阳师范大学;2014年



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