我国上市公司定向增发折价及其长期市场表现研究

发布时间：2018-05-04 12:15

本文选题：定向增发 + 定向增发折价　；参考：《北京交通大学》2012年硕士论文

【摘要】：本文以2006年至2010年成功进行定向增发的上市公司为样本,首先研究了大股东控制下的上市公司定向增发折价及其价值影响。我们发现：大股东的机会主义行为是定向增发折价的重要原因。当大股东的认购比例与定向增发前的持股比例差额越大时,定向增发的折价也越大。且上市公司定向增发的折价水平与大股东的认购比例共同决定了大股东实施定向增发的意愿,以及从上市公司转移财富的多少。也即,当定向增发处于折价发行时,只要大股东的认购比例大于其定向增发之前的持股比例,大股东就能从定向增发这一行为中从上市公司转移财富。这说明定向增发在一定程度上会成为大股东进行利益输送和侵害原有中小股东利益的工具,不过,本文也发现,只有在市场行情较好时,大股东才能顺利实现利益输送的目的。此外,我们的研究还发现,机构投资者的参与能显著提高定向增发的发行价格,降低折价水平。这表明,当只有大股东参与定向增发时,公司可能制定不合适的价格向大股东输送利益,而机构投资者的参与,能使定向增发过程更加市场化,从而在一定程度上维护了全体投资者的利益。同时,与国内外已有的研究结果一致,我们的研究也证实,信息不对称也是影响定向增发折价的一个重要因素。其次,本文也对公司定向增发后的长期市场表现进行了实证分析。结果表明：定向增发对我国上市公司的长期股价有正面的影响；向大股东等关联股东进行定向增发的上市公司长期股价表现和业绩表现要好于向非关联股东进行定向增发的上市公司长期市场表现,但该影响并不显著；定向增发对象以非现金资产进行认购的上市公司长期股价表现和业绩表现要好于以现金进行认购的上市公司长期市场表现。因此,信息不对称理论能很好的解释我国上市公司的定向增发行为。
[Abstract]:This paper takes the listed companies which successfully carried out the private placement from 2006 to 2010 as the sample, first studies the discount price and the value influence of the listed companies under the control of the large shareholders. We find that the opportunistic behavior of large shareholders is an important reason for the discount of directional issuance. When the difference between the subscription ratio of the major shareholders and the proportion of the shares before the placement is greater, the discount of the placement is also greater. Moreover, the discount level of the listed company and the subscription ratio of the major shareholders jointly determine the willingness of the large shareholders to implement the private placement, and the amount of wealth transferred from the listed company. That is to say, when the IPO is at a discount, as long as the subscription ratio of the major shareholders is greater than the proportion of the shares held before the placement, the majority shareholders can transfer wealth from the listed company from the behavior of the private placement. This shows that to a certain extent, targeted issuance will become a tool for large shareholders to carry out interest transmission and encroach on the interests of the original minority shareholders. However, this paper also finds that only when the market is better, the large shareholders can smoothly realize the purpose of interest transmission. In addition, our research also found that the participation of institutional investors can significantly increase the issuance price and reduce the discount level. This shows that when only large shareholders participate in the IPO, the company may set an inappropriate price to convey the benefits to the large shareholders, and the participation of institutional investors can make the process of directional placement more market-oriented. Thus, to a certain extent, to protect the interests of all investors. At the same time, in accordance with the existing research results at home and abroad, our study also confirmed that information asymmetry is also an important factor affecting the discount of directional placement. Secondly, this paper also makes an empirical analysis on the long-term market performance of the company. The results show that: directional placement has a positive impact on the long-term stock price of listed companies in China; The long-term stock price performance and performance performance of the listed company with private additional offering to the large shareholders and other associated shareholders are better than those of the non-associated shareholders, but the effect is not significant. The long-term stock price performance and performance performance of the listed companies which are subscribed by non-cash assets are better than the long-term market performance of the listed companies subscribed by cash. Therefore, the theory of asymmetric information can explain the behavior of listed companies in China.
【学位授予单位】：北京交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F832.51;F224

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