企业社会绩效视角下机构投资者持股偏好与机制研究

发布时间：2018-05-08 19:17

本文选题：企业社会绩效 + 机构投资者　；参考：《华中科技大学》2012年博士论文

【摘要】：层出不穷的企业恶性事故和欺诈行为使得企业社会绩效的重要性愈发凸显,投资者们意识到除了经济绩效,社会绩效也是一个非常重要的企业监控指标。多维度的企业社会绩效反映了各利益相关者的不同利益,社会绩效良好的企业具有更大的竞争优势。而相比个人投资者,机构投资者更有动机和能力监控企业社会绩效,在制定投资决策时偏好企业社会绩效良好的公司,并进一步督促持股公司改善企业社会绩效。在我国资本市场“大力发展机构投资者”的背景下,深入检验机构投资者持股与企业社会绩效的互动关系,对我国资本市场大力发展机构投资者进而促进企业社会绩效的提升具有重要的意义。首先,本文对国内外文献进行了梳理与回顾,结合我国资本市场实践确定了研究的主题与内容,并对机构投资者积极主义和企业社会绩效相关概念与理论进行了简要介绍,在此基础上从研究思路与框架、研究样本与数据、研究方法三个方面进行了研究设计。其次,从持股动机、影响因素和持股方式三个方面对企业社会绩效视角下机构投资者的持股机理进行了剖析,为下面的实证分析提供必要的理论支持。再次,基于利益相关者理论设计了涵盖股东、债权人、政府、员工、供应商、消费者、社会公益七个方面共计23个指标的指标体系,并利用因子分析法构建了我国企业社会绩效评价模型,对我国上市公司的企业社会绩效进行了综合评价。基于上述理论分析和企业社会绩效的计量,本文对企业社会绩效视角下我国机构投资者持股偏好与机制进行了实证分析。首先,检验了我国机构投资者基于企业社会绩效的持股偏好,通过对企业社会绩效与机构投资者整体持股、企业社会绩效与各类机构投资者持股、企业社会绩效各维度与机构投资者持股三方面关系的检验,证实了企业社会绩效视角下我国机构投资者的持股偏好,即持股过程中扮演了道德偏好角色。然后,从持股目的、持股策略、持股效果三方面剖析了我国机构投资者道德偏好角色背后的持股机制,解决了我国机构投资者基于企业社会绩效“为什么持股”、“怎么持股”以及“持股效果如何”的问题。结论显示我国机构投资者道德偏好角色背后存在一定的经济因素,道德偏好角色的形成源于正面筛选策略的采用,且机构投资者持股仅能促进企业社会绩效微弱的改善。进而推断我国机构投资者目前扮演的道德改善角色尚不显著。最后,根据实证分析结论,提炼相应的政策建议,为我国“大力发展机构投资者”、提升企业社会绩效提供一定的科学依据和理论指导。
[Abstract]:In addition to economic performance, investors realize that social performance is also a very important indicator of corporate monitoring. Multi-dimensional corporate social performance reflects the different interests of various stakeholders, and enterprises with good social performance have greater competitive advantage. Compared with individual investors, institutional investors have more motivation and ability to monitor corporate social performance, prefer companies with good corporate social performance when making investment decisions, and further urge shareholding companies to improve corporate social performance. Under the background of "vigorously developing institutional investors" in China's capital market, this paper examines the interactive relationship between institutional investors' shareholding and corporate social performance. It is of great significance for the development of institutional investors in China's capital market and the promotion of corporate social performance. First of all, this paper reviews the domestic and foreign literature, determines the theme and content of the research combined with the practice of China's capital market, and briefly introduces the concepts and theories of institutional investor activism and corporate social performance. On this basis, the research design is carried out from three aspects: the research thought and frame, the research sample and data, the research method. Secondly, the paper analyzes the mechanism of institutional investors' shareholding from the perspective of corporate social performance from three aspects of motivation, influencing factors and ways of holding shares, and provides the necessary theoretical support for the following empirical analysis. Thirdly, based on stakeholder theory, the paper designs a total of 23 indicators including shareholders, creditors, government, employees, suppliers, consumers and social welfare. A model of corporate social performance evaluation in China is constructed by using factor analysis method, and a comprehensive evaluation of corporate social performance of listed companies in China is carried out. Based on the above theoretical analysis and the measurement of corporate social performance, this paper makes an empirical analysis on the preference and mechanism of institutional investors' shareholding under the perspective of corporate social performance. First of all, we test the preference of institutional investors based on corporate social performance, through corporate social performance and institutional investors as a whole, corporate social performance and various types of institutional investors holding shares. The test of the relationship between the three dimensions of corporate social performance and institutional investors' shareholding proves that the institutional investors' preference for holding shares in the perspective of corporate social performance, that is, the role of moral preference in the process of holding shares. Then, the paper analyzes the shareholding mechanism behind the moral preference role of institutional investors in China from three aspects: the purpose of holding shares, the strategy of holding shares and the effect of holding shares, and solves the problem of why holding shares based on the social performance of enterprises. The question of how to hold shares and how to effect them. The conclusion shows that there are some economic factors behind the moral preference role of institutional investors in China. The formation of moral preference role originates from the adoption of positive screening strategies and institutional investors' shareholding can only promote the slight improvement of corporate social performance. It is concluded that the moral improvement role played by institutional investors in China is not significant. Finally, according to the conclusion of empirical analysis, the corresponding policy suggestions are extracted to provide scientific basis and theoretical guidance for "vigorously developing institutional investors" and improving the social performance of enterprises in China.
【学位授予单位】：华中科技大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F832.48;F272

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