我国商业银行公司治理结构对银行信用风险影响的研究

发布时间：2018-05-09 05:45

本文选题：商业银行 + 公司治理结构　；参考：《西南财经大学》2012年硕士论文

【摘要】：商业银行在经济活动中扮演着不可或缺的角色,银行的很多特性决定了其高风险和脆弱性的特征。而在所有的风险中,由信贷业务所产生的信用风险是银行最主要的风险。商业银行信用风险的管理能力关系到其长远的生存和发展,具有举足轻重的作用。自20世纪80年代末开始,各国学者都致力于信用风险防范的技术性探索,建立了很多度量模型。但是随着历次金融危机的爆发,也使得人们的关注焦点开始从技术层面转向商业银行自身的体制建设方面。越来越多的学者认为完善的公司治理结构可以从根本上加强银行的信用风险防范能力。而随着我国市场体制和金融业的改革步伐的不断加快,以前国有独资的大型国有银行都开始实行股份制改造,以2010年农业银行改组上市为标志,彻底完成了股份制改造的进程。股份制改造的进行对我国商业银行信用风险管理产生了积极的效果,不良贷款率和不良贷款额都有大幅度的下降。但是,究其原因却主要是政府介入的结果。实际上我国商业银行在其公司治理方面还存在很多问题。而要想从根本上解决我国信用风险管理中存在的问题,就必须溯本求源,先从银行自身体制出发,完善商业银行的公司治理结构。本文从理论和实证的角度分析了商业银行公司治理结构对信用风险的影响,主要可以分为以下几个方面的内容：第一部分是导论。主要介绍了本文的研究背景和研究目的、研究的思路和采取的研究方法,以及主要的贡献和存在的不足。第二部分是文献综述。该部分主要对国内外有关商业银行公司治理结构以及公司治理结构对信用风险影响的相关文献进行了归纳和阐述,在参考前人研究成果的同时,认为基于商业银行公司治理结构的信用风险研究具有十分重要的意义。第三部分是商业银行公司治理结构与银行信用风险的理论概述。该部分阐述了商业银行公司治理结构与一般企业公司治理结构相比所具有的特殊性质：主要有委托代理关系的多重性、资本结构的特殊性、信息的非透明性以及政府监管的严厉性,并以此为基础介绍了商业银行公司治理结构的特点。另外在介绍商业银行风险种类之后,重点对我国的信用风险进行了相关研究,重点分析了我国近年来信用风险的现状、信用风险的成因以及信用风险取得成效的原因。第四部分是公司治理结构对商业银行信用风险影响的理论分析。主要从内部治理结构和外部治理结构两个方面进行阐述。其中,内部治理结构方面主要分析了股权结构、董事会、监事会以及激励约束机制对信用风险的影响,外部治理结构方面重点分析了政府监管对信用风险的影响。第五部分是公司治理结构对银行信用风险影响的实证研究。以2007-2010年我国14家上市商业银行的面板数据作为样本,其中信用风险用不良贷款率来衡量,作为被解释变量；解释变量主要有股权集中度、股权性质、董事会规模及独立性、监事会规模、高管薪酬和持股比例等商业银行内部治理结构相关指标,以及资本充足率和特许权价值等外部治理结构的相关指标,另外,还参照前期学者的研究方法,将资产规模和资本杠杆作为控制变量来进行研究。第六部分是主要结论与政策建议。该部分主要是就第五章的实证结果进行总结,得出以下结论：在股权结构方面,第一大股东持股比例越大,信用风险越大；第一大股东的国有性质对信用风险的防范具有积极作用；董事会方面,董事会规模越大,商业银行信用风险越小；监事会规模也与信用风险呈负相关的关系；激励机制方面,管理层薪酬越高、持股比例越大,商业银行的信用风险也就越大。而从外部治理结构来看,资本充足率与信用风险呈正相关关系。另外,商业银行的资产规模和资本杠杆越大,商业银行的信用风险也越小。最后,本文根据前文的理论分析和实证结果对完善商业银行公司治理结构提出了一系列的建议。总体来讲,本文的主要贡献有：首先,研究内容较为全面。文章主要从商业银行的特殊性出发研究了商业银行公司治理结构的特点及其对信用风险的影响,并在参照相关指引文件以及前期学者研究的基础上构建了商业银行的公司治理框架,然后运用实证研究的方法分析了我国商业银行目前的公司治理结构与信用风险之间的关系,最后根据实证研究的结果有针对性的对我国商业银行公司治理结构的完善提出了建议。其次,理论分析较为深入。第一,提出完善商业银行公司治理具有重要意义的原因在于,商业银行本身具有的特殊性使得商业银行具有高风险和脆弱性的特征,而商业银行的特殊性则主要体现在产品、资产结构、委托代理关系、信息透明度以及监管严厉度几个方面。第二,在构建商业银行公司治理结构时,本文认为完善的公司治理结构应当同时考虑内部治理和外部治理两个方面,除了加强银行内部利益相关者之间的制衡机制,还要重视外部监管的力量。就目前我国的情况来看,外部力量主要是指政府的力量,而存款人作为与商业银行密切相关的一方,同样具有监督银行风险的权利,所以为了实现外部力量的多元化,应当加强存款人和债权人对银行监督的力度。第三,本文详细分析了银行内部公司治理结构和外部公司治理结构对分别商业银行信用风险的影响。第四,搜集整理了我国2007-2010年商业银行不良贷款情况的相关数据,通过分析数据发现,我国不良贷款总额中占比最大的是国有商业银行,说明国有银行在改革前的遗留问题还很多,股份制需要进一步深化。再次,实证研究较为充分。在研究数据方面,本文利用我国14家上市商业银行作为样本,选取了2007-2010年的面板数据进行研究,尽可能弥补我国商业银行相关数据较少的不足。在研究方法方面,运用了时间序列-截面数据回归分析的方法,利用实证模型更为全面的分析了商业银行公司治理结构对其信用风险的影响。在变量选取方面,主要结合我国的实际情况,以不良贷款率来衡量信用风险,作为被解释变量；选取的公司治理结构方面也较为全面的包含了内部治理结构和外部治理结构的相关指标。最后,政策建议具有针对性。根据前文理论分析和实证分析的结构,本文提出了一系列完善商业银行公司治理的建议。一是建设性的提出了债权人治理内部化的观点,商业银行信用风险的管理和防范与银行存款者的利益密切相关,而目前我国监事会起到的作用有限,因此可以将二者有机结合起来,让债权人也加入监事会,加强监事会的监管效果；二是提出将信用风险作为公司管理层绩效考核的指标,避免管理者由于追求短期利益而从事高风险的行为；三是认为我国商业银行要在晚上内部治理结构和提高信用风险管理水平的基础上适度推行资本充足监管,不能操之过急。但是,由于笔者水平有限,本文仍然还存在了以下不足：一是由于篇幅有限,在对商业银行公司治理结构进行理论分析时,未像后文分析信用风险那样结合我国商业银行公司治理的现状进行阐述。二是由于我国上市商业银行数量过少,上市时间较短且不一致,所以在样本选取方面具有一定的局限性,样本数量少、时间跨度段是最主要的问题,另外,由于我国商业银行改革时间不长,很多数据不易获得或者准确性有待考证,所以对实证分析结果的准确性也有可能会造成影响。
[Abstract]:Commercial banks play an indispensable role in economic activities. Many characteristics of the banks determine their high risk and vulnerability. In all the risks, credit risk caused by credit business is the main risk of the bank. The management ability of the credit risk of commercial banks is related to its long-term survival and development. Since the end of 1980s, scholars of all countries have devoted themselves to the technical exploration of credit risk prevention and set up a lot of measurement models. However, with the outbreak of the financial crisis, the focus of attention has begun to turn from the technical level to the system construction of commercial banks themselves. More and more scholars have been concerned. It is believed that a sound corporate governance structure can fundamentally strengthen the bank's credit risk prevention capability.
With the rapid pace of the reform of the market system and the financial industry in our country, the former state-owned large state-owned banks have begun to carry out the reform of the shareholding system. In 2010, the reform of the stock system has completed the process of the reform of the stock system completely. The reform of the stock system has produced the credit risk management of the commercial banks of our country. However, the main reason is the result of the government intervention. In fact, there are still many problems in the corporate governance of commercial banks in China. But to solve the problems in the management of credit risk in our country, we must go back to the source and start from the silver. Embarking on its own system and improving the corporate governance structure of commercial banks.
From the theoretical and empirical point of view, this paper analyzes the impact of corporate governance structure on credit risk of commercial banks, which can be divided into the following aspects:
The first part is the introduction, which mainly introduces the background and purpose of the study, the ideas and methods to be taken, and the main contributions and shortcomings of the research.
The second part is the literature review. This part mainly summarizes and expounds the related literature about the corporate governance structure and the impact of corporate governance on credit risk at home and abroad. In the reference of previous research results, it is considered that the credit risk research based on the corporate governance structure of commercial banks is very important. Significance.
The third part is the theoretical overview of the corporate governance structure and the bank credit risk of commercial banks. This part expounds the special nature of the corporate governance structure of commercial banks compared with the general corporate governance structure: the multiplicity of the principal agent relationship, the particularity of the capital structure, the non transparency of the information and the government supervision. On the basis of this, it introduces the characteristics of the corporate governance structure of commercial banks. After introducing the risk types of commercial banks, it focuses on the related research on the credit risk of our country, focusing on the status of the credit risk in recent years, the causes of the credit risk and the reasons for the success of the credit risk.
The fourth part is the theoretical analysis of the impact of corporate governance on the credit risk of commercial banks, mainly from two aspects of the internal governance structure and external governance structure. Among them, the internal governance structure mainly analyzes the ownership structure, the board of directors, the board of supervisors and the impact of incentive contract mechanism on the credit risk, and the external governance structure. In terms of structure, the impact of government regulation on credit risk is analyzed.
The fifth part is an empirical study on the impact of corporate governance on bank credit risk. In the past 2007-2010 years, the panel data of 14 listed commercial banks in China are taken as samples. The credit risk is measured by the rate of bad loans, which are interpreted as the variables. The explanatory variables are mainly ownership concentration, equity nature, board size and independence, and the supervision of the board of directors. The related indexes of the internal governance structure of commercial banks, such as the scale of the event, the executive compensation and the proportion of the shareholding, as well as the related indexes of the external governance structure, such as the capital adequacy ratio and the franchise value, are also studied with reference to the previous scholars' research methods, and the assets scale and the capital leverage as control variables.
The sixth part is the main conclusion and policy recommendations. This part is mainly a summary of the empirical results of the fifth chapter, and draws the following conclusions: in the ownership structure, the larger the proportion of the first large shareholders, the greater the credit risk; the state-owned nature of the first major shareholders has a positive effect on the prevention of credit risk; the board of directors, the board of directors. The larger the scale, the smaller the credit risk of the commercial banks and the negative correlation between the scale of the board of supervisors and the credit risk; the higher the salary of the management level, the greater the proportion of the stock, the greater the credit risk of the commercial banks, and the positive correlation between the rate of capital filling and the credit risk. The larger the asset scale and the capital leverage, the smaller the credit risk of commercial banks. Finally, a series of suggestions are put forward to improve the corporate governance structure of commercial banks based on the theoretical analysis and empirical results of the previous article.
In general, the main contributions of this article are as follows:
First, the research content is more comprehensive. The article mainly studies the characteristics of the commercial bank's corporate governance structure and its impact on the credit risk from the particularity of commercial banks, and constructs the corporate governance framework of commercial banks on the basis of relevant guidance documents and previous scholars' research, and then uses the empirical research method. This paper analyzes the relationship between the current corporate governance structure and the credit risk of the commercial banks in China, and finally puts forward some suggestions on the improvement of the corporate governance structure of China's commercial banks according to the results of the empirical study.
Secondly, the theoretical analysis is more thorough. First, the reasons for improving the corporate governance of commercial banks are that the particularity of commercial banks makes commercial banks have the characteristics of high risk and vulnerability, while the particularity of commercial banks is mainly embodied in product, asset structure, principal-agent relationship, and information transparency. Second, when constructing the corporate governance structure of commercial banks, this paper thinks that the perfect corporate governance structure should consider both internal and external governance at the same time. Besides strengthening the balance mechanism among the stakeholders in the bank, we should pay more attention to the power of external supervision. The external force mainly refers to the power of the government, and the depositor, as a party closely related to the commercial bank, also has the right to supervise the bank risk. Therefore, in order to realize the diversification of the external forces, the depositors and creditors should strengthen the supervision of the banks. Third. This paper analyzes the internal corporate governance in the bank in detail. The influence of structure and external corporate governance structure on the credit risk of commercial banks respectively. Fourth, collecting and sorting out related data of non-performing loans in China's 2007-2010 year commercial banks. Through the analysis of data, it is found that the largest proportion of the total amount of non-performing loans in China is the state-owned commercial bank, indicating the legacy problems of the state-owned banks before the reform. Many, the shareholding system needs to be further deepened.
Thirdly, the empirical research is more sufficient. In the field of research data, this paper uses 14 Chinese listed commercial banks as samples and selected 2007-2010 year panel data to make up the shortage of less related data in China's commercial banks. In the research method, the method of regression analysis of time series - section data is used, The empirical model is used to analyze the influence of the corporate governance structure on the credit risk of commercial banks more comprehensively. In the selection of variables, it mainly combines the actual situation of our country to measure the credit risk with the bad loan rate as an explanatory variable; the selected corporate governance structure also contains the internal governance structure and the internal governance structure in a more comprehensive way. The related indicators of the external governance structure.
Finally, the policy proposal is pertinent. According to the structure of theoretical analysis and empirical analysis, this paper puts forward a series of suggestions to improve the corporate governance of commercial banks. First, it puts forward the viewpoint of the internalization of the creditor governance constructively. The management and anti model of the credit risk of commercial banks are closely related to the interests of the bank depositors. The former China board of supervisors plays a limited role, so we can combine the two parties together, let the creditors join the board of supervisors, strengthen the supervision effect of the board of supervisors; two, put forward the credit risk as the performance evaluation index of the company management, and avoid the high risk behavior of the managers in pursuit of short-term interests; three, I think that I China's commercial banks should appropriately implement capital adequacy supervision on the basis of internal governance structure and improve the level of credit risk management in the evening.
However, because of the limited level of the author, this paper still has the following shortcomings: first, because of the limited length of the text, the theoretical analysis of the corporate governance structure of the commercial banks is not like the analysis of the current situation of the corporate governance of the commercial banks in our country. Two is that the number of the listed commercial banks in our country is too small. The listing time is short and inconsistent, so the sample selection has some limitations, the sample size is small, the time span is the most important problem. In addition, because the time of the reform of China's commercial banks is not long, a lot of data are not easy to be obtained or the accuracy is still to be tested, and the accuracy of the results of the empirical analysis may also be caused. Influence.

【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F832.33;F224

【参考文献】