现金股利、代理风险及市场反应

发布时间：2018-05-13 09:25

本文选题：现金股利 + 代理风险　；参考：《北京工商大学学报(社会科学版)》2013年02期

【摘要】：以2008—2011期间A股市场非国有企业为研究对象,借鉴了系统论的思维模式构建分析框架,研究了不同代理风险情况下,现金股利预案公告非预期市场反应的差异。实证分析结果表明:最终控制人的掏空能力越强、受到的掏空激励越大、面临的掏空机会越好,现金股利预案公告的非预期市场反应越大;而相关的监督机制越完善,现金股利预案公告的非预期市场反应越小。最后,在深化对股利代理成本相关问题认识的同时,也为A股市场"分红新政"提供了经验参考。
[Abstract]:Taking the non-state-owned enterprises in the A share market as the research object during 2008-2011, using the thinking mode of the system theory as a reference to construct the analysis framework, the paper studies the differences of the unexpected market reaction of the cash dividend announcement under different agency risks. The empirical results show that: the stronger the hollowing ability of the ultimate controller, the greater the tunneling incentive, the better the tunneling opportunity faced, the greater the unexpected market response of the cash dividend announcement, and the more perfect the relevant supervision mechanism is. Cash dividend announcement of unexpected market reaction is smaller. Finally, while deepening the understanding of dividend agency cost, it also provides an empirical reference for A share market dividend New deal.
【作者单位】：中央财经大学会计学院;新疆财经大学会计学院;北京工商大学;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金项目(11BGL022) 北京市社会科学基金项目(11JGB027) 北京市教育委员会科研基地—科技创新平台—会计与投资者保护研究基地项目(PXM2012_014213_000031)
【分类号】：F832.51;F224

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