IPO超募、过度投资与公司价值

发布时间：2018-05-13 11:56

本文选题：超额融资 + 资金冗余　；参考：《证券市场导报》2013年08期

【摘要】：与已有研究多探讨中国公司是否偏好股权融资及其原因不同,本文重点考察公司偏好股权融资的后果。以2006年至2010年首次发行股票的公司为样本,通过分析IPO超募行为,研究我国公司的股权融资偏好及其对公司长期业绩、过度投资行为和公司价值的影响。研究发现,半数以上超额融资的企业在IPO之后显示出强烈的厌恶长期负债的倾向;大多数企业在IPO时过度融资,导致存在过多的冗余金融资产,企业金融资产比重越大,IPO后业绩下降幅度越大;而且超额融资量和冗余资产比例与企业过度投资行为的概率显著正相关,与企业的未来价值显著负相关。建议在IPO公司中引进EVA的考核与奖惩机制,对大股东和管理层进行投资约束,以遏制超额融资行为。
[Abstract]:This paper focuses on the consequences of Chinese companies' preference for equity financing, which is different from the previous studies on whether or not Chinese companies prefer equity financing. Based on the sample of the initial stock issue from 2006 to 2010, this paper studies the equity financing preference and its influence on the long-term performance, over-investment behavior and corporate value of Chinese companies through the analysis of IPO over-raising behavior. The study found that more than half of the overfunded enterprises showed a strong aversion to long-term debt after IPO, and most of them overfinanced during IPO, resulting in excessive redundant financial assets. The larger the proportion of financial assets, the greater the decline in performance after IPO, and the excess amount of financing and the proportion of redundant assets are significantly positively correlated with the probability of overinvestment, and negatively correlated with the future value of enterprises. It is suggested that the mechanism of examination, reward and punishment of EVA should be introduced into IPO Company to restrict the investment of large shareholders and management in order to curb the behavior of excess financing.
【作者单位】：南京大学会计与财务研究院;华南师范大学经济与管理学院;
【基金】：教育部人文社会科学青年基金项目(09YJCZH048) 广东省哲学社会科学“十一五”规划基金项目(08Y004)的阶段性成果
【分类号】：F275;F832.51

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