关于人民币汇率政策的双层博弈分析：2002-2011

发布时间：2018-05-13 17:10

本文选题：国内政治 + 人民币汇率政策　；参考：《外交学院》2012年博士论文

【摘要】：本文以双层博弈理论为分析框架，从国内政治与国际政治互动角度，分析了2002年以来中美两国政府在人民币汇率政策博弈中的合作与竞争行为。本文包括七个部分。导论部分主要通过文献综述表明，纯粹经济学理论难以解释人民币汇率问题，运用双层博弈理论是研究这一主题的一个比较新颖的视角，并在前人研究基础上提出本文的创新点和研究难点。第一、二章为本文理论阐述部分。第一章主要是在普特南双层博弈理论基础上，构建一个分析国际合作的双层博弈理论模型，它包括静态和动态两种分析模型。第二章主要是将国际合作的双层博弈理论模型引入汇率政策合作议题中，构建一个分析国际汇率政策合作的双层博弈理论模型，它也包括静态和动态两种分析模型。第三、四、五章为本文案例验证部分，主要是用双层博弈动态模型来解释中美两国在人民币汇率政策博弈中的合作行为。第三章主要描述了在美国国内政治中，改变现状政策利益集团如何利用国内政治制度，来表达其人民币汇率政策偏好，分析了在无外来压力条件下，布什政府时期（2002-2008）和奥巴马政府执政以来（2009-2011），美国政府在人民币汇率政策上的获胜集合。第四章主要研究中国国内制造业企业行为体，如何利用国内政治制度表达其汇率政策偏好，，在无外来压力条件下，中国政府如何根据进、出口企业集团的汇率政策需求，以及自身宏观经济政策目标，决定了2002-2008年和2009-2011年的人民币汇率政策获胜集合。第五章主要分析了布什政府时期和奥巴马政府执政以来，面对双方在人民币汇率政策中的分歧，两国政府如何运用中美战略经济对话或中美战略与经济对话解决分歧，双方谈判代表如何运用边缘支付、议题联系和预期收益战略，调整双方获胜集合并使之产生交集。结语部分主要包括论文的主要结论、政策建议和后续研究方向。通过本文的研究可以发现，共有利益是国际合作达成的基础。与静态模型相比，双层博弈动态分析模型更加适用于分析中美两国在人民币汇率政策上的博弈实践。在静态分析模型中，边缘支付和议题联系战略是谈判代表对获胜集合施加影响的重要手段。要理解中美两国的人民币汇率政策博弈均衡结果何以产生，还必须引入预期收益战略这一变量，即行为体未来收益考量也是影响两国在人民币汇率政策博弈中合作达成的重要解释变量。
[Abstract]:This paper analyzes the cooperation and competition between Chinese and American governments in the RMB exchange rate policy game from the perspective of domestic and international political interaction in the framework of two-tier game theory. This paper includes seven parts. The introduction mainly through literature review shows that the pure economic theory is difficult to explain the RMB exchange rate problem, and the use of two-tier game theory is a relatively new perspective to study this topic. And on the basis of previous studies, this paper points out the innovation and research difficulties. The first and second chapters are the theoretical part of this paper. In the first chapter, on the basis of Putnam's two-level game theory, we construct a two-level game theory model to analyze international cooperation, which includes static and dynamic analysis models. The second chapter mainly introduces the two-level game theory model of international cooperation into the topic of exchange rate policy cooperation, and constructs a two-level game theory model to analyze international exchange rate policy cooperation, which also includes static and dynamic analysis models. The third, fourth and fifth chapters are the case verification part of this paper, which mainly uses the two-layer game dynamic model to explain the cooperative behavior of China and the United States in the RMB exchange rate policy game. The third chapter mainly describes how to use the domestic political system to express the preference of RMB exchange rate policy in American domestic politics, and analyzes how to use the domestic political system to express the RMB exchange rate policy preference. The Bush administration (2002-2008) and the Obama administration have won the yuan exchange rate policy since 2009-2011. The fourth chapter mainly studies the domestic manufacturing enterprise actors, how to use the domestic political system to express their exchange rate policy preferences, under no external pressure, how the Chinese government according to the import and export enterprise groups exchange rate policy needs, And its own macroeconomic policy objectives, which determine the 2002-2008 and 2009-2011 RMB exchange rate policy winning set. The fifth chapter mainly analyzes the differences between the two governments in the RMB exchange rate policy during the Bush administration and the Obama administration, how the two governments use the Sino-American Strategic Economic Dialogue or the Sino-US Strategic and Economic Dialogue to resolve the differences. How the negotiators use marginal payments, issue linkages and expected revenue strategies to adjust the winning set and make it intersect. The conclusion includes the main conclusions, policy recommendations and future research directions. Through the study of this paper, we can find that common interests are the foundation of international cooperation. Compared with the static model, the two-level game dynamic analysis model is more suitable for analyzing the game practice of the RMB exchange rate policy between China and the United States. In the static analysis model, marginal payment and topic connection strategy are the important means for negotiators to exert influence on the winning set. In order to understand why the game equilibrium of RMB exchange rate policy between China and the United States came into being, we must also introduce the expected income strategy as a variable. That is, the actor's future income is also an important explanatory variable that affects the cooperation between the two countries in the RMB exchange rate policy game.
【学位授予单位】：外交学院
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F832.6;F224.32

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