小额信贷的偿还机制:一个理论述评

发布时间：2018-05-30 22:34

本文选题：小额信贷 + 偿还机制　；参考：《中国农村观察》2010年01期

【摘要】：本文从小额信贷机构面临的信贷风险和采用的贷款技术两个维度,综述并评论了小额信贷偿还机制方面的理论文献。现有理论文献分别解释了小额信贷机构采用连带责任、次序贷款、定期还款、小组基金等贷款技术,利用横向选择、横向监督、动态激励、分期偿付与担保替代等机制,解决金融中介机构常见的信贷风险问题(包括逆向选择、项目选择、努力程度选择、审计成本与策略性违约等)并最终有效提高还款率的机理。近20年来,对于小额信贷还款机制的理论研究,已经建立了横向选择、横向监督、动态激励机制的基本研究框架,并通过放宽假设、引入多样化机制、采用实验博弈方法等实现了向现实的逐渐逼近。
[Abstract]:This paper summarizes and reviews the theoretical literature on microfinance repayment mechanism from the two dimensions of credit risk and loan technology used by microfinance institutions. The existing theoretical literature respectively explains that microfinance institutions adopt loan techniques such as joint and several liability, sequential loans, periodic repayment, subfunds, and so on, using lateral selection, horizontal supervision, dynamic incentive, installment payment and guarantee substitution, etc. To solve the common credit risk problems of financial intermediaries (including adverse selection, project selection, degree of effort selection, audit costs and strategic default) and ultimately improve the repayment rate mechanism. In the past 20 years, the basic research framework of lateral selection, horizontal supervision and dynamic incentive mechanism has been established for the theoretical study of microfinance repayment mechanism. The experimental game method is used to realize the gradual approaching to reality.
【作者单位】：西北农林科技大学经济管理学院;中国社会科学院农村发展研究所;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金项目“中国二元非均衡经济社会结构与转型期农民增收困境”(项目编号:09XJL004) 国家自然科学基金项目“基于信任视角的弱势农户正规融资风险控制研究”(项目编号:70873096) “农户网络组织机制及其信用演化机理研究”(项目编号:70973097)的资助
【分类号】：F832.4

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