公司内部治理对我国商业银行风险承担的影响研究

发布时间：2018-05-31 13:37

本文选题：风险承担 + 商业银行　；参考：《西南财经大学》2012年硕士论文

【摘要】：近年来,美国次贷危机逐渐演变成全球范围内的金融危机,大规模的银行出现兼并重组、政府接管甚至破产的现象。其中贷款机构向次级贷款者贷款产生的巨大信用风险是美国次贷危机爆发的主要原因,因为当这些次级贷款者不能按时还款时,贷款机构就有可能会破产。银行业因为承担风险而存在和发展、以致繁荣,频繁发生的银行危机使人们更加深刻的认识到良好的公司治理在控制银行风险方面具有重要意义。因此,商业银行的公司治理对于银行的经营和发展具有重要作用,与此同时银行的风险承担问题也被提到议事日程,成为国内外相关学者、部门和政府关注的焦点。目前,研究商业银行的公司治理问题与其经营绩效之间关系的文献较多,而对商业银行的公司治理与银行风险承担之间关系的研究文献并不是很多,特别是只单独研究公司内部治理与银行风险承担之间关系的文献更是相对较少。虽然目前国外学者对这一相关问题的研究也正在从早期的定性化研究转向在实践应用中对其进行量化研究的过程,但是由于我国的特殊经济体制和商业银行刚刚完成股份制改革的具体情况,对二者之间关系的实证研究还只是处于一个初级阶段。因此,以商业银行的公司内部治理为研究对象,探讨其与银行风险承担之间的关系,就目前来看,视角较新,值得研究。本文在对公司治理理论、商业银行公司治理理论及其与银行风险承担之间关系相关理论及文献综述的基础之上,选取我国13家上市银行的年报数据,进而构建模型,对数据资料进行统计分析(相关分析、多元回归分析等),深入研究了商业银行公司治理内部各因素对银行风险承担的影响,致力于弄清楚哪些因素会对银行的风险水平造成影响,进而从中获取启示,以期为我国商业银行的公司治理提供有利的建议。本文采用定性与定量相结合、规范与实证相结合的研究方法,分析了我国商业银行的内部各因素对银行风险承担的影响。本研究主要安排如下：第1章：绪论。介绍了论文的研究背景、研究意义及目的,同时提出本文的创新点和结构安排。第2章：相关理论概述。包括一般企业的公司治理理论概述和商业银行风险承担的理论概述：即在对一般企业公司治理理论进行简单介绍的基础之上,根据银行业的特殊性,分析商业银行的公司治理特点,介绍商业银行公司治理的基本原则和基本框架,最后对银行风险承担的含义和银行风险承担的成因进行概述,同时对国内外现有的相关文献研究成果进行归纳总结。第3章：理论分析。对商业银行的公司治理机制进行界定,首先分析商业银行的内部治理现状,然后分别从股权机构、组织制衡机制和高管激励机制方面阐述其对银行风险承担的影响。第4章：实证分析。主要包括研究设计与实证分析两大部分。研究设计中主要对研究样本、数据来源、变量的选取等进行了说明,并在此基础上提出了本文的研究假设、构建了回归模型。实证分析部分主要对所获得的样本数据进行统计分析,包括描述性统计分析、变量相关分析以及回归分析。第5章：结论与展望。通过相关理论分析和对假设的相关验证,最终得出本文的研究结论。根据结论,为我国商业银行公司治理的优化和商业银行的风险控制提出政策性建议。本文采用综合风险指标(风险加权资产占总资产的比例)衡量银行风险,以我国2004—2010年的13家上市银行为研究样本,运用SPSS软件,建立多元回归模型进行分析,实证结果表明：大股东控制力与银行风险承担之间呈显著正相关关系；国有股比例与银行风险承担之间呈显著正相关关系；董事会规模与银行的风险承担之间存在显著的正相关关系；监事会规模与银行的总体风险之间呈显著负相关关系；独立董事的比例ID对银行风险的影响不显著；前三名高管的薪酬水平及高管持股对银行总体风险不具有显著性影响。本文的创新点主要有： 1.研究视角的创新。目前,对商业银行公司治理与其经营绩效之间关系研究的文献较多,而对商业银行公司治理机制对其风险承担的影响研究的文献较少。因此本文在借鉴相关学者的已有相关的研究的基础之上,以商业银行的内部治理为视角,结合我国的具体国情和商业银行刚刚完成股份制改革的现实,运用理论和实证相结合的方法对商业银行的内部治理与银行风险承担之间的关系进行研究。 2.在变量选取方面,国外对此问题的研究,大多是衡量的银行的各种具体风险,本文对对被解释变量的选择,主要采用风险加权资产占总资产的比例RWA,即从银行的总体风险方面对其研究。这不仅因为风险加权资产占总资产的比例是事前指标,能够很好的度量银行在从事风险资产业务中所面临的总体风险,也因为目前对银行治理结构因素与其之间的影响研究较少,已有的文献大多都是对银行的具体风险进行衡量,如信用风险、市场风险、证券市场整体风险等。 3.国内外相关研究中,对商业银行公司治理与银行风险承担的文献中大多都重点研究了股权结构,而对组织制衡机制和高管激励机制的研究较少且不深,本文在以前相关研究的基础上重点研究了组织制衡机制和高管激励机制对银行风险承担的影响,即主要从董监事会规模及其独立性和高管薪酬、高管持股几方面进行研究。
[Abstract]:In recent years, the American subprime crisis has gradually evolved into a global financial crisis. Large scale banks have merged and reorganized, the government takes over even bankruptcy. The huge credit risk caused by the loan agencies to the subprime borrowers is the main reason for the outbreak of the American subprime mortgage crisis because these subprime borrowers are not on time. When the loan is paid, the loan institution may go bankrupt. The banking industry exists and develops because of the risk, so that the frequent occurrence of the bank crisis makes people more deeply aware that the good corporate governance is of great significance in controlling the bank risk. Therefore, the corporate governance of commercial bank has a great effect on the management and development of the bank. At the same time, banks' risk taking has also been put on the agenda. It has become the focus of relevant scholars, departments and governments at home and abroad.
At present, there are more literature on the relationship between corporate governance and performance of commercial banks, and there are not many literature on the relationship between corporate governance and bank risk bearing of commercial banks, especially the literature that only studies the relationship between corporate governance and bank risk bearing only is relatively small. At present, the foreign scholars' research on this related issue is changing from the early qualitative research to the process of quantitative research in the practical application. However, the empirical study of the relationship between the two parties is only at the beginning because of the specific economic system and the specific situation of the commercial banks in China. Therefore, taking the internal governance of the commercial banks as the research object and discussing the relationship between them and the risk bearing of the bank, it is worth studying at the present point of view.
On the basis of the theory of corporate governance, the theory of corporate governance in commercial banks and their relationship with the risk bearing of banks, this paper selects the data of the annual reports of 13 listed banks in China, and then constructs the model, and makes a thorough study of the business of the business. The influence of the internal factors of the bank on the risk bearing of the bank is devoted to finding out which factors will affect the risk level of the bank, and then get the inspiration from it, in order to provide favorable suggestions for the corporate governance of the commercial banks in China.
This paper uses the combination of qualitative and quantitative, normative and empirical research methods to analyze the impact of the internal factors of commercial banks in China on the risk of banks. This study is mainly arranged as follows:
The first chapter: introduction, introduces the research background, significance and purpose of the thesis, and points out the innovation and structural arrangement of this paper.
The second chapter: a summary of the related theories, including the overview of the corporate governance theory of the general enterprise and the theoretical overview of the risk bearing of commercial banks: on the basis of a simple introduction to the general corporate governance theory and the particularity of the banking industry, the characteristics of the corporate governance of the commercial banks are analyzed, and the basic management of the commercial banks is introduced. The principle and the basic framework are summarized. At last, the meaning of bank risk bearing and the causes of bank risk bearing are summarized. At the same time, the relevant literature research results at home and abroad are summarized.
The third chapter: theoretical analysis. It defines the corporate governance mechanism of commercial banks. First, it analyzes the current situation of the internal governance of commercial banks, and then expounds their impact on the risk bearing of the bank from the equity institutions, the organizational balance mechanism and the executive incentive mechanism.
The fourth chapter is an empirical analysis. It mainly includes two parts of research design and empirical analysis. In the research design, the research samples, data sources and variables are explained. On this basis, the research hypothesis and the regression model are put forward. The empirical analysis department is mainly on the statistical analysis of the sample data obtained. It includes descriptive statistical analysis, variable correlation analysis and regression analysis.
The fifth chapter: the conclusion and the prospect. Through the relevant theoretical analysis and the relevant verification of the hypothesis, the conclusion of this paper is finally drawn. According to the conclusion, the policy suggestions are put forward for the optimization of the corporate governance of the commercial banks in China and the risk control of commercial banks.
This paper uses the comprehensive risk index (the proportion of the risk weighted assets to account for the total assets) to measure the bank risk, taking 13 listed banks in China from 2004 to 2010 as the research samples and using the SPSS software to establish a multiple regression model. The empirical results show that there is a significant positive correlation between the control power of the large shareholders and the risk bearing of the bank; There is a significant positive correlation between the share ratio and the risk bearing of the bank; there is a significant positive correlation between the board size and the risk bearing of the bank; the scale of the board of supervisors has a significant negative correlation with the overall risk of the bank; the proportion of the independent director ID has no significant influence on the bank risk; the salary of the top three executives is not significant. Horizontal and executive shareholding have no significant impact on overall bank risk.
The main innovations of this article are as follows:
1. the innovation of the research perspective. At present, there are more literature on the relationship between corporate governance and the performance of commercial banks, and there are few literature on the impact of the corporate governance mechanism on the risk bearing of commercial banks. Therefore, this paper is based on the related research of relevant scholars and the internal governance of commercial banks. In view of the actual situation of our country and the reality that the commercial banks have just completed the reform of the joint-stock system, the relationship between the internal governance of commercial banks and the risk bearing of the banks is studied by the combination of theory and empirical method.
2. in the selection of variables, most of the foreign research on this problem is the specific risk of the bank. This paper mainly adopts the proportion of the risk weighted assets to the total assets RWA, that is, to study the overall risk of the bank, which is not only because the proportion of the risk weighted assets to the total assets is the front of the incident. Indicators can be a good measure of the overall risks that banks face in the business of risky assets, but also because there are few studies on the impact of the structural factors on the bank's governance. Most of the existing literature is to measure the specific risks of the banks, such as credit risk, market risk, and the overall risk of the securities market.
3. in the related research at home and abroad, most of the literatures on corporate governance and risk bearing of commercial banks have focused on the ownership structure, while the research on the mechanism of organizational checks and balances and the incentive mechanism of senior executives is less and less. On the basis of previous related research, this paper focuses on the organizational balance mechanism and the executive incentive mechanism to the banking wind. The impact of insurance is mainly from the scale and independence of the board of supervisors and executive compensation, and executive shareholding.
【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F832.33;F224

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