机构投资者持股与上市家族企业盈余管理的实证研究

发布时间：2018-06-07 05:12

本文选题：盈余管理 + 家族企业　；参考：《贵州财经大学》2012年硕士论文

【摘要】：改革开放以来,特别是随着我国经济的迅猛发展,民营企业的经济地位不断上升。而民营企业的集中代表-家族企业,因其具有初始融资迅速、管理成本低、决策效率高、家族成员凝聚力强等优势,在我国经济发展所起的作用也日益增大。且伴随着一些家族企业的上市,这些企业更跻身于经济发展的前列。因此管理层对上市公司的盈余管理行为也就备受相关利益者的关注。如果企业的盈余管理行为导致了投资者无法根据客观、公允的会计信息作出正确的决策判断时,我们就认为影响了正常的资本市场运行。而机构投资者作为资本市场中的重要组成部分,在公司治理、信息披露、资产定价方面发挥重要作用。并且当机构投资者在持股比例、持股时间、监督成本等特征的不同,给企业带来监督作用也有所不同。本文以2008-2010年新会计报表中的上市家族企业为样本进行实证分析。通过对1486家上市家族企业的盈余管理程度进行的有效计量和对其机构投资者差异性持股的分析发现。机构投资者积极持股与盈余管理程度明显负相关,即积极持股会降低家族企业盈余管理的程度；机构投资者消极持股与盈余管理程度正相关,即消极持股会刺激到家族企业的盈余管理行为。而混合持股与盈余管理正相关但是不显著的。由于家族企业的所有权与经营权并存的特殊性,所以本文从内容上研究了由于家族企业机构投资者差异性持股对盈余管理的影响也是不同的。考察不同类型机构投资者对上市家族企业盈余管理行为的影响,为我国监管机构稳定资本市场而大力发展机构投资者并使其参与到上市公司的公司治理中提供一个参考依据,从而得出更具体的结论,提出更具体的相关的建议。
[Abstract]:Since the reform and opening up, especially with the rapid development of China's economy, the economic status of private enterprises has been rising. Because of its advantages such as rapid initial financing, low management cost, high decision-making efficiency and strong cohesion of family members, family enterprises play an increasingly important role in the economic development of our country. And with the listing of some family enterprises, these enterprises are in the forefront of economic development. Therefore, the management of listed companies earnings management behavior is concerned by the relevant stakeholders. If the enterprise's earnings management behavior leads to investors unable to make a correct decision based on objective and fair accounting information, we think it affects the normal operation of the capital market. As an important part of capital market, institutional investors play an important role in corporate governance, information disclosure and asset pricing. And when institutional investors in the shareholding ratio, holding time, supervision costs and other characteristics of different, to the enterprise supervision role is also different. This paper makes an empirical analysis on the listed family firms in the new accounting statements of 2008-2010. Through the effective measurement of the earnings management degree of 1486 listed family enterprises and the analysis of their institutional investors' differential shareholding. The positive shareholding of institutional investors is negatively correlated with the degree of earnings management, that is, the degree of earnings management is reduced by active shareholding, and the degree of earnings management is positively correlated with the negative shareholding of institutional investors. That is, negative ownership will stimulate the earnings management behavior of family firms. The mixed shareholding and earnings management are positively related but not significant. Because of the particularity of the coexistence of ownership and management right of family business, this paper studies the influence of institutional investors' different shareholding on earnings management. This paper investigates the influence of different types of institutional investors on the earnings management behavior of listed family enterprises, and provides a reference basis for our country's regulators to stabilize the capital market and vigorously develop institutional investors and make them participate in the corporate governance of listed companies. In order to draw more specific conclusions, put forward more specific recommendations.
【学位授予单位】：贵州财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F275;F832.51;F224

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