可转债融资选择实证研究

发布时间：2018-06-08 14:55

本文选题：可转债 + 上市公司　；参考：《财会通讯》2013年35期

【摘要】：正一、引言早在20世纪,国外有金融财务学者就指出,公司可以通过发行可转债减少信息不对称(Stein,1992)、抑制投资不足和过度投资以及减少代理成本(Green,1984)。较近的研究Lewis(1999,2003)也认为,可转债发行人可以通过转债条款的设计有效地解决公司外部融资时面临的特定委托代理、信息不对称以及财务风险等问题。但是国内不少学者的研究表明,我国资本市场上的上市公司普遍存在着股权融资偏好,这与发达资本市场上市公司的融资行为不相符。从理论上说,在我国市场背景下进行可转债融资选择研究,可以丰富我国上市公司融资决策理论,特别是符合我国实际的
[Abstract]:First, as early as the 20th century, foreign financial and financial scholars pointed out that companies can reduce information asymmetry by issuing convertible bonds, curb underinvestment and overinvestment, and reduce agency costs. A recent study by Lewis 1999 / 2003 also shows that convertible bond issuers can effectively solve the problems of specific principal-agent, information asymmetry and financial risk in the external financing of a company through the design of convertible terms. However, the research of many domestic scholars shows that there is a general preference for equity financing in listed companies in China's capital market, which is inconsistent with the financing behavior of listed companies in developed capital markets. Theoretically speaking, the study on the choice of convertible bond financing under the background of Chinese market can enrich the financing decision theory of listed companies in China, especially in line with the reality of our country.
【作者单位】：苏州工业职业技术学院;
【分类号】：F832.5;F224

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