银行并购反垄断管制与中国的管制政策研究

发布时间：2018-06-15 15:39

本文选题：银行并购 + 并购反垄断　；参考：《武汉大学》2012年博士论文

【摘要】：银行并购反垄断管制是银行反垄断管制的重要方面，2007年全面爆发的美国金融危机引发了人们对银行反垄断管制的思考，同样也引起了人们对银行并购反垄断管制的关注。对中国而言，对银行并购反垄断的管制还十分薄弱，机构缺失，法律缺失，程序和方法缺失，既不能有效地管制国内银行实施的滥用市场力的并购，也不能有效地管制外资银行在中国境内实施的有损中国金融安全的并购，更不利于国内银行通过海外并购占领国际市场。因此，这一研究具有很强的理论意义和现实意义。本文以“后危机”为背景，以银行并购为研究对象，以反垄断管制为研究视角，论证“后危机”时代加强银行并购反垄断管制的必要性、机理、方法与程序，在国际比较的基础上，设计出中国银行业并购的反垄断管制政策。美国金融危机爆发的一个重要原因在于银行的掠夺性借贷行为，而掠夺性借贷的产生则要归因于反垄断管制的不作为。因此，加强银行业的反垄断管制是应对金融危机的重要举措。作为银行反垄断管制重要组成部分的银行并购反垄断，在当前背景下，尤其必要。银行并购反垄断的机理主要有两个，一是哈佛学派的SCP范式，另一是威廉姆森的效率权衡理论。SCP范式认为市场结构决定企业行为，企业行为影响企业绩效。按照这一理论，对市场结构的管制是最重要的，由于并购提高了市场集中度，导致了市场结构的变化，进而对企业绩效产生了不利影响，因此需要对并购进行反垄断管制。并购→集中度提高→银行市场力提高→社会福利损失，这一逻辑的并购效应我们称为并购的负效应。威廉姆森的效率权衡理论认为，即使并购带来了负效应，导致了社会福利受损，但如果并购同时带来了效率的提高，且效率的提高足以抵消并购产生的负效应，那么这起并购不应被禁止；只有那些并购带来的效率不足以抵消社会福利受损的并购才应被禁止。并购导致的效率提高的效应我们称为并购的正效应。银行并购的竞争性评估即是对这两方面进行权衡。本文对威廉姆森的静态效率进行了修正，重点说明了对效率的定量评价方法，包括对效率的传递率和“补偿的边际成本降低”的定量分析。银行并购反垄断的机制可分为五种机制：相关市场界定机制、市场力测定机制、并购效应评估机制、垄断缓释因素分析机制、分拆机制。其中，对相关市场界定机制，重点介绍了市场界定的方法，如SSNIP检验、HarrisSimons(1989)的临界损失检验、KatzShapiro（2003）的“总的转换率”检验；对市场力测定，重点介绍了离散选择模型在银行业中的运用；对并购效应评估机制，重点介绍了转换率方法和向上价格压力法；对垄断缓释因素，分析了如下缓释因素：竞争者；市场进入；顾客的转换成本；失败银行救济；公共利益；人口迁移等；对分拆机制，文章提示了银行并购分拆的原理、目标和机制设计，这为后面我们设计中国的银行并购分拆制度准备了理论基础。中国缺乏对银行并购实施反垄断管制的经验，需要借鉴其它国家或地区的经验来为我所用。文章选取有代表性的国家或地区（包括美国、加拿大、欧盟、澳大利亚、日本、中东欧国家），从价值取向、机构设置、相关市场的界定、并购反垄断临界值的确定、竞争效应分析等方面比较他们在银行并购反垄断政策上的异同，并辅以案例，为中国银行业“走出去”，实施海外并购战略提供经验指导和决策参考。银行并购的反垄断管制最基本的一步是界定相关市场。美国费城银行案中，将银行并购反垄断的相关地区市场界定为“本地市场”，将相关产品市场界定为“银行服务群”。这一界定是否适用于中国银行业的并购反垄断管制，文章对此进行了实证分析。通过设计消费者和中小企业融资调查问卷，在本地抽样调查1500个消费者、200家中小企业，文章验证了传统的“本地市场”假设和“群服务”假设在中国的合理性，根据中国银行业市场的竞争态势和发展趋势，提出了中国对银行并购实施反垄断的相关市场界定的方法。从各国对银行并购实施反垄断管制的实践看，经济性分析越来越普遍，其地位日益突出。银行并购反垄断管制的经济分析包括单边效应和协调效应分析。对单边效应的分析，文章重点介绍并购模拟技术的运用，并对并购模拟这一技术进行了评价；对协调效应的研究，通过改进传统的“核对表”方法，将之与“一致同意-甄别欺骗-可信的惩罚”范式结合，提出银行业并购规制的协调效应新的分析框架。这一新的框架是：从Friedman的“平衡诱惑均衡”概念入手，不是研究银行卡特尔的形成条件，而是从卡特尔稳定性指标（δ）来判断银行并购的协调效应。随着中国银行业对外开放进程的深化，外资银行加强了对中国银行业市场的渗透。并购是外资银行进入中国市场的重要手段，对外资银行的并购，我们需要做辩证分析，一方面，外资银行并购有利于中国银行业的竞争局面的形成；另一方面，外资银行并购也有可能损害中国银行业的竞争，甚至有损中国金融安全，因此，需要对外资银行并购进行反垄断管制。本文从发展中国家的视角，分析了外资银行在华并购的动机，并对外资银行进入中国市场的竞争效应进行了实证研究，，最后设计了外资银行并购的反垄断管制政策。设计中国银行业并购的反垄断政策是本文的重点和落脚点。银行业并购反垄断的政策设计包括银行并购反垄断的机构设置、反垄断的原则、标准与目标、银行并购申报制度、竞争评估制度、并购救济制度等；除此以外，文章还从需求边和供给边两方面论述了构建中国银行业竞争政策的主要内容，它是对前一个内容的深化与发展。本文的主要观点是：（1）在“后危机”时代，中国既要加强对银行审慎性的监管，更要强化对银行的竞争性管制，二者不可或缺。（2）在机构设置上，由商务部的反垄断局负责银行并购的反垄断管制，同时赋予银监会相应的权利和义务。（3）银行并购的反垄断管制应以“合理原则”为核心原则，考虑到外资银行并购对国家金融安全的影响，对外资银行并购还需进行国家金融安全审查。（4）构建合理的银行并购申报制度，实行两步审查法，申报标准应相对宽松。（5）重视经济性分析方法在银行并购反垄断管制中的运用，包括相关市场界定的方法、单边效应和协调效应评估的方法以及效率评估方法等。（6）在银行并购的反垄断管制中，合理运用适用除外和域外适用制度。（7）加强国际反垄断的协调。一是商务部与国外竞争权威的双边和多边协调机制的建设；另一是银监会与外国银行监管机构的国际协调机制的建设。
[Abstract]:The bank ' s anti - monopoly control is an important aspect of the bank ' s anti - monopoly control . In 2007 , the American financial crisis triggered the attention of people to the anti - monopoly control of the banks . In the case of China , the regulation of the anti - monopoly of the banks ' M & A is weak , the mechanism is missing , the law is missing , the procedure and the method are missing , which can not only effectively control the acquisition of the domestic banks ' abuse of market forces , but also can not effectively control the domestic banks ' merger and acquisition of international markets through overseas acquisitions . Therefore , the research has a strong theoretical and practical significance .

On the basis of international comparison , the thesis designs the anti - monopoly control policy of China ' s banking M & A .

One of the important reasons for the financial crisis in the United States lies in the predatory lending behavior of banks , while the generation of predatory lending is due to the inaction of anti - monopoly control . Therefore , strengthening the anti - monopoly control of banking is an important measure to deal with the financial crisis . As a major component of the bank ' s anti - monopoly control , the anti - monopoly of M & A is especially necessary in the current context .

The mechanism of the anti - monopoly of M & A is mainly two , one is the SCP paradigm of the Harvard School , and the other is the efficiency trade - off theory of William Mons . According to this theory , the market structure decides the enterprise behavior and the enterprise behavior influences the performance of the enterprise . According to this theory , it is the negative effect of M & A .
The efficiency of M & A is not enough to offset the damage of social welfare . The effect of M & A is the positive effect of M & A . The competitive evaluation of M & A is the positive effect of M & A . The competitive evaluation of M & A is a trade - off . In this paper , the static efficiency of M & A is corrected , and the quantitative evaluation method of efficiency , including the transfer rate of efficiency and the quantitative analysis of the marginal cost of compensation .

The mechanism can be divided into five mechanisms : relevant market defining mechanism , market force measurement mechanism , M & A effect evaluation mechanism , monopoly slow - release factor analysis mechanism and separation mechanism .
This paper focuses on the application of discrete selection model in banking industry .
The evaluation mechanism of M & A effect is introduced , and the conversion rate method and upward price pressure method are mainly introduced .
The sustained - release factors of monopoly were analyzed , and the following slow - release factors were analyzed : competitors ;
Market access ;
customer ' s conversion cost ;
Failure Bank Relief ;
Public interest ;
Population migration , etc . ;
This paper suggests the principle , goal and mechanism design of the bank merger and acquisition , which provides the theoretical basis for the later design of China ' s bank M & A separation system .

China lacks the experience of implementing anti - monopoly control on the merger and acquisition of banks , and needs to draw lessons from other countries or regions . The article selects representative countries or regions ( including the United States , Canada , EU , Australia , Japan , Central and Eastern Europe ) , compares their similarities and differences from value orientation , institutional setting , related markets , merger and acquisition anti - monopoly thresholds , competition effect analysis , etc . , and provides empirical guidance and decision - making reference for China ' s banking " go out " and implement overseas M & A strategies .

The most basic step in the anti - monopoly control of bank M & A is to define the relevant market . In the case of Philadelphia Bank of America , the relevant regional market of the anti - monopoly of M & A is defined as the " local market " , and the relevant product market is defined as " bank service group " . This article makes an empirical analysis on whether the traditional " local market " hypothesis and " group service " hypothesis are applicable to China ' s banking industry .

The economic analysis of the anti - monopoly control of M & A includes single - side effect and coordination effect analysis . The analysis of single - side effect includes single - side effect and coordination effect analysis .
By improving the traditional " checklist " method and combining it with the " consensus - screening fraud - credible punishment " model , this paper puts forward a new analytical framework for the coordination effect of banking M & A regulation . This new framework is to judge the coordination effect of the bank M & A from Cartel ' s stability index ( 未 ) .

With the deepening of the opening process of China ' s banking industry , foreign banks have strengthened the penetration of China ' s banking market . The acquisition is an important means for foreign banks to enter the Chinese market . As a result , we need to make a dialectical analysis on the mergers and acquisitions of foreign banks . On the one hand , the merger of foreign banks is conducive to the formation of competition in China ' s banking industry ;
On the other hand , foreign bank mergers and acquisitions may damage China ' s banking industry and even undermine China ' s financial security . Therefore , it is necessary to carry out anti - monopoly control on the merger and acquisition of foreign banks . From the perspective of developing countries , this paper analyzes the motives of foreign banks ' merger and acquisition in China , and makes an empirical study on the competition effect of foreign banks in China ' s market . Finally , the anti - monopoly control policy of foreign banks ' merger and acquisition is designed .

The anti - monopoly policy in the design of China ' s banking M & A is the focus and the foothold in this paper . The policy design of the anti - monopoly of M & A includes the establishment of the anti - monopoly mechanism , the principle of anti - monopoly , the standard and the target , the system of the application of the merger and acquisition of the bank , the system of competition evaluation and the remedy system of M & A .
In addition , the article discusses the main contents of the construction of China ' s banking competition policy from both the demand side and the supply side , which is the deepening and development of the previous content .

The main point of this paper is : ( 1 ) In the post - crisis era , China should strengthen the supervision of bank ' s prudence and strengthen the competitive regulation of the bank .
Another is the establishment of an international coordination mechanism between the Banking Regulatory Commission and the foreign bank regulator .
【学位授予单位】：武汉大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F832.3;D630

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