农户联保贷款的模型研究

发布时间：2018-07-01 11:08

本文选题：联保贷款 + 社会成本　；参考：《西南财经大学》2012年硕士论文

【摘要】：国外对农村金融的研究由来己久,学术界对农村金融问题的研究经历了长期的探索和实践,从最初的农村金融补贴论发展到上世纪八十年代以后对孟加拉国运用农户联保贷款实现扶贫的金融模式的研究。联保贷款之所以具有这种可持续性扶贫功能,主要的原因是其内生作用机制所产生的作用,简要而言就是通过联保模式可以解决农村金融无担保贷款中因信息不对称引起的道德风险问题和降低贷款监督成本。该模式在孟加拉获得的巨大成功后就被迅速推广到全世界,特别是受到亚洲、非洲和拉丁美洲等欠发达国家的广泛效仿,各国根据自己的具体情况创造了不同的信贷模式。虽然传统的联保贷款理论指出其在降低银行甄别成本和促成小组成员为了各自的利益而互相监督从而能够降低贷款违约风险方面效果显著,但是在实际各国各地区的操作中却反应出了与理论并不一致的结果。特别值得关注的是联保贷款在我国局部地区出现衰退甚至己经趋于消亡(例如四川南充、成都温江、安徽毫州等地),同时数据也显示出联保贷款在我国农村金融贷款中所占的比例依旧不高,这些现象不符合联保理论中指出的相对于个人信用贷款所具有的优势。正是基于以上的理论与实践的背离,让作者认识到对联保贷款在局部区域的研究或许比广义上的研究更有价值、对其在理论上进行深化或许比已经被大量实证的数据分析更有帮助。总结起来主要研究了以下几点问题：(1)联保贷款还款率在时间和空间上的差异。(2)内部监督机制产生的条件。(3)联保成员的空间分布和社会成本在联保贷款中的作用。围绕上述问题,文章是这样设计逻辑结构的。第一章主要介绍了本文的研究背景、主要研究的问题、研究中运用的方法以及文章可能的创新之处。第二章主要是总结和分析前人的研究文献,通过对该领域较为重要的研究文献以及对本文的研究具有一定影响的文献资料进行介绍并作出分析评价。本章首先介绍了联保贷款研究中的重要理论文献,通过对不同理论的对比分析总结出理论研究的范式同时发现研究中存在的不足；其次对国外的实证分析进行了综述,通过理论和实证对比分析以确定本文研究的先进性;最后对我国联保贷款的作用、还款率和现状做了简要分析,进一步论证了本文研究的意义。第三章通过建立两人联保贷款理论模型对本文提出的几个问题展开了研究,运用分情况对比分析的方法对项目收益率、小组成员空间分布、社会成本这几个变量和还款率之间的关系做了研究。第四章是对以上两人模型的一种拓展,考虑到实际联保贷款操作中基本上不存在两人模型的形式,为了研究小组人数是否会对还款率产生影响,在本章中作者建立了五人联保模型进行讨论。另外,结合我国目前逐渐开放农村贷款抵押品种类的政策,作者研究了在联保贷款中通过引入部分担保品对还款率的影响。第五章作者简单扼要的总结了本文的主要结论,并针对研究成果提出了几个建议。围绕上述问题,文章采用了历史分析法、对比分析法、事实举例法和图表分析法,采用由浅入深的研究路径逐渐展开得到了如下一些具有新意的结论：(1)通过对比分析个人信用贷款中完全信息和不完全信息条件下的不同情况,得到了由于信息不对称农户能够获得一个信息租金的结论；(2)文章首次严格论证了联保贷款小组成员在空间上的分布对整个联保贷款所产生的影响,合理的把小组成员空间分布和监督成本、恶意违约付出的社会成本自然的联系到一起进行研究；(3)在区分了不同项目收益下的两种情况对两人联保贷款模型进行了分析研究,对比分析了无监督、一人监督和两人同时监督三种情形,作者严格论证了在不同的收益条件下农户是否选择监督也是不确定的,并且在不同的情况下联保贷款对还款率的作用也是不同的,这一结论就解释了在不同的时间和空间上联保贷款在还款率方面的差异；(4)作者简单探讨了在五人博弈模型中的情形,论证了由于项目收益的差异银行应该合理的设定一个联保贷款小组成员人数以实现最大化收益的结论；(5)文章探讨了市场价格波动给对还款率的影响,作者认为这也是导致还款率在时间和空间上表现出巨大差异的重要因素；(6)结合国家政策以及农村耐用品逐渐提高的实际情况,作者分析了引入部分担保品对联保贷款的影响,论证了引入部分担保品对降低恶意违约率产生的积极作用。
[Abstract]:The study of rural finance has been carried out for a long time . The study of rural financial problems has undergone long - term exploration and practice . The main reason for this problem is that it can solve the problem of moral hazard caused by asymmetric information in rural financial unsecured loans and reduce the cost of loan supervision .

Although the traditional warranty loan theory points out that it has obvious effect in reducing the bank screening cost and facilitating the team members to supervise each other in order to reduce the risk of loan default , the paper also shows that the proportion of the loan in the local area of China is still not high . It is based on the above theory and practice .

In chapter 1 , the author introduces and analyzes the important theoretical literature in the research of this paper .
In chapter 3 , the author studies the relationship between the function , the repayment rate and the current situation of the loan in China . In chapter 3 , the author studies the relationship between the variables and the repayment rate of the loan in this chapter . In addition , the author studies the effect of introducing part of the collateral on the repayment rate in this chapter . The fifth chapter summarizes the main conclusions of this paper , and puts forward some suggestions for the research results .

Based on historical analysis , comparative analysis , fact example method and graph analysis method , some new conclusions are obtained : ( 1 ) the conclusion that the information asymmetry farmer can obtain a rent can be obtained by comparing the different situation of incomplete information and incomplete information in personal credit loan .
( 2 ) For the first time , the paper strictly demonstrates the effect of the distribution of the members of the Group in the space on the whole UNPROFOR loan , and reasonably associates the space distribution of the team members with the supervision cost and the social cost of the malicious default ;
( 3 ) In the case of distinguishing between the two situations of different project income , the author analyzes the two - person UNPROFOR loan model , compares and analyzes the three situations of non - supervision , one - person supervision and two - person supervision , the author strictly demonstrates whether the selection supervision of the farmer is uncertain under different income conditions , and the role of the loan to the repayment rate under different circumstances is different , and this conclusion explains the difference in the repayment rate of the loan in different time and space ;
( 4 ) The author simply discusses the situation in the five - person game model , demonstrates the conclusion that the difference bank of the project income should reasonably set the number of members of the UNPROFOR loan group to realize the maximum benefit ;
( 5 ) The article discusses the effect of market price fluctuation on repayment rate , and the author thinks that it is also the important factor that leads to the great difference in repayment rate in time and space ;
( 6 ) Combined with the actual situation of national policy and the gradual improvement of rural durable goods , the author analyzes the effect of introducing part of the collateral on UNPROFOR , and demonstrates the positive effect of introducing part of the collateral on the reduction of malicious default rate .
【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F832.4

【参考文献】