中小板上市公司管理层薪酬与公司价值研究
发布时间：2018-08-09 18:19
【摘要】：所有权和经营权相互分离是现代企业公司治理结构的主要特征之一,这种所有权和经营权的分离导致公司所有者和公司管理层之间利益博弈,且这种利益博弈随着公司经营的复杂化变得更加激烈。大多数现代公司基本上由中高层管理人员组成的领导团队所控制,他们主要根据公司既定目标制定实施计划并保证能够得到落实,针对公司外部所有者,他们仅需要提供一个让投资者满意的投资回报率。但是管理者与所有者存在信息、不对称、公司控制权分离、效用函数不一致等问题,导致管理者更多的为自身利益考虑。公司所有者设计较为合理的薪酬体制来激励管理层,而管理层又会利用薪酬体制最大化自我收益。这中间薪酬机制设计成为双方博弈的焦点之一。 在现代公司治理研究中,对高管薪酬进行大量学术探讨和理论分析。国外涉及管理层薪酬激励文献研究的对象多数以股权结构分散的公司为主,这与我国当前股权结构较为集中的国情有所差异。在国内学术研究中,大部分以国有上市公司为研究对象,这体现了我国体制改革的大背景。国有企业是我国经济主体,背景较为特殊,国企改革时间较早,数据容易获取,转型过程中问题也较为突出,研究结果可为以后企业改革提供借鉴。伴随经济体制转向市场化,非国有企业在国民经济中的作用和地位迅速提升。相比国有企业,非国企发展起步较晚,且大多数企业规模较小、管理不科学、企业运作不规范、披露的信息质量不高,因此对于民营企业的学术研究较晚。 从研究内容看,国内研究文献引入在职消费观念时间较晚,将管理层货币性薪酬和在职消费都进行实证研究时间更短,得出结果也不尽然相同。从发展背景看,我国中小企业是在我国工业化初级阶段和经济转轨时期崛起的。相比大型企业,中小企业为数众多,其总数占我国企业总数99%以上,并且吸纳了超过七成的劳动力。中小企业不仅在多数领域对大型企业形成竞争态势,促使经济的市场化,且相当程度上解决了居民就业问题,中小企业对我国的济发展起了举足轻重作用。 2004年5月,经国务院批准,中国证监会批复同意深圳证券交易所在主板市场内设立中小企业板块。中小板上市公司中非国有企业比重较大,较符合我国中小企业以民营企业为主体的特点。相对主板公司,中小板上市公司具有规模小、以高科技创新型公司为主、公司成长性高等特点；而在公司治理方面,内控制度的设计及执行都与主板上市公司有一定差距。 那么,针对中小板上市公司,管理层薪酬在多大程度上影响公司价值?管理层货币性薪酬与在职消费对公司价值的影响结果如何?中小板国有企业与非国有企业在薪酬激励方面的区别及效果如何?本文试图通过理论分析和实证检验回答上述问题。 文章共分为四个部分,具体安排如下： 第一章为绪论,重点说明研究背景与研究意义,并整理本文的研究思路和写作框架。 第二章为文献综述,主要从管理层薪酬激励相关内容展开,分为国外文献研究和国内文献部分。国外文献从研究管理层货币性薪酬与公司绩效开始,一直到最近几年逐渐兴起的在职消费与公司业绩关系,根据时间顺序综述各个时期较为代表性的学者文献,重点介绍近期国外文献。国内文献根据写作特点归类为规范文献和实证文献,规范文献重点分析相关学者研究背景及成果；实证文献划分为三个阶段,并评述得到实证结果的原因。在上述文献综述基础上说明本文研究的意义。 第三章为相关概念界定和本文理论基础。概念界定主要分析管理层薪酬、货币性薪酬、在职消费和公司价值四个核心概念。在理论基础部分列示了本文需要的四个理论。其中委托代理理论主要阐释管理层与公司所有者之间博弈关系,由此引出所有者通过薪酬契约方式激励管理层的原理；契约理论主要说明薪酬契约由于信息不对称而导致契约内容不完全；管理层权力理论阐述了管理层可能利用剩余控制权寻租,即超额货币性收益和过度在职消费现象；激励相容理论则说明了应该如何有效的制定薪酬,使得管理层与公司所有者利益趋同,弱化管理层对于公司价值的侵蚀。 第四章为实证部分,也是文章核心。文章将管理层薪酬激励分为货币性薪酬激励和在职消费两方面,以2007-2010年中小板上市公司为样本,按公司性质分为国有企业和非国有企业对比分析。描述性统计部分利用EXCEL软件,分别从总样本、按企业性质分组分析了管理层货币性薪酬、在职消费、因变量和控制变量的年度趋势变化,并对比分析国企和非国企样本数据年度差异性。接着通过STATA软件进行相关变量的相关性分析,采取皮尔逊相关性检验方法,相关性分析主要是观测相关变量的相关系数及P值。回归分析分为多元线性回归和稳健性检验。实证结果显示：(1)在货币性薪酬与公司价值关系研究中,总样本回归结果是货币性薪酬与公司价值正相关,显著性水平较高；因此总体而言,我国中小板上市公司管理层货币性薪酬激励对公司价值提升起到促进作用。而分组检验同样表明中小板公司管理层货币性薪酬与公司价值正相关,但是国企样本的显著性水平较低,而非国有企业管理层货币性薪酬与公司价值显著性水平很高,说明非国企薪酬设计体制更有效,非国有企业货币性薪酬起到了较好的激励作用；(2)在职消费与公司价值关系研究中,总样本回归结果是在职消费与公司价值正相关,且显著性水平同样较高,说明我国中小企业管理层在职消费作为薪酬激励的一种方式,其存在有利于公司价值提升。分组检验显示了国企管理层在职消费与公司价值显著性水平更高,通过在职消费更能促进公司价值的提升；而非国有企业管理层在职消费更为透明,在职消费与公司价值显著性水平偏低。 第五章是研究结论、政策建议及本文不足的分析。总结前文相关研究文献及本文实证分析后发现,虽然我国市场化改革已较为深入,但是中小型国有企业管理层薪酬管制依然存在,因此通过货币性薪酬激励管理层的公司价值创造效果较差,在职消费反而更能促进国企管理层经营水平,提升价值创造活动,而在职消费水平多半是一种隐形的控制权消费,其消费标准难以衡量和监督,国企管理层能够通过这种方式增加自己效用,而非国企管理层货币性薪酬激励更有效。针对上述结论,提出相应应对措施,主要包括设计更为有效的薪酬契约,注重绩效薪酬的合理性,合理分配薪酬中固定收入与变动收入；强化公司治理,加强公司董事会中薪酬委员会的作用,注重公司内部控制,弱化管理层过度在职消费倾向；加强公司外部监管,通过经理人市场和公司外部舆论监督等方式约束管理层的自我激励。 本文主要贡献在于 (1)立足于中小板上市公司,对上市公司按企业性质分组为国有企业和非国有企业,研究结论更有现实意义。中小板上市公司作为中小型企业的代表,我国中小企业规模相对较小,数量众多,且非国有企业占据大多数,而本文符合条件的研究样本有51个国有企业和122个非国有企业,非国企样本占比达70.52%,符合非国企占数量优势的现状。 (2)将管理层薪酬激励分为货币性薪酬与在职消费两个方面,分别研究两类激励方式对于公司价值的影响。货币性薪酬激励与在职消费作为管理层薪酬激励的主要方式,它们对公司价值影响不同,产生的结果也迥然不同。研究结论发现,对于货币性薪酬激励,国企样本并不显著,其激励效果对于公司价值的提升并不明显,而非国企管理层货币性薪酬更能反映公司价值创造；管理层在职消费都与公司价值正相关,说明随着公司价值逐步提升,管理层的在职消费能力都有提高,且国有企业在职消费水平与公司价值相关性更强,说明国有企业管理层通过在职消费更好的获得了激励效果,能够为企业创造价值。 (3)研究数据界定为2007-2010年。2007年后新会计准则在上市公司强制推行,新准则对于公司信息披露更为严格,弱化了管理层公司内部操控的空间,因此数据的更新提高研究结论的可靠性。 本文的不足之处： (1)本文选择回归方式是面板数据的GLS回归,一般来说,面板数据年度跨期越长,回归结果越有说服力。本文选择中小板连续四年上市公司为研究样本,研究样本年度相对较短,这可能会对于回归结果有一定影响。 (2)研究数据时间段受宏观经济影响较大。样本期间选择为2007-2010年度,这期间的国际金融危机和国家经济救助计划对于公司价值和管理层薪酬披露都有一定的影响,本文未予考虑。 (3)在职消费数据值得进一步改进。文章对于在职消费的数据获取采取绝对值法,而目前在职消费界定的标准并不统一,因此其数据标准也不同,这可能会对实证结果有一定影响。
[Abstract]:The separation of ownership and management is one of the main features of the corporate governance structure of a modern enterprise. The separation of ownership and management rights leads to the game of interests between the owners and the management of the company, and this interest game becomes more and more intense with the complexity of the company's management. Most modern companies are basically the middle and high level management. The leadership team of the staff is controlled by the team. They are mainly based on the established objectives of the company and ensure that they can be implemented. For the external owners of the company, they only need to provide an investor satisfaction rate of return. However, the manager and the owner have information, asymmetry, corporate control separation, utility function. The problem of inconsistency causes the managers to think more of their own interests. The owner of the company designs a more reasonable salary system to motivate the management, and the management will use the salary system to maximize the self benefit. The middle salary mechanism is one of the focal points of the game.
In the study of modern corporate governance, a large number of academic discussions and theoretical analyses are carried out on executive compensation. Most of the foreign companies involved in the study of management salary incentives are mainly based on companies with decentralized ownership structure, which are different from the current state of our country's more centralized ownership structure. In domestic academic research, most of them are publicly listed public. The company is the research object, which embodies the background of the reform of China's system. The state-owned enterprises are the main body of our economy, the background is more special, the time of the reform of state-owned enterprises is earlier, the data is easy to obtain, and the problems in the process of transformation are more prominent. The role and status of the national economy has rapidly improved. Compared to the state-owned enterprises, the development of non-state-owned enterprises started relatively late, and most of the enterprises are smaller, the management is unscientific, the operation of enterprises is not standardized and the information quality is not high. Therefore, the academic research on private enterprises is late.
From the research content, the domestic research literature has introduced the concept of on-the-job consumption late, and the empirical study of monetary compensation and on-the-job consumption in management is shorter, and the results are not the same. From the background of development, China's small and medium-sized enterprises are rising in the primary stage of industrialization and economic transition in China. There are a large number of small and medium-sized enterprises, which account for more than 99% of the total number of enterprises in our country, and absorb more than 70% of the labor force. Small and medium-sized enterprises have not only formed competition situation for large enterprises in most fields, promoted economic marketization, but also solved the problem of employment of residents to a considerable extent. Small and medium enterprises have played an important role in the economic development of our country. Effect.
In May 2004, with the approval of the State Council, the CSRC approved the establishment of small and medium enterprise plate in the main board market of the Shenzhen stock exchange. The proportion of non-state-owned enterprises in the medium and small board listed companies is larger, which is more consistent with the characteristics of the private enterprises in China's small and medium-sized enterprises. The main features of scientific and technological innovation companies and the high growth of the company, and in the corporate governance, the design and implementation of the internal control system have a certain gap with the main board listed companies.
So, to what extent does management salary affect the company value for small and medium board listed companies? What are the effects of monetary compensation and on-the-job consumption on corporate value? How are the difference and effect of the salary incentive between small and medium-sized state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises? This paper tries to answer by theoretical analysis and empirical test. The above question.
The article is divided into four parts, which are arranged as follows:
The first chapter is the introduction, which focuses on the research background and significance, and collates the research ideas and writing framework.
The second chapter is the literature review, mainly from the related content of management salary incentive, which is divided into foreign literature research and domestic literature part. Foreign literature begins from the study of monetary salary and company performance in management, and has been gradually rising in recent years to the relationship between on-the-job consumption and corporate performance. The representative literature of scholars, focusing on recent foreign literature. Domestic literature is classified as standard literature and empirical literature according to the characteristics of writing. The research background and achievements of relevant scholars are analyzed. The empirical literature is divided into three stages, and the reasons for the results are reviewed. The meaning of the study.
The third chapter is the definition of related concepts and the theoretical basis of this paper. The concept definition mainly analyzes the four core concepts of management salary, monetary remuneration, on-the-job consumption and company value. In the theoretical basis, it shows the four theories needed in this paper. The principal agent theory mainly explains the game relationship between the management layer and the owner of the company. This leads to the principle that the owner motivate the management by means of compensation contract; the contract theory mainly shows that the compensation contract is incomplete because of information asymmetry; the management level theory expounds that management may use the residual control rent-seeking, that is, excess monetary benefit and excessive on-the-job consumption; incentive compatibility. The theory explains how to set up salary effectively, make the benefit of management and company owner converge, weaken the erosion of management to company value.
The fourth chapter is an empirical part and also the core of the article. The article divides the salary incentive of management layer into two aspects: monetary salary incentive and on-the-job consumption, with 2007-2010 year small and medium board listed companies as samples, according to the company nature, divided into state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises. The descriptive statistics part uses EXCEL software, respectively from the total sample, respectively. The enterprise nature group analyses the monetary salary, the on-the-job consumption, the annual trend of the variable and the control variable, and compares and analyzes the annual difference of the sample data of the state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises. Then the correlation analysis of the related variables is carried out by the STATA software, and the Pearson correlation test method is adopted. The correlation analysis is mainly observed. Correlation coefficient and P value of related variables. Regression analysis is divided into multiple linear regression and robustness test. The empirical results show: (1) in the study of the relationship between monetary compensation and corporate value, the regression result of the total sample is that the monetary compensation is positively related to the value of the company, and the significant level is higher; therefore, in general, China's small and medium listed companies are listed. The management layer monetary compensation incentive plays a promoting role in the company's value promotion. The group test also shows that the monetary compensation of the small and medium-sized board companies is positively related to the value of the company, but the significant level of the state-owned enterprise samples is low, while the non state-owned enterprise management level of monetary compensation and the value of the company value is very significant, indicating the non state-owned enterprises. The salary design system is more effective, and the monetary compensation of non-state-owned enterprises has played a better incentive role. (2) in the study of the relationship between the on-the-job consumption and the company value, the results of the total sample return are the positive correlation between the on-the-job consumption and the company value, and the significant level is high, indicating that the on-the-job consumption of the small and medium enterprises in our country is one of the salary incentive. The group test shows that the level of on-the-job consumption and the value of corporate value is higher, and the value of the company can be promoted by the on-the-job consumption, while the on-the-job consumption of the non state-owned enterprise management is more transparent, and the level of the on-the-job cancellation fee and the value of the company value are low.
The fifth chapter is the conclusion, the policy suggestion and the analysis of the insufficiency of this article. After summarizing the relevant literature and empirical analysis of the previous article, it is found that although the market reform in China has been more thorough, the compensation control of the management layer of the medium and small state-owned enterprises still exists, so the value creation effect of the management layer of the monetary incentive is more effective. On the contrary, on-the-job consumption can promote the management level of state-owned enterprise management and enhance the value creation activity, while the in-service consumption level is mostly invisible control consumption, and its consumption standard is difficult to measure and supervise. The state-owned enterprise management can increase its utility by this way, and the monetary incentive of non state-owned enterprise management is more effective. To the above conclusions, the corresponding measures are put forward, including the design of more effective compensation contract, the rationality of performance compensation, the rational distribution of fixed income and changing income in salary, strengthening the corporate governance, strengthening the role of the compensation committee in the board of directors, paying attention to the internal control of the company and weakening the excessive in-service consumption of management. To strengthen the external supervision of the company and restrain the self-motivation of the management through the supervision of the manager market and the company's external public opinion.
The main contributions of this article are
(1) based on the listed companies of small and medium board, the research conclusions are more practical. As the representative of small and medium enterprises, the small and medium-sized listed companies are relatively small, there are a large number of small and medium sized enterprises in China, and the majority of the non-state-owned enterprises in China, and this paper is in accordance with the conditions. There are 51 state-owned enterprises and 122 non-state-owned enterprises in the sample. The proportion of non-state-owned enterprises is 70.52%, which is in line with the current situation that non-state-owned enterprises have a predominant number.
(2) the management layer compensation incentive is divided into two aspects of monetary salary and on-the-job consumption, and the influence of the two types of incentive methods on the company value respectively. Monetary compensation incentive and on-the-job consumption are the main ways of management salary incentive, they have different influence on the company value and the results are very different. As for monetary compensation incentive, the sample of state-owned enterprises is not significant, its incentive effect is not obvious to the promotion of company value, but the monetary compensation of non state-owned enterprise management can reflect the value creation of the company more. The management level of on-the-job consumption is positively related to the company value. In addition, the level of the incumbency consumption of the state-owned enterprises is more relevant to the value of the company, which indicates that the management of the state-owned enterprises can better get the incentive effect through the on-the-job consumption and can create value for the enterprises.
(3) the research data is defined as the compulsory implementation of the new accounting standards in the listed companies after 2007-2010 years of.2007. The new guidelines are more stringent for the company information disclosure, weakening the space manipulated by the management companies, so the updating of the data improves the reliability of the research conclusions.
The shortcomings of this article are as follows:
(1) the regression method is selected as the GLS regression of panel data. Generally speaking, the longer the annual panel data is, the more convincing the regression results are. This paper chooses the four year listed companies as the research sample, and the sample year is relatively short, which may have a certain impact on the return results.
(2) the time period of the study is greatly influenced by the macro economy. The selection of the sample period is 2007-2010. The international financial crisis and the national economic assistance plan during this period have a certain influence on the value of the company and the compensation disclosure of the management level. This article is not considered in this paper.
(3) the on-the-job consumption data should be further improved. The article adopts the absolute value method for the data acquisition of on-the-job consumption, while the current definition of on-the-job consumption is not uniform, so the data standards are different, which may have a certain impact on the empirical results.
【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F272.92;F832.51;F224
本文编号：2174909
[Abstract]:The separation of ownership and management is one of the main features of the corporate governance structure of a modern enterprise. The separation of ownership and management rights leads to the game of interests between the owners and the management of the company, and this interest game becomes more and more intense with the complexity of the company's management. Most modern companies are basically the middle and high level management. The leadership team of the staff is controlled by the team. They are mainly based on the established objectives of the company and ensure that they can be implemented. For the external owners of the company, they only need to provide an investor satisfaction rate of return. However, the manager and the owner have information, asymmetry, corporate control separation, utility function. The problem of inconsistency causes the managers to think more of their own interests. The owner of the company designs a more reasonable salary system to motivate the management, and the management will use the salary system to maximize the self benefit. The middle salary mechanism is one of the focal points of the game.
In the study of modern corporate governance, a large number of academic discussions and theoretical analyses are carried out on executive compensation. Most of the foreign companies involved in the study of management salary incentives are mainly based on companies with decentralized ownership structure, which are different from the current state of our country's more centralized ownership structure. In domestic academic research, most of them are publicly listed public. The company is the research object, which embodies the background of the reform of China's system. The state-owned enterprises are the main body of our economy, the background is more special, the time of the reform of state-owned enterprises is earlier, the data is easy to obtain, and the problems in the process of transformation are more prominent. The role and status of the national economy has rapidly improved. Compared to the state-owned enterprises, the development of non-state-owned enterprises started relatively late, and most of the enterprises are smaller, the management is unscientific, the operation of enterprises is not standardized and the information quality is not high. Therefore, the academic research on private enterprises is late.
From the research content, the domestic research literature has introduced the concept of on-the-job consumption late, and the empirical study of monetary compensation and on-the-job consumption in management is shorter, and the results are not the same. From the background of development, China's small and medium-sized enterprises are rising in the primary stage of industrialization and economic transition in China. There are a large number of small and medium-sized enterprises, which account for more than 99% of the total number of enterprises in our country, and absorb more than 70% of the labor force. Small and medium-sized enterprises have not only formed competition situation for large enterprises in most fields, promoted economic marketization, but also solved the problem of employment of residents to a considerable extent. Small and medium enterprises have played an important role in the economic development of our country. Effect.
In May 2004, with the approval of the State Council, the CSRC approved the establishment of small and medium enterprise plate in the main board market of the Shenzhen stock exchange. The proportion of non-state-owned enterprises in the medium and small board listed companies is larger, which is more consistent with the characteristics of the private enterprises in China's small and medium-sized enterprises. The main features of scientific and technological innovation companies and the high growth of the company, and in the corporate governance, the design and implementation of the internal control system have a certain gap with the main board listed companies.
So, to what extent does management salary affect the company value for small and medium board listed companies? What are the effects of monetary compensation and on-the-job consumption on corporate value? How are the difference and effect of the salary incentive between small and medium-sized state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises? This paper tries to answer by theoretical analysis and empirical test. The above question.
The article is divided into four parts, which are arranged as follows:
The first chapter is the introduction, which focuses on the research background and significance, and collates the research ideas and writing framework.
The second chapter is the literature review, mainly from the related content of management salary incentive, which is divided into foreign literature research and domestic literature part. Foreign literature begins from the study of monetary salary and company performance in management, and has been gradually rising in recent years to the relationship between on-the-job consumption and corporate performance. The representative literature of scholars, focusing on recent foreign literature. Domestic literature is classified as standard literature and empirical literature according to the characteristics of writing. The research background and achievements of relevant scholars are analyzed. The empirical literature is divided into three stages, and the reasons for the results are reviewed. The meaning of the study.
The third chapter is the definition of related concepts and the theoretical basis of this paper. The concept definition mainly analyzes the four core concepts of management salary, monetary remuneration, on-the-job consumption and company value. In the theoretical basis, it shows the four theories needed in this paper. The principal agent theory mainly explains the game relationship between the management layer and the owner of the company. This leads to the principle that the owner motivate the management by means of compensation contract; the contract theory mainly shows that the compensation contract is incomplete because of information asymmetry; the management level theory expounds that management may use the residual control rent-seeking, that is, excess monetary benefit and excessive on-the-job consumption; incentive compatibility. The theory explains how to set up salary effectively, make the benefit of management and company owner converge, weaken the erosion of management to company value.
The fourth chapter is an empirical part and also the core of the article. The article divides the salary incentive of management layer into two aspects: monetary salary incentive and on-the-job consumption, with 2007-2010 year small and medium board listed companies as samples, according to the company nature, divided into state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises. The descriptive statistics part uses EXCEL software, respectively from the total sample, respectively. The enterprise nature group analyses the monetary salary, the on-the-job consumption, the annual trend of the variable and the control variable, and compares and analyzes the annual difference of the sample data of the state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises. Then the correlation analysis of the related variables is carried out by the STATA software, and the Pearson correlation test method is adopted. The correlation analysis is mainly observed. Correlation coefficient and P value of related variables. Regression analysis is divided into multiple linear regression and robustness test. The empirical results show: (1) in the study of the relationship between monetary compensation and corporate value, the regression result of the total sample is that the monetary compensation is positively related to the value of the company, and the significant level is higher; therefore, in general, China's small and medium listed companies are listed. The management layer monetary compensation incentive plays a promoting role in the company's value promotion. The group test also shows that the monetary compensation of the small and medium-sized board companies is positively related to the value of the company, but the significant level of the state-owned enterprise samples is low, while the non state-owned enterprise management level of monetary compensation and the value of the company value is very significant, indicating the non state-owned enterprises. The salary design system is more effective, and the monetary compensation of non-state-owned enterprises has played a better incentive role. (2) in the study of the relationship between the on-the-job consumption and the company value, the results of the total sample return are the positive correlation between the on-the-job consumption and the company value, and the significant level is high, indicating that the on-the-job consumption of the small and medium enterprises in our country is one of the salary incentive. The group test shows that the level of on-the-job consumption and the value of corporate value is higher, and the value of the company can be promoted by the on-the-job consumption, while the on-the-job consumption of the non state-owned enterprise management is more transparent, and the level of the on-the-job cancellation fee and the value of the company value are low.
The fifth chapter is the conclusion, the policy suggestion and the analysis of the insufficiency of this article. After summarizing the relevant literature and empirical analysis of the previous article, it is found that although the market reform in China has been more thorough, the compensation control of the management layer of the medium and small state-owned enterprises still exists, so the value creation effect of the management layer of the monetary incentive is more effective. On the contrary, on-the-job consumption can promote the management level of state-owned enterprise management and enhance the value creation activity, while the in-service consumption level is mostly invisible control consumption, and its consumption standard is difficult to measure and supervise. The state-owned enterprise management can increase its utility by this way, and the monetary incentive of non state-owned enterprise management is more effective. To the above conclusions, the corresponding measures are put forward, including the design of more effective compensation contract, the rationality of performance compensation, the rational distribution of fixed income and changing income in salary, strengthening the corporate governance, strengthening the role of the compensation committee in the board of directors, paying attention to the internal control of the company and weakening the excessive in-service consumption of management. To strengthen the external supervision of the company and restrain the self-motivation of the management through the supervision of the manager market and the company's external public opinion.
The main contributions of this article are
(1) based on the listed companies of small and medium board, the research conclusions are more practical. As the representative of small and medium enterprises, the small and medium-sized listed companies are relatively small, there are a large number of small and medium sized enterprises in China, and the majority of the non-state-owned enterprises in China, and this paper is in accordance with the conditions. There are 51 state-owned enterprises and 122 non-state-owned enterprises in the sample. The proportion of non-state-owned enterprises is 70.52%, which is in line with the current situation that non-state-owned enterprises have a predominant number.
(2) the management layer compensation incentive is divided into two aspects of monetary salary and on-the-job consumption, and the influence of the two types of incentive methods on the company value respectively. Monetary compensation incentive and on-the-job consumption are the main ways of management salary incentive, they have different influence on the company value and the results are very different. As for monetary compensation incentive, the sample of state-owned enterprises is not significant, its incentive effect is not obvious to the promotion of company value, but the monetary compensation of non state-owned enterprise management can reflect the value creation of the company more. The management level of on-the-job consumption is positively related to the company value. In addition, the level of the incumbency consumption of the state-owned enterprises is more relevant to the value of the company, which indicates that the management of the state-owned enterprises can better get the incentive effect through the on-the-job consumption and can create value for the enterprises.
(3) the research data is defined as the compulsory implementation of the new accounting standards in the listed companies after 2007-2010 years of.2007. The new guidelines are more stringent for the company information disclosure, weakening the space manipulated by the management companies, so the updating of the data improves the reliability of the research conclusions.
The shortcomings of this article are as follows:
(1) the regression method is selected as the GLS regression of panel data. Generally speaking, the longer the annual panel data is, the more convincing the regression results are. This paper chooses the four year listed companies as the research sample, and the sample year is relatively short, which may have a certain impact on the return results.
(2) the time period of the study is greatly influenced by the macro economy. The selection of the sample period is 2007-2010. The international financial crisis and the national economic assistance plan during this period have a certain influence on the value of the company and the compensation disclosure of the management level. This article is not considered in this paper.
(3) the on-the-job consumption data should be further improved. The article adopts the absolute value method for the data acquisition of on-the-job consumption, while the current definition of on-the-job consumption is not uniform, so the data standards are different, which may have a certain impact on the empirical results.
【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F272.92;F832.51;F224
【参考文献】
相关期刊论文 前10条
1 张宗益,宋增基;上市公司经理持股与公司绩效实证研究[J];重庆大学学报(社会科学版);2002年06期
2 连建辉;“管理者控制权”重探——管理者与企业剩余控制权的配置[J];财经科学;2004年04期
3 陈志广;高级管理人员报酬的实证研究[J];当代经济科学;2002年05期
4 周业安;经理报酬与企业绩效关系的经济学分析[J];中国工业经济;2000年05期
5 罗宏;黄文华;;国企分红、在职消费与公司业绩[J];管理世界;2008年09期
6 陈信元;陈冬华;万华林;梁上坤;;地区差异、薪酬管制与高管腐败[J];管理世界;2009年11期
7 李善民;毛雅娟;赵晶晶;;高管持股、高管的私有收益与公司的并购行为[J];管理科学;2009年06期
8 吴育辉;吴世农;;股权集中、大股东掏空与管理层自利行为[J];管理科学学报;2011年08期
9 赵文红,李垣;中国国企经营者“在职消费”行为探讨[J];经济体制改革;1998年05期
10 魏刚;高级管理层激励与上市公司经营绩效[J];经济研究;2000年03期
，本文编号：2174909
本文链接：https://www.wllwen.com/guanlilunwen/huobilw/2174909.html
