农户农地抵押借款博弈行为研究

发布时间：2018-08-11 15:50

【摘要】：农地经营权抵押贷款等农地抵押融资方式的试点缓解了在土地规模经营中由抵押物缺乏造成的农户融资难问题。但是，在某些约束条件下农户农地抵押借款行为在一定程度上并未得到优化，一些缺乏资金的农户对农地经营权抵押贷款缺乏有效需求或还款积极性不足。为此，，论文以山东省临沂市为例，研究在不同约束条件下农户与金融机构进行的借款博弈行为，从而为完善农地经营权抵押贷款制度设计提供参考依据。论文首先回顾总结了我国农地抵押发展历程和现状，并分析了山东临沂等试点地区农户农地抵押借款现状及存在的问题。在此基础上，从融资方式选择行为角度，对山东省临沂市农地经营权抵押贷款试点中样本农户农地抵押借款行为影响因素进行了实证分析。通过多分类logistic回归分析得出：土地流转和专业合作社的发展对农户选择农地经营权抵押贷款具有显著正向影响，而流转服务体系不健全、农村社会保障滞后和现行禁止性法律具有制约作用。其次，运用完全信息和不完全信息动态博弈模型对不同约束条件下农户农地抵押借款博弈行为进行分析，进一步归纳出农户农地抵押借款博弈行为在由制约因素造成的约束条件下的恶化状况，及其对农地金融创新的影响。在当地缺乏流转服务机构、流转合同不规范和现行禁止性法律的约束下，农户农地抵押借款的还款积极性不足，融资方式仍然受限；在农地评估费用过高的约束下，农户对农地经营权抵押贷款的选择受限；在农地评估价值虚高和农地价值波动预测失误的约束下，农地经营权抵押物不能完全补偿金融机构的不良贷款损失，农户的融资方式选择行为受到制约。再次，运用完全信息和不完全信息动态博弈模型，分析了无约束条件下农户农地抵押借款博弈行为。在不存在约束条件的最优状态下，农户农地抵押借款博弈过程中的融资方式选择行为和还款行为均得到显著优化，农户融资难问题得以解决。最后，进行全文总结，并根据博弈分析的结果，从优化农户农地抵押借款博弈行为、完善农地抵押相关制度和提高金融机构服务水平方面提出了政策建议。
[Abstract]:The agricultural land mortgage financing methods such as farmland management right mortgage loan have alleviated the farmers' financing difficulties caused by the lack of collateral in the land scale management. However, the behavior of rural land mortgage loan has not been optimized to a certain extent under some constraints, and some farmers who lack funds lack effective demand for agricultural land management right mortgage loan or lack enthusiasm for repayment. Therefore, taking Linyi City of Shandong Province as an example, this paper studies the game behavior of borrowing between farmers and financial institutions under different constraints, thus providing a reference for improving the design of mortgage loan system of farmland management right. Firstly, the paper reviews the development and current situation of farmland mortgage in China, and analyzes the current situation and problems of rural land mortgage loan in Linyi, Shandong province. On this basis, from the angle of financing mode choice, this paper makes an empirical analysis on the influencing factors of sample farmers' agricultural land mortgage loan behavior in Linyi City, Shandong Province. Through multi-classification logistic regression analysis, it is concluded that the land circulation and the development of specialized cooperatives have a significant positive impact on the farmers' choice of farmland management right mortgage, while the circulation service system is not perfect. Rural social security lag and the current prohibition of the role of the law. Secondly, the dynamic game model of complete information and incomplete information is used to analyze the game behavior of agricultural land mortgage loan under different constraints. Furthermore, the paper summarizes the deterioration of the game behavior of rural land mortgage loan under the restrictive conditions caused by the constraints, and its influence on the agricultural land financial innovation. In the absence of local circulation service organizations, the non-standard transfer contract and the current prohibition law, the farmers have insufficient enthusiasm for repayment of agricultural land mortgage loans, and the financing methods are still limited; under the constraints of excessive agricultural land evaluation costs, The farmer's choice of the farmland management right mortgage loan is restricted, under the constraint of the false high value of the farmland evaluation and the wrong forecast of the farmland value fluctuation, the farmland management right mortgage can not completely compensate the non-performing loan loss of the financial institution. The farmer's financing way choice behavior is restricted. Thirdly, using the dynamic game model of complete information and incomplete information, this paper analyzes the game behavior of rural land mortgage loan under unconstrained conditions. In the optimal condition without constraint conditions, the choice of financing mode and repayment behavior in the process of farm land mortgage game have been significantly optimized, and the problem of farmers' financing difficulty can be solved. Finally, based on the result of game analysis, the paper puts forward some policy suggestions on optimizing the game behavior of farm land mortgage loan, perfecting the relevant system of farmland mortgage and improving the service level of financial institutions.
【学位授予单位】：西北农林科技大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F832.43;F224.32

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