创业投资中联合投资策略的演化博弈分析
发布时间：2018-12-17 15:39
【摘要】：十七大以后，我国加速产业结构升级，把自主创新放在了国家发展战略的核心位置，而创业投资作为提高创新能力的加速器，在产业升级过程中起到了至关重要的作用，近几年创业投资高速发展，但由于创业投资具有高风险与收益不确定的特点，为了尽量降低风险，增加投资收益，许多创业投资机构都采用联合投资模式。 由于我国的创业投资起步较晚，，资本市场不规范，市场机制不成熟，法制不完善，配套设施不健全，所以，创业投资公司在运用联合投资策略时存在许多问题亟待改善。鉴于此，本文主要研究了联合投资的三个问题：创业投资机构在进行创业投资时是否会选择联合投资模式进行投资；当创业投资机构形成联合投资后，内部会存在哪些管理问题，如何采取措施解决这些问题从而来提高联合投资效率；创业投资机构在退出联合投资时会考虑何种资本退出方式。 本文通过构造演化博弈模型，分析两类创业投资机构动态演化的过程，寻找出在不同条件下创业投资机构的演化稳定策略，结果表明：创业投资机构间是否能形成联合投资，很大程度上取决于寻求联合伙伴而可能产生的成本费用以及联合效应的大小，当成本越小，联合效应越大时，越易形成联合投资模式；创业投资机构的“搭便车”行为是由于即期博弈中收益与成本的对比关系引致的，管理成本以及在投资中所占的比例即股权份额直接影响了联合投资参与者是否会出现道德风险；无论是在IPO条件还是非IPO条件下，违约费用的大小都会直接影响创业投资机构选择资本退出的方式，如果违约费用过高，创业投资机构则会倾向于选择股份回购策略，但如果违约费用低或者根本不存在违约费用的话，创业投资机构会更愿意采取IPO上市策略和并购策略。 本文通过演化博弈分析联合投资中存在的问题，并通过控制参数和优化条件提出解决问题的一些建议，希望能为联合投资的良性发展提供参考依据。
[Abstract]:After the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, China accelerated the upgrading of industrial structure and put independent innovation at the core of the national development strategy. Venture capital, as an accelerator to improve the ability of innovation, played a vital role in the process of industrial upgrading. In recent years, venture capital has developed rapidly, but because venture capital has the characteristics of high risk and uncertain income, in order to minimize risk and increase investment income, many venture capital institutions adopt the mode of joint investment. Due to the late start of venture capital in our country, the capital market is not standardized, the market mechanism is not mature, the legal system is not perfect, and the supporting facilities are not perfect, there are many problems that need to be improved when the venture capital companies use the joint investment strategy. In view of this, this paper mainly studies the three problems of joint investment: whether the venture capital institutions will choose the joint investment mode to invest in the venture capital; When venture capital institutions form joint investment, what management problems will exist inside, and how to take measures to solve these problems in order to improve the efficiency of joint investment; By constructing evolutionary game model, this paper analyzes the process of dynamic evolution of two kinds of venture capital institutions, and finds out the evolutionary stability strategy of venture capital institutions under different conditions. The results show that: can venture capital institutions form joint investment? Much depends on the possible cost of seeking a joint partner and the magnitude of the joint effect. When the cost is smaller, the greater the joint effect, the easier it is to form a joint investment model; The "free-rider" behavior of venture capital institutions is caused by the comparative relationship between income and cost in spot game. The management cost and the proportion in the investment, that is, the share of equity, have a direct impact on the moral hazard of the joint investment participants. Whether under the IPO condition or the non-IPO condition, the default cost will directly affect the venture capital investment institutions to choose the way to withdraw capital. If the default cost is too high, the venture capital institutions will tend to choose the stock repurchase strategy. But if the default fee is low or there is no default fee, venture capitalists will be more willing to adopt the IPO listing strategy and mergers and acquisitions strategy. This paper analyzes the problems existing in the joint investment by evolutionary game theory, and puts forward some suggestions to solve the problem by controlling the parameters and optimizing the conditions, hoping to provide a reference for the benign development of the joint investment.
【学位授予单位】：重庆大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F832.48;F224.32
本文编号：2384400
[Abstract]:After the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, China accelerated the upgrading of industrial structure and put independent innovation at the core of the national development strategy. Venture capital, as an accelerator to improve the ability of innovation, played a vital role in the process of industrial upgrading. In recent years, venture capital has developed rapidly, but because venture capital has the characteristics of high risk and uncertain income, in order to minimize risk and increase investment income, many venture capital institutions adopt the mode of joint investment. Due to the late start of venture capital in our country, the capital market is not standardized, the market mechanism is not mature, the legal system is not perfect, and the supporting facilities are not perfect, there are many problems that need to be improved when the venture capital companies use the joint investment strategy. In view of this, this paper mainly studies the three problems of joint investment: whether the venture capital institutions will choose the joint investment mode to invest in the venture capital; When venture capital institutions form joint investment, what management problems will exist inside, and how to take measures to solve these problems in order to improve the efficiency of joint investment; By constructing evolutionary game model, this paper analyzes the process of dynamic evolution of two kinds of venture capital institutions, and finds out the evolutionary stability strategy of venture capital institutions under different conditions. The results show that: can venture capital institutions form joint investment? Much depends on the possible cost of seeking a joint partner and the magnitude of the joint effect. When the cost is smaller, the greater the joint effect, the easier it is to form a joint investment model; The "free-rider" behavior of venture capital institutions is caused by the comparative relationship between income and cost in spot game. The management cost and the proportion in the investment, that is, the share of equity, have a direct impact on the moral hazard of the joint investment participants. Whether under the IPO condition or the non-IPO condition, the default cost will directly affect the venture capital investment institutions to choose the way to withdraw capital. If the default cost is too high, the venture capital institutions will tend to choose the stock repurchase strategy. But if the default fee is low or there is no default fee, venture capitalists will be more willing to adopt the IPO listing strategy and mergers and acquisitions strategy. This paper analyzes the problems existing in the joint investment by evolutionary game theory, and puts forward some suggestions to solve the problem by controlling the parameters and optimizing the conditions, hoping to provide a reference for the benign development of the joint investment.
【学位授予单位】：重庆大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F832.48;F224.32
【引证文献】
相关硕士学位论文 前1条
1 徐钢;创投机构特征、IPO后减持套现行为与超额收益研究[D];重庆大学;2014年
本文编号：2384400
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