创业股东增减持股份与公司成长性实证研究
发布时间:2018-12-21 12:43
【摘要】:创业股东是公司在IPO之前的先期投入者,是公司重要的资本金资源和人力资源,他们掌握着公司长期健康成长的关键要素,而上市公司的健康发展是证券市场稳定的基石。尤其在公司成功上市以后,,创业股东除了能获取高额创业利润外,还可能利用信息优势及持股成本低的优势在市场上进行套利,适当的套利有利于市场回归价值区间,但利用信息不对称的过度套利无疑会对公司的成长和市场的稳定造成很大危害。所以,创业股东的市场行为及其对公司成长性的影响应受到广泛关注,规范创业股东的市场行为不仅有利于维护市场的稳定,还可以保持公司的长期成长。对股东市场行为的动因及市场影响研究较多,但针对创业股东的市场行为与公司成长性的关系研究较少,本文以2006年—2010年发生创业股东增减持股票的公司为样本,根据创业股东增减持股份后公司成长性的实际变化,进行了多方面的实证,其研究不仅具有现实意义,还具有一定的理论意义。 文章以委托代理理论为基础分析了两个层次“搭便车”问题,确立创业股东是公司成长的核心力量,从“利益协同效应”和“壕沟防御效应”视角探讨了创业股东对经营者的激励;实证论证了创业股东增持股票强化了“利益协同效应”,减持股票加重了“壕沟防御效应”;而第一大股东持股比例越大,“壕沟防御效应”越明显,前十大股东持股比例越大,“利益趋同效应”越显著,这体现出股权制衡与股权控制的平衡关系。在分析创业利润的基础上,剖析了创业股东IPO套利动机和套利模式,得出创业股东存在着长期IPO套利的机会主义这一结论。最后根据以上结论提出了对创业股东减持股票的限制措施,使创业股东利润最大化目标由市场套利转移到促进公司长期成长上来。
[Abstract]:Venture shareholders are the investors before IPO, the important capital resources and human resources of the company. They hold the key elements of the long-term healthy growth of the company, and the healthy development of the listed companies is the cornerstone of the stability of the securities market. Especially after the successful listing of the company, the venture shareholders can not only obtain high venture profits, but also may arbitrage in the market by using the advantages of information advantage and low cost of holding shares. Appropriate arbitrage is conducive to the return of the market to the value range. But the use of asymmetric information arbitrage will undoubtedly cause great harm to the growth of companies and the stability of the market. Therefore, the market behavior of the venture shareholders and its influence on the growth of the company should be paid more attention to. Standardizing the market behavior of the venture shareholders is not only conducive to maintaining the stability of the market, but also can maintain the long-term growth of the company. There are many researches on the motivation and market influence of shareholders' market behavior, but there are few researches on the relationship between the market behavior of venture shareholders and the growth of the company. According to the actual changes of the growth of the company after the increase or decrease of the shares of the venture shareholders, this paper has carried out a variety of empirical studies, the research of which is not only of practical significance, but also of certain theoretical significance. Based on the principal-agent theory, this paper analyzes the problem of "hitchhiking" at two levels, and establishes that the entrepreneurial shareholders are the core force of the growth of the company. From the perspective of "benefit synergy effect" and "trench defense effect", this paper discusses the incentive of venture shareholders to operators; It is demonstrated that the increase of stock holding by venture shareholders strengthens the "benefit synergy effect", and the "trench defense effect" is aggravated by the reduction of stock holdings. However, the larger the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder, the more obvious the "trench defense effect", and the greater the shareholding ratio of the top ten shareholders, the more significant the "interest convergence effect", which reflects the balance between equity balance and equity control. Based on the analysis of entrepreneurial profits, this paper analyzes the IPO arbitrage motivation and arbitrage model of venture shareholders, and draws the conclusion that there is a long-term opportunism of IPO arbitrage among venture shareholders. Finally, according to the above conclusions, the paper puts forward the restriction measures to reduce the stock holdings of the venture shareholders, so that the goal of maximizing the profits of the venture shareholders is transferred from market arbitrage to promoting the long-term growth of the company.
【学位授予单位】:合肥工业大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2012
【分类号】:F275;F832.51;F224
本文编号:2388926
[Abstract]:Venture shareholders are the investors before IPO, the important capital resources and human resources of the company. They hold the key elements of the long-term healthy growth of the company, and the healthy development of the listed companies is the cornerstone of the stability of the securities market. Especially after the successful listing of the company, the venture shareholders can not only obtain high venture profits, but also may arbitrage in the market by using the advantages of information advantage and low cost of holding shares. Appropriate arbitrage is conducive to the return of the market to the value range. But the use of asymmetric information arbitrage will undoubtedly cause great harm to the growth of companies and the stability of the market. Therefore, the market behavior of the venture shareholders and its influence on the growth of the company should be paid more attention to. Standardizing the market behavior of the venture shareholders is not only conducive to maintaining the stability of the market, but also can maintain the long-term growth of the company. There are many researches on the motivation and market influence of shareholders' market behavior, but there are few researches on the relationship between the market behavior of venture shareholders and the growth of the company. According to the actual changes of the growth of the company after the increase or decrease of the shares of the venture shareholders, this paper has carried out a variety of empirical studies, the research of which is not only of practical significance, but also of certain theoretical significance. Based on the principal-agent theory, this paper analyzes the problem of "hitchhiking" at two levels, and establishes that the entrepreneurial shareholders are the core force of the growth of the company. From the perspective of "benefit synergy effect" and "trench defense effect", this paper discusses the incentive of venture shareholders to operators; It is demonstrated that the increase of stock holding by venture shareholders strengthens the "benefit synergy effect", and the "trench defense effect" is aggravated by the reduction of stock holdings. However, the larger the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder, the more obvious the "trench defense effect", and the greater the shareholding ratio of the top ten shareholders, the more significant the "interest convergence effect", which reflects the balance between equity balance and equity control. Based on the analysis of entrepreneurial profits, this paper analyzes the IPO arbitrage motivation and arbitrage model of venture shareholders, and draws the conclusion that there is a long-term opportunism of IPO arbitrage among venture shareholders. Finally, according to the above conclusions, the paper puts forward the restriction measures to reduce the stock holdings of the venture shareholders, so that the goal of maximizing the profits of the venture shareholders is transferred from market arbitrage to promoting the long-term growth of the company.
【学位授予单位】:合肥工业大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2012
【分类号】:F275;F832.51;F224
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