内部控制、信息披露与投资者保护的实证研究

发布时间：2018-12-23 18:17

【摘要】：投资者保护中的两个重要问题是：(1)如何降低控股股东对中小股东的利益侵占；(2)如何抑制管理层机会主义行为的发生。因企业所有权和经营权的分离,产生了不同类型投资者之间、投资者与管理层之间的委托代理关系,而在内部管理人员掌握企业经营决策权的情况下,中小投资者处于代理关系中的信息劣势地位,进而引发了上市公司内部普遍存在不同程度的控股股东或管理层侵占中小投资者利益的现象(李增泉等,2004),且来自公司内部的侵占方式比较隐蔽,不易被察觉,因而不容易控制。因此,要切实保护投资者的利益,首先应当解决两个主要的问题：信息问题和代理问题(Healy和PalePu,2001)。继美国SOX法案之后,我国监管部门对上市公司内部控制建设也提出了相应的要求,作为企业内部人实现权力制衡、防范错误与风险的基本措施(杨雄胜,2005),有效的内部控制能够合理保证企业财务与管理信息的真实可靠性；而充分的信息披露能够确保管理层将有效内部控制制度生成的可靠信息及时准确的传递给投资者,从而缓解市场参与者之间的信息不对称程度和代理问题。但从现有的相关文献来看,以国外学者的研究居多,针对我国特殊的公司治理机制及资本市场制度背景,这些结论适用性还值得进一步的验证。基于以上分析,本文从委托代理关系及代理问题的角度出发,对上市公司信息披露质量、内部控制有效性与投资者保护之间关系的研究,应当具有一定的理论意义和应用价值。本文的研究内容主要包括以下六个部分：第一部分为绪论,主要介绍了本文的研究背景、研究意义、研究思路与方法等；第二部分为文献综述,从国内外学者对投资者利益侵占的方式、影响因素等的研究,以及信息披露质量、内部控制制度与投资者保护的关系三个方面进行梳理和总结,并做了简要评述；第三部分为基础理论分析与本文的研究假设,主要阐述了现代企业中双重委托代理关系及其代理问题的产生,并从缓解代理问题的视角出发,进一步分析了上市公司的信息披露质量、内部控制有效性对投资者保护的影响,继而提出本文的研究假设；第四部分为研究设计,主要介绍本文实证研究的数据来源、变量定义方法与模型的建立；第五部分为实证检验,在描述性统计、单变量相关性分析的基础上,对样本公司的信息披露质量、内部控制有效性与两类代理成本的关系进行了多元回归分析,并利用Heckman两阶段处理效应模型,计算逆米尔斯比率来校正变量间的自选择与内生性问题；第六部分为研究结论与政策建议,在理论分析与实证研究的基础上,总结本文的研究结论与研究不足,并据此提出相应的政策建议。其中,在变量选择方面,本文以深交所的信息披露考评结果作为上市公司信息披露质量的代理变量,对内部控制有效性从两个角度来描述,一是是否披露内部控制鉴证报告,二是内部控制经营效率和效果目标的完成程度,并以资金占用率来衡量大股东的利益侵占,以管理费用率来衡量管理层的代理成本。通过理论分析与实证检验,本文得出的主要研究结论有： (1)高质量的信息披露能够有效的抑制大股东的资金占用、降低经理人与股东之间的代理成本。 (2)从内部控制目标完成程度的角度来看,内部控制与两类代理成本均呈现出显著的负相关关系；而从是否聘请审计师对内部控制进行鉴证的角度来看,内部控制的有效运行能够抑制大股东的资金占用,但是否进行审计鉴证与公司管理费用率的负相关关系在统计上不显著。 (3)上市公司的信息披露质量、内部控制的有效性与两类委托代理成本之间,存在自选择或内生性的问题,在运用两阶段处理效应模型进行控制之后,研究结论更为稳健。
[Abstract]:Two important issues in investor protection are: (1) how to reduce the controlling shareholder's interest and occupation of small and medium-sized shareholders; and (2) how to restrain the occurrence of management opportunism. Due to the separation of the ownership of the enterprise and the management right, the principal-agent relationship between the investors and the management is generated, and the information and disadvantage position of the small and medium-sized investors in the agency relationship is in the case of the internal management personnel grasping the decision-making power of the enterprise. In addition, the phenomenon of controlling the interests of small and medium-sized investors (Li Zengquan et al., 2004), which is common to different degree of controlling shareholders or the management of the listed company, is also raised, and the occupation mode from the inside of the company is relatively hidden, and is not easy to be perceived, and therefore is not easy to control. Therefore, to effectively protect the interests of investors, two major issues should be addressed first: information and agency issues (Healiy and PalePu, 2001). Following the SOX Act of the United States, the regulatory authorities of our country have also put forward corresponding requirements for the internal control and construction of the listed companies, as the basic measures to balance the power and prevent the errors and risks of the internal people of the company (Yang Xiong-sheng, 2005) The effective internal control can reasonably ensure the real reliability of the enterprise's financial and management information; and the sufficient information disclosure can ensure the management to timely and accurately transfer the reliable information generated by the effective internal control system to the investment The information asymmetry between the market participants and the agent's question are mitigated by the person However, from the existing relevant literature, the research of foreign scholars is mostly based on the special corporate governance mechanism and the background of the capital market system, and the applicability of these conclusions is worth further examination. Based on the above analysis, in this paper, the relationship between the quality of the information disclosure, the effectiveness of the internal control and the protection of the investors should be studied from the perspective of the relationship between the agency and the agency. The research contents of this paper mainly include the following six parts: the first part is the introduction, the research background, the research significance, the research thought and the method of this paper are mainly introduced, and the second part is the literature review, from the domestic and foreign scholars to the investor's interest. The third part is the basic theory analysis and the research of this paper. In this paper, the relationship of the double-trust agent and its agent problem in the modern enterprise are mainly discussed, and the influence of the information disclosure quality and the internal control effectiveness of the listed company on the investor protection is further analyzed from the point of view of the agent problem, and then the research of this paper is put forward. The fourth part is divided into the research and design, mainly introduces the data source, the variable definition method and the establishment of the model in this paper. The fifth part is the empirical test, on the basis of descriptive statistics and single-variable correlation analysis, the information of the sample company is analyzed. The relationship between the quality of dew, the effectiveness of internal control and the cost of two types of agents is analyzed, and the self-selection and endogenous problem between variables are corrected by using the two-stage treatment effect model of Heckman. The sixth part is divided into the study conclusion and the government. Based on the theoretical analysis and the empirical study, the paper sums up the conclusions and shortcomings of this paper and puts forward the corresponding government accordingly. In the aspect of variable selection, the paper uses the information of SZSE as a proxy variable of the information disclosure quality of the listed company, describes the effectiveness of the internal control from two angles, and one is whether to disclose the internal control. System assurance report, two is the degree of completion of internal control and operation efficiency and effect target, and measure the interests of large shareholders with the capital occupation rate to measure the management cost rate to measure the management level Based on the theoretical analysis and the empirical test, the main results of this paper are as follows: The conclusions are as follows: (1) High-quality information disclosure can effectively restrain the capital occupation of large shareholders, and reduce the managers and shareholders (2) From the point of view of the degree of the internal control objective, the internal control and the two types of agency costs have a significant negative correlation; and from whether to engage the auditor to control the internal control From the point of view of authentication, the effective operation of internal control can restrain the capital occupation of large shareholders, but whether to carry out the negative correlation between the audit assurance and the company's rate of management The relationship is not statistically significant. (3) The quality of the information disclosure of the listed company, the effectiveness of the internal control and the cost of the two types of entrusted agents, the problem of self-selection or endogenous nature, and the control of the two-stage processing effect model
【学位授予单位】：东北财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F233;F832.51;F224

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