中国商业银行高管薪酬激励机制研究及设计
发布时间：2019-01-29 20:02
【摘要】：不论是与银行普通员工相比还是与其他行业同等级别的高级管理人员相比,银行业高级管理人员的薪酬水平都非常高。2008年国际金融危机之后,这一问题再次引起极大关注。国外许多金融机构出现赤字,但同时,这些企业依然为高级管理人员支付天价薪酬：国内情况相对较好,尽管金融机构高管薪酬过高也受到公众诟病(其中又以银行业为代表),但至少这些企业处于持续盈利状态,情况看起来不及国外严峻,但不能否认的是,金融机构高管薪酬的确过高。 在大量阅读国内外学者对商业银行高管薪酬激励机制的研究文献之后,本文将中国上市商业银行高管薪酬制度及其激励机制与汇丰控股、花旗集团两大全球金融机构进行对比：制度上看,汇丰控股和花旗集团对高管薪酬激励有一系列明确规定,并且在年报中除了会披露当年及前一年高管薪酬总额及其构成之外,还会详细解释每部分的变动原因；比较而言,中国上市商业银行仅披露当期高管薪酬,部分银行甚至出现数据缺失,会披露薪酬构成更是寥寥无几；结构上看,汇丰控股和花旗集团都采用长期激励为主、短期激励为辅的激励方式,而中国上市商业银行则呈现出短期激励为主、长期激励缺失的现状。 数据统计分析的结果显示,中国目前上市商业银行高管薪酬呈现以下三个特征：(1)不论是与其他行业高管相比,还是与银行普通员工相比,商业银行高管薪酬都过高；(2)与世界大型商业银行相比,中国商业银行高管薪酬似低实高；(3)股份制商业银行的高管薪酬问题比五大国有商业银行以及城市商业银行的高管薪酬问题更加突出和严峻。 此后我们利用实证分析研究了上市商业银行高管薪酬的影响因素,研究发现我国上市银行高管薪酬与银行总资产、不良贷款率、资本充足率、每股收益、高管激励力度、股东权益增长率正相关,与净资产收益率负相关,其中与总资产和每股收益的相关性较大。 由此可知,我国目前银行高管薪酬结构不合理,可以利用E值(E=N1/COM3×N1/TA)对高管薪酬进行合理性分析,作为来年制定高管薪酬的标准之一,同时根据资本充足率和不良贷款率两大银行特征指标对高管薪酬进行调整,使高管薪酬回归到正常合理的水平。同时在薪酬体系中逐步建立长期激励机制,遵循先引入再调整最后扩大这三个步骤,实现长期激励机制从无到有、从少到多的改变,形成短期激励为辅、长期激励为主的薪酬制度和激励格局。
[Abstract]:The pay levels of senior executives in the banking sector are very high, compared with the average bank staff and senior managers at the same level in other industries. This issue has once again attracted great attention in the wake of the international financial crisis in 2008. Many foreign financial institutions are running deficits, but at the same time, these companies are still paying sky-high salaries to senior executives: the domestic situation is relatively good. Although financial institutions have also been criticized for their high executive pay (represented by the banking sector), at least these companies are in a state of sustained profitability, and the situation seems too late to be grim abroad, but it cannot be denied that, Financial institutions are overpaid for executives. After reading a large number of domestic and foreign scholars' research literature on executive compensation incentive mechanism of commercial banks, this paper combines the executive compensation system of listed commercial banks in China and its incentive mechanism with HSBC Holdings. Citigroup contrasts with two major global financial institutions: HSBC Holdings and Citigroup have a series of clear rules on executive compensation incentives, and in their annual reports, in addition to disclosing the total and composition of executive compensation for the current year and the previous year, The reasons for each change will also be explained in detail; In comparison, Chinese listed commercial banks only disclose the current executive compensation, some banks even have missing data, will disclose the composition of compensation is very few; Structurally, HSBC Holdings and Citigroup use long-term incentives, short-term incentives are supplemented by incentives, while China's listed commercial banks are showing short-term incentives, long-term incentive is missing. The results of statistical analysis show that the executive compensation of listed commercial banks in China is characterized by the following three characteristics: (1) whether compared with other industry executives or ordinary bank employees, the executive compensation of commercial banks is too high; (2) compared with the large commercial banks in the world, the executive compensation of Chinese commercial banks seems to be lower and higher; (3) the problem of executive compensation of joint-stock commercial banks is more serious than that of five state-owned commercial banks and city commercial banks. Then we use empirical analysis to study the influencing factors of executive compensation in listed commercial banks, and find out that the executive compensation of listed banks in China is related to total assets, non-performing loan ratio, capital adequacy ratio, earnings per share, executive incentive. The growth rate of shareholders' equity is positively correlated with the return on net assets, especially with the total assets and earnings per share. It can be seen that the structure of executive compensation is unreasonable in our country, so we can use E value (E=N1/COM3 脳 N1/TA) to analyze the rationality of executive compensation, as one of the standards for formulating executive compensation in the coming year. At the same time, according to the capital adequacy ratio and non-performing loan ratio of the two major bank characteristics of the adjustment of executive compensation, so that executive compensation to return to a normal and reasonable level. At the same time, the long-term incentive mechanism is gradually established in the compensation system, following the three steps of first introducing and then adjusting and finally expanding, so that the long-term incentive mechanism can be changed from nothing to much, and the formation of short-term incentive will be supplemented by the formation of short-term incentive. Long-term incentive-based compensation system and incentive pattern.
【学位授予单位】：复旦大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F832.33;F272.92
本文编号：2417815
[Abstract]:The pay levels of senior executives in the banking sector are very high, compared with the average bank staff and senior managers at the same level in other industries. This issue has once again attracted great attention in the wake of the international financial crisis in 2008. Many foreign financial institutions are running deficits, but at the same time, these companies are still paying sky-high salaries to senior executives: the domestic situation is relatively good. Although financial institutions have also been criticized for their high executive pay (represented by the banking sector), at least these companies are in a state of sustained profitability, and the situation seems too late to be grim abroad, but it cannot be denied that, Financial institutions are overpaid for executives. After reading a large number of domestic and foreign scholars' research literature on executive compensation incentive mechanism of commercial banks, this paper combines the executive compensation system of listed commercial banks in China and its incentive mechanism with HSBC Holdings. Citigroup contrasts with two major global financial institutions: HSBC Holdings and Citigroup have a series of clear rules on executive compensation incentives, and in their annual reports, in addition to disclosing the total and composition of executive compensation for the current year and the previous year, The reasons for each change will also be explained in detail; In comparison, Chinese listed commercial banks only disclose the current executive compensation, some banks even have missing data, will disclose the composition of compensation is very few; Structurally, HSBC Holdings and Citigroup use long-term incentives, short-term incentives are supplemented by incentives, while China's listed commercial banks are showing short-term incentives, long-term incentive is missing. The results of statistical analysis show that the executive compensation of listed commercial banks in China is characterized by the following three characteristics: (1) whether compared with other industry executives or ordinary bank employees, the executive compensation of commercial banks is too high; (2) compared with the large commercial banks in the world, the executive compensation of Chinese commercial banks seems to be lower and higher; (3) the problem of executive compensation of joint-stock commercial banks is more serious than that of five state-owned commercial banks and city commercial banks. Then we use empirical analysis to study the influencing factors of executive compensation in listed commercial banks, and find out that the executive compensation of listed banks in China is related to total assets, non-performing loan ratio, capital adequacy ratio, earnings per share, executive incentive. The growth rate of shareholders' equity is positively correlated with the return on net assets, especially with the total assets and earnings per share. It can be seen that the structure of executive compensation is unreasonable in our country, so we can use E value (E=N1/COM3 脳 N1/TA) to analyze the rationality of executive compensation, as one of the standards for formulating executive compensation in the coming year. At the same time, according to the capital adequacy ratio and non-performing loan ratio of the two major bank characteristics of the adjustment of executive compensation, so that executive compensation to return to a normal and reasonable level. At the same time, the long-term incentive mechanism is gradually established in the compensation system, following the three steps of first introducing and then adjusting and finally expanding, so that the long-term incentive mechanism can be changed from nothing to much, and the formation of short-term incentive will be supplemented by the formation of short-term incentive. Long-term incentive-based compensation system and incentive pattern.
【学位授予单位】：复旦大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F832.33;F272.92
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